Union-Management Cooperation: Structure, Process, Impact by Schuster, Michael H.
Upjohn Press Upjohn Press Collection 
1-1-1984 
Union-Management Cooperation: Structure, Process, Impact 
Michael H. Schuster 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the Unions 
Commons 
Citation 
Schuster, Michael. 1984. Union-Management Cooperation: Structure, Process, Impact. Kalamazoo, MI: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
UNION-MANAGEMENT 
COOPERATION





Structure • Process •Impact
Michael H. Schuster 
Syracuse University
1984
The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Schuster, Michael H. 
Union-management cooperation.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Labor-management committees United States. 
2. Industrial relations United States. I.Title. 
HD6490.L33S38 1984 331'.01'12 84-17373 
ISBN 0-88099-023-6 
ISBN 0-88099-024-4 (pbk.)
Copyright   1984
by the
W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE 
FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH
300 South Westnedge Ave. 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
THE INSTITUTE, a nonprofit research organization, was established 
on July 1, 1945. It is an activity of the W. E. Upjohn Unemployment 
Trustee Corporation, which was formed in 1932 to administer a fund set 
aside by the late Dr. W. E. Upjohn for the purpose of carrying on 
"research into the causes and effects of unemployment and measures for 
the alleviation of unemployment."
The Board of Trustees
of the
W. E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trustee Corporation
Preston S. Parish, Chairman
Martha G. Parfet, Vice Chairman
Charles C. Gibbons, Vice Chairman
James H. Duncan, Secretary-Treasurer
E. Gifford Upjohn, M.D.
Mrs. Genevieve U. Gilmore
John T. Bernhard
Paul H. Todd 
David W. Breneman
The Staff of the Institute












Michael Schuster is associate professor of Personnel and Industrial Rela 
tions and director of the Employment Studies Institute at Syracuse 
University. He has served as a consultant on human resource planning, 
union-management cooperation, and productivity-gainsharing to 
various business, labor and government agencies.
Dr. Schuster has published widely in the areas of cooperation and change 
in union and nonunion environments, quality of worklife, productivity, 
and employment discrimination. He is co-author of The Aging Worker: 
Research and Recommendations (1983). His published articles have ap 
peared in journals such as Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Jour 
nal of Applied Behavior Science, Human Resource Management, and 
Aging and Work.
Dr. Schuster holds a B.A. in political science from the University of 
Rhode Island and an M.S. from the University of Massachusetts Labor 
Relations and Research Center. He received his J.D. and Ph.D. from 
Syracuse University.
IV
This book is dedicated to my grandparents 
Michael and Annie Harrison
and 
Isadore and Clara Schuster
FOREWORD
Although cooperative union-management programs are not new to the 
American scene, their increasingly widespread use during the past decade 
suggests a need for systematic study and evaluation of these efforts and 
their outcomes. This study by Schuster demonstrates the application of a 
theory-based approach to the examination of such programs.
Using a combination of empirical and case study procedures, the author 
examines the structure of six different forms of cooperative experiments, 
analyzes their implementation process, and assesses their impact. His fin 
dings identify a number of factors and conditions associated with suc 
cessful cooperation and document a significant potential for improve 
ment in company performance and overall labor-management relations. 
The study is unique because of (1) its large sample size; (2) its use of ac 
tual performance measures to assess program outcomes; and (3) its 
longitudinal design to measure impacts over time.
Facts and observations expressed in this study are the sole responsibility 
of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.





I first became interested in studying union-management cooperation 
after reading James Healy's book, Creative Collective Bargaining. A 
model of organizational change in the context of union-management 
relations developed by Thomas Kochan and Lee Dyer (1976) fortified my 
interest in the subject matter and stimulated me to further pursue this 
area of inquiry. The project began in November 1977 as my doctoral 
dissertation. I am very grateful to Professors Donald DeSalvia, R.J. 
Chesser, and Susan Rhodes for their support, encouragement, and ideas 
in the initial phases of this project.
In addition to the sponsorship provided by the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research, earlier portions of the research were sup 
ported by grants from the United States Department of Labor (Grant 
No. 91-36-79-10) and the National Science Foundation (DAR 80-11866). 
I am very grateful to the funding organizations for their support. As 
always, the views expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the 
official opinion or policy of these agencies. I am solely responsible for 
the content of this book.
The book attempts to meet the needs of a diverse audience. I hope that 
students, practitioners, policymakers, and academicians in personnel 
and industrial relations will find this book beneficial. In many respects, 
the book may also be appealing to individuals interested in organiza 
tional change, since very few studies in this area have examined change 
and cooperation in unionized plants. Although cooperative union- 
management programs are not new to the American scene, their increas 
ingly widespread use requires that they be more systematically studied. 
Hopefully, the findings of this research will influence the practice of in 
dustrial relations and future studies of cooperative strategies.
In a large scale research project, the dedicated contributions of a host of 
individuals are required. Christopher Miller conducted many of the site 
visits, assisted in the data analysis, drafted portions of chapters, and
vn
competently handled numerous tasks related to the management of the 
project. I am indebted to him for his loyalty to this effort. Robert Ahern, 
executive director of the Buffalo-Erie County Labor-Management Coun 
cil, provided the wise guidance of an experienced practitioner of 
cooperative strategies, as well as assisting in the acquisition of three 
research sites and commenting on two chapters of the book. I am 
grateful to Professor Richard McCleary for his willingness to answer my 
questions on time-series analysis and to Heather Tully for her efforts in 
keeping the many data sets in good and logical order.
Mary Jo Chase typed endless letters to the research sites requesting an 
additional data set or data in a different form. Her interest and dedica 
tion in her work are most noteworthy. Cindy Clark typed the manuscript 
and its many revisions.
Most important, this project would not have been possible without the 
cooperation and patience of union and company personnel at the 38 
research sites studied. Their candor in responding to our numerous ques 
tions and their willingness to provide as much information as possible 
has been the key element in the success of this project. Because each 
research site was guaranteed complete confidentiality, I can only extend 
an anonymous "thank you" to each person who took time from his/her 
busy schedule to assist us. Finally, no project of this size could be under 
taken without the support and encouragement of one's family. Their 
understanding on the many occasions when travel took me away from 
home made the conduct of this project much easier.
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There is a long history of union-management cooperation 
in the United States. Although the resolution of important 
workplace issues continues to be most commonly addressed 
within the traditional system of collective bargaining, there is 
increasing evidence of a wide array of cooperative efforts 
taking place. These efforts are occurring within the im 
mediate workplace as well as at company, industry, and na 
tional levels. 1
Union-management cooperation can be classified into 
eight categories. At the macro level these have been: 
(1) presidential labor-management committees which were 
assembled during the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter presidencies. These committees differed in the scope 
of the agendas and in their prestige, but generally made 
recommendations on economic, industrial relations, and 
manpower issues (Maye 1980); (2) industry level labor- 
management policy committees (Driscoll 1980), for example 
the steel industry's human relations committee (Healy 1965) 
and those in retail food (Ray 1982) and health care (Corbett 
1982); and (3) joint industry or company-wide committees to 
develop responses to technological change (Brooks 1968; 
Healy 1965; Horvitz 1968; Shiron 1968).
At an intermediate level, (4) areawide labor-management 
committees developed during the 1970s (Ahern 1979; Leone, 
Eleey, Watkins, & Gershenfeld 1982; Popular 1980). Area
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labor-management committees are composed of the com 
munity's key union leaders and chief operating managers. 
Most area committees employ a professional staff to direct 
their activities. Area committees sponsor social and educa 
tional events to increase communication and understanding 
between labor and management and to demonstrate the 
mutual benefits of cooperation, act as informal neutrals in 
difficult collective bargaining negotiations, and serve as an 
integral part of the area's economic development activities. 
The most important work of the area committees is in 
stimulating and facilitating the creation of in-plant labor- 
management committees to improve labor relations within 
establishments and, collectively, for the entire community.
At the plant level, four distinct efforts have appeared. 
Although several have overlapping goals, their structure and 
process are sufficiently distinct to require differential con 
sideration. The four are: (5) safety committees (Beaumont & 
Deaton 1981; Kochan, Dyer & Lipsky 1977); (6) in-plant 
labor-management committees and programs to improve 
union-management relations, which have applied a variety 
of organizational development and other process change ac 
tivities to reduce animosity and improve attitudes between 
unions and companies and to address problems normally 
outside the scope of traditional collective bargaining (Ahern 
1978; Healy 1965; Mayer 1980). One such program was the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service's Relationships- 
by-objectives program (Gray, Sinicropi, & Hughes 1982); 
(7) productivity committees, gainsharing or productivity 
plans, and quality circles (Dale 1949; Dewar 1980; Dubin 
1949; Fein 1981; Frost, Wakeley, & Ruh 1974; Lesieur 1958; 
Mohrman 1982; Moore & Goodman 1973; Moore & Ross 
1978; Schuster 1983 a&b & 1984); and (8) efforts to improve 
the quality of worklife (Drexler & Lawler 1977; Goodman 
1979; Macy 1979).
This book presents the findings of a five-year study of the 
structure, process, and impact of joint union-management
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programs to improve productivity. The focus of this research 
is on productivity-sharing plans2 (PSPs) such as Scanlon, 
Rucker, and Improshare Plans, in-plant Labor-Management 
Committees (L-MCs), Quality Circles (QCs), and Quality of 
Worklife (QWL) projects. 3 All of the programs have a com 
mon basis, that is, they are structural interventions which at 
tempt to generate greater worker interest, involvement and 
effort toward achieving important organization goals.
In spite of the long history of union-management coopera 
tion, there has been very little scientific analysis of the struc 
ture, process, and impact of cooperative programs. The 
dominant form of research in the field has been case 
analysis. Empirical studies have tended to be mostly at- 
titudinal. This research breaks new ground in three areas. 
First, it is a large sample (38 sites) of firms with cooperative 
union-management programs. Second, the research utilized 
actual performance measures, for example, of productivity. 
And finally, the research employed a longitudinal research 
design along with sophisticated analytical methods. Thus 
this research offers both substantive findings on the struc 
ture, process, and impact of union-management cooperation 
(chapters 4, 5, 6) as well as addressing and developing 
methodological techniques for evaluating cooperative pro 
grams (chapter 3).
This introductory chapter is divided into three sections. At 
the outset a section underscoring the growth and importance 
of union-management cooperation is presented. This is 
followed by a discussion of union and management attitudes 
toward cooperation. The third section is a brief description 
of the structure of the book.
Importance of Union-Management Cooperation
It is unlikely that change in the American industrial rela 
tions system would have occurred in the absence of sweeping 
environmental influences. Since the early 1970s, foreign
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competition, the increased cost advantages and more 
modern equipment of the nonunion sector of the economy, 
and a change in the values, attitudes, and work behaviors of 
much of the labor force have increasingly shaken the fouri- 
dations of the traditional system of collective bargaining. In 
more recent years, harsh economic difficulties have ac 
celerated the process of change and accommodation. 
Whether, and to what degree, the increased levels of 
cooperation will continue once economic conditions stabilize 
is very much an open question. At the present time, however, 
companies have had to increase their efficiency in order to 
remain viable, and one strategy for doing so has been to ex 
pand the level of employee and union involvement in deci- 
sionmaking affecting the workplace. Many of these efforts 
were stimulated and publicized by the now defunct National 
Center for Productivity and the Quality of Working Life 
(NCPQWL).
Although there is no way of knowing precisely how much 
cooperation is occurring in the United States, there is 
evidence which suggests that there has been a marked in 
crease in cooperative activities. This evidence comes from a 
variety of governmental, academic, and journalistic sources. 
In 1977 and 1978, the NCPQWL published directories listing 
companies and unions with ongoing cooperative activities. 
In each case, approximately 100 experiments were listed. The 
publication of the directory was suspended until the 1982 
edition, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, which 
contains a listing of 700 experiments.
Additional evidence of the upswing in cooperative labor- 
management activity may be found in the increase in safety 
committees. The Bureau of National Affairs has reported 
that in its 1979 survey of collective bargaining agreements, 
43 percent contained provisions calling for safety commit 
tees. This was an increase in the number of contracts with 
such provisions over the 1970 and 1975 surveys which 
reported 31 percent and 39 percent, respectively.
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In a recent study of 26 sites with labor-management com 
mittees in Illinois, Derber and Flanigan (1980) found that the 
majority had been established in the 1970s. Moreover, five 
were found to be revitalized efforts of earlier years.
During the 1970s, the number of area labor-management 
committees increased to just over 20. Although several com 
munities Toledo, Ohio (1945) and Louisville, Ken 
tucky already had such committees, it was the success of 
the Jamestown, New York committee (1972) which drew 
significant attention. The increasing use of areawide labor- 
management committees represents the development of an 
important new institutional arrangement in industrial rela 
tions.
There is no precise way of knowing how many Scanlon, 
Rucker, and Improshare Plans, profit-sharing plans, quality 
circles, or quality of worklife programs have been instituted. 
However, a 1982 survey by the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) highlights the growth of workplace changes. The 
NYSE (1982) study was based on a sample of 49,000 cor 
porations with one hundred or more employees. The study 
reported the "most rapidly growing human resource ac 
tivities over the past two years" (p. 26). Over the two-year 
reporting period, the following efforts were initiated: 74 per 
cent added quality circles, 36 percent job design/redesign, 30 
percent group incentive plans, and 29 percent production 
teams. There is other qualitative evidence which strongly 
suggests increasingly widespread use of these cooperative 
strategies. First, there has been overwhelming attention in 
the popular press to companies with quality circles, gainshar- 
ing programs and quality of worklife efforts. Business Week 
titled its special report on these efforts "The New Industrial 
Relations." Second, there is evidence that the use of these 
strategies has spread from the traditional manufacturing sec 
tor into the service and public sectors. Finally, there have 
been several important national bargaining agreements (for
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example in auto, steel, and communications) which encom 
pass one or more cooperative strategies.
These efforts have taken on a new sense of urgency and 
importance as demonstrated by the recently enacted Labor- 
Management Cooperation Act (LMCA) of 1978 [29 U.S.C. 
1975(a)]. The LMCA is designed to encourage plant, area, 
and industrywide cooperative union-management efforts to:
(1) improve communication between represen 
tatives of labor and management;
(2) provide workers and employers with oppor 
tunities to study and explore new and in 
novative joint approaches to achieving 
organizational effectiveness;
(3) assist workers and employers in solving prob 
lems of mutual concern not susceptible to 
resolution within the collective bargaining pro 
cess;
(4) study and explore ways of eliminating poten 
tial problems which reduce the competitiveness 
and inhibit the economic development of the 
plant, area, or industry;
(5) enhance the involvement of workers in making 
decisions that affect their working lives;
(6) expand and improve working relationships 
between workers and managers; and
(7) encourage free collective bargaining by 
establishing continuing mechanisms for com 
munication between employers and their 
employees through Federal assistance to the 
formation and operation of labor- 
management committees.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) 
has been empowered to provide financial and technical 
assistance to aid companies and unions in this process. 
Limited amounts of funds have been allocated by the FMCS,
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most of it going to support area labor-management commit 
tees.
Three studies by the United States General Accounting Of 
fice (GAO) also underscore the potential importance of this 
subject. The first GAO (1980a) study criticized the now 
defunct Council on Wage and Price Stability for its failure to 
promulgate an exemption to its compensation standards for 
pay increases associated with productivity-sharing plans such 
as Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare.
The second study (GAO 1980b) criticized the United States 
Department of Labor for not having expended resources or 
provided sufficient leadership to encourage improvements in 
workers' productivity in the private sector. The GAO recom 
mended that the Department of Labor develop programs 
and encourage human resource efforts to improve produc 
tivity. Finally, the third study (GAO 1981) of productivity- 
sharing plans found that they had had a positive impact on 
organizational productivity as well as improving labor- 
management relations, reducing absenteeism, turnover, and 
grievances.
In September 1982, the U.S. Department of Labor, in a 
departure from past policy, announced the formation of a 
new division, the Cooperative Labor-Management Programs 
Division, to encourage shop floor cooperation. The initial 
mission of the Division will be limited to the gathering and 
dissemination of information. Yet, this represents a first step 
in federal recognition and support for change at the 
workplace.
It is somewhat paradoxical that the increase in cooperative 
activity in the United States comes at a time when relations 
between the labor movement and employers at the national 
level have been strained. Increased employer aggressiveness 
in political activity and at the workplace, as well as an anti- 
union administration in Washington, have caused this rift.
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In the political arena, employer lobbying resulted in the 
defeat of Common Situs Picketing and Labor Law Reform 
legislation. Both of these bills were actively sought by the 
labor movement. At the workplace there has been increased 
management opposition to union efforts to organize non 
union operations, as well as increased efforts to decertify ex 
isting unions. In collective bargaining, management 
demands for concessions on wages and work rules have been 
widespread.
The apparent dichotomy between conflict at the national 
level and cooperation at the plant level can be explained by 
the strong stimulus for change being created by the harsh 
economic environment faced by many firms, thus providing 
the requisite stimuli to shape local collective bargaining rela 
tions, national activity notwithstanding.
Union and Management Attitudes Toward Cooperation
Large scale studies of union and management attitudes 
toward cooperation have not been undertaken. Two studies, 
however, one by Kochan, Lipsky, & Dyer (1974) and another 
commissioned by Business Week ("Concessionary Bargain 
ing" June 14, 1982) and conducted by Louis Harris & 
Associates do provide some evidence of attitudes toward 
cooperation. The Kochan, Lipsky & Dyer study surveyed a 
sample of local and district level union leaders as well as 
stewards and committee members. Their results are sum 
marized in table 1-1.
Union activists were found to support cooperative 
strategies on some workplace issues. The respondents were 
questioned as to their rating of the effectiveness of collective 
bargaining in handling 13 work-related issues. The majority 
of the respondents indicated that collective bargaining was 
"somewhat helpful" or "very helpful" in resolving issues 
related to fringe benefits (91 percent); earnings (90 percent); 
job security (80 percent); grievance procedures (76 percent);
Table 1-1 
Union Attitudes Toward Cooperation
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10 Introduction
safety (65 percent); and hours (58 percent). At the same time 
collective bargaining was found to be "not very helpful" or 
"not helpful at all" in addressing interesting work (76 per 
cent); supervisors (68 percent); control of work (67 percent); 
productivity (62 percent); better job (63 percent); adequate 
resources (58 percent); and work load (55 percent).
The respondents were then asked what the "best way" was 
to deal with the issues. More than half the respondents 
would "seek improvements through formal collective 
bargaining" for issues of fringe benefits (96 percent), earn 
ings (94 percent), job security (86 percent), hours (66 per 
cent), grievance procedures (67 percent), and safety (57 per 
cent). However, there was a distinct preference for setting up 
"a joint program with management outside collective 
bargaining" for interesting work (68 percent), supervisors 
(66 percent), adequate resources (61 percent), control of 
work (54 percent), and productivity (51 percent). Only on the 
issue of work load did the respondents split (44 percent for 
joint program, 42 percent through collective bargaining). 
These results were replicated by Ponak and Fraser (1979) on 
a sample of Canadian trade unionists with similar results.
According to the union activists, collective bargaining was 
viewed as effective in resolving more traditional 
issues wages, fringe benefits, and grievances. Thus, there 
was less preference for collaboration with management. Col 
lective bargaining was viewed as less effective in resolving 
issues related to productivity and the quality of worklife and 
there was greater interest expressed in pursuing joint pro 
grams. Although clear policy preferences emerge from this 
study, it is difficult to ascertain whether these differences are 
translated into practice.
At the national level, union officials have spoken out on 
the issue of cooperation with varying degrees of enthusiasm. 
Glenn Watts, president of the Communications Workers 
Union of America is a proponent of cooperation. He states:
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Labor is concerned with the development of 
democracy in Industry. The collective bargaining 
process will always be the foundation of industrial 
democracy; but QWL gives us the tools to build 
higher than we ever have before.
For our Members, QWL has provided one of the 
most important benefits of all the chance to be 
treated with dignity and have a voice on the job.
. . . through QWL, we are extending our in 
fluence into the murky territory of 'management 
prerogatives,' helping to shape management prac 
tices and policies while they are being formed 
rather than after the fact. (Watts 1982)
Thus, consistent with the views of local activists, Watts sees 
cooperative strategies as supplementing union efforts 
through collective bargaining and being primarily responsive 
to nontraditional issues such as the nature of the work and 
the relationship between supervision and workers.
A different view of QWL programs was recently taken by 
George J. Poulin, general vice-president of the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Poulin 
1982). An extensive portion of his statement is reproduced 
here because it reflects a view of cooperation that has not 
received sufficient attention.
If the shop floor people are so vital in achieving 
management's goals in providing the benefits just 
listed [improved worker job satisfaction, improved 
product quality, reduced unit labor costs by in 
creasing productivity] then why in the hell hasn't 
management recognized our vitality, until now?
All of a sudden, why is it that we start sharing in 
decisions?
12 Introduction
Our quick answer is that management has often 
made such a mess of things, they want to share the 
blame. They come to us, after they've screwed up.
A second answer is that management wants to 
make a change in production planning or process, 
or it wants to introduce some new 
technology either or both of which will shove 
some of us out the door onto the unemployment 
line and it wants to con us into helping get the job 
done.
A third answer is management simply wants 
more production more work from the same or 
fewer workers. In other words, a speed up.
But a fourth answer is more likely the real 
answer: To undercut the union; to use up its duties 
and powers and responsibilities; to make it seem 
unnecessary and ultimately put it out of business; 
to take control of workers away from the bargain 
ing agent and put in the grip of management itself.
Poulin argues that the goals of QWL programs can be ac 
complished through the existing collective agreements.
It is too early to determine whether the Watts or Poulin 
view best describes the eventual outcome of cooperation. It 
will take more time, experience with cooperation, and 
evaluation research to determine whether meaningful change 
has come about from cooperation and whether cooperative 
strategies have enabled unions to better represent their 
members. For the time being, however, cooperative 
strategies continue to increase, but the future will be largely 
determined by the manner in which the parties manage the 
current level of cooperation.
Management attitudes toward cooperation were assessed 
in a survey of more than 400 "high-level executives" of large 
companies reported by Business Week ("Concessionary
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Bargaining" 1982). Executives were asked whether they 
would like to see a return to traditional bargaining once the 
economy became healthy or whether they would prefer giv 
ing unions and workers more say in company operations if 
employee compensation were tied to company performance. 
Overall, 50 percent of the executives would opt for greater 
union and employee involvement. The complete results of 
the survey, along with a breakdown by the extent of 
unionization and industry, are presented in table 1-2.
Heavily unionized companies were more likely to favor 
employee participation than firms which have experienced 
unionization to a lesser degree. The number favoring par 
ticipation increased from 42 percent to 58 percent as the 
degree of unionization in the company increased from 40 
percent or fewer to more than 70 percent of employees. 
There were also differences among various industry groups 
with utilities (87 percent) and electrical (73 percent) most 
heavily favoring cooperation and natural resources (27 per 
cent) and retail (25 percent) least likely to prefer coopera 
tion.
Although not a pure indication of management 
preference, the data still suggest a change in traditional 
management attitudes. When combined with the growing 
emphasis on employee involvement strategies discussed in 
the previous section, it must be concluded that a significant 
shift has occurred in management's approach to workplace 
collaboration.
Structure of the Book
The main body of this monograph is organized into six 
chapters. Chapter 2 presents an overview of theories and 
models of cooperation and change in unionized settings. The 
overview is followed by the models employed to guide this 
research, the specific research issues treated, and the 
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a detailed presentation of the research design, measures of 
study variables, and analytical techniques employed, as well 
as a summary of the characteristics of the research sites and 
methodological findings. Chapters 4-6 present the findings 
from this research. Chapters 4 and 5 are, of necessity, more 
qualitative and descriptive, while chapter 6 includes both 
quantitative and case study evidence. Chapter 4 describes the 
structural characteristics of the six types of interventions 
studied. This includes not only the findings from the im 
mediate work, but also draws from the literature to provide a 
more thorough overview. Chapter 5 deals with the results of 
the process leading to cooperation and some of the condi 
tions necessary to implement and maintain a cooperative 
program.
In chapter 6, the results of the analysis of performance at 
the research sites are presented. Although the type and dura 
tion of the data on each site varies, there is a substantial 
amount of data on productivity and employment and lesser 
amounts on quality, turnover, absenteeism, and grievances. 
Some of the time-series data sets on these variables are as 
long as eight years, making this the first truly longitudinal 
study on this subject matter. Chapter 6 also includes 11 case 
studies which serve to highlight significant issues involved in 
the practice of cooperative union-management relations. In 
chapter 7, a summary of the research methodology and the 
findings is offered, along with a future research agenda.
NOTES
1. One of the most comprehensive works on cooperation and change is 
by Irving H. Siegel and Edgar Weinberg, Labor-Management Coopera 
tion: The American Experience. Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn In 
stitute for Employment Research, 1982.
2. In recent years, productivity-sharing plans have oftentimes been refer 
red to as gainsharing plans. The terms are used synonymously.
3. Most readers will be familiar with these six types of interventions. 
Those readers wishing more information on the types of programs 
studied should refer to chapter 4.

Chapter 2
Models of Change and Cooperation 
in Unionized Settings
The outcomes of collective bargaining are generally con 
sidered to form a web of rules to govern the workplace 
(Dunlop 1958). The interaction of labor and management in 
traditional conflict-based bargaining is the mechanism which 
drives the system of industrial relations. In this system, 
bargaining power, defined as "the ability to secure another's 
agreement on one's own terms" (Chamberlain & Kuhn 1965, 
p. 170) is paramount. Each side considers the costs of agree 
ing and disagreeing with its opponent and develops a strategy 
for rendering economic harm and defending against 
economic attack. Strikes, picketing, boycotts, stockpiling, 
strike funds, etc. are the gears of the collective bargaining 
system.
Other forms and processes of bargaining have been iden 
tified and categorized within the traditional process by 
Walton and McKersie (1965). Thus integrative or problem- 
solving bargaining, attitudinal structuring or the relationship 
between the employer and the labor organization, as well as 
the relationship between the key union and management ac 
tors, and intraorganizational bargaining or the relationships 
and internal political considerations within each organiza 
tion, serve to underscore the complexity of the traditional 
process.
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It is within this framework that cooperation and change 
must occur. Through the years, the occasional necessity to 
cooperate rather than confront has forced labor and 
management to approach their relationship in a different 
way. The difficult economic times since the early 1970s and 
changing work attitudes and behaviors on the part of the 
workforce have stimulated the need for change. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, union leaders and 
managers now show increased support for cooperative pro 
grams to resolve issues of productivity and improve the 
quality of worklife (Dyer, Lipsky & Kochan 1977; Kochan, 
Lipsky & Dyer 1974; Ponak & Fraser 1979).
Models of Change and Cooperation
Although not all of the propositions have been identified 
and ordered, five models of change and cooperation in 
unionized settings have been developed. Kochan and Dyer's 
(1976) model integrates the organizational change and in 
dustrial relations literature into a general three-stage 
(stimulus for change, initial commitment, and institu- 
tionalization of the change) model for change. Lawler and 
Drexler (1978) have analyzed the dynamics of establishing 
cooperative union-management quality of worklife projects 
and identified the factors operating in favor of, and against 
such efforts. Three other models have addressed the 
variables necessary to operationally succeed in implementing 
cooperative programs. Nadler, Hanlon, and Lawler (1980) 
have identified the factors influencing the success of labor- 
management quality of worklife projects. Goodman (1973) 
has proposed an expectancy model to explain Scanlon Plan 
performance, which probably has applicability to all gain- 
sharing programs. Finally, a model of labor-management 
productivity program effectiveness (Schuster 1980) was 
developed to guide this research. The Schuster model is 
broadly based and was designed to be useful in studying all
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forms of cooperative programs having a goal of improved 
productivity and increased organizational effectiveness. This 
would include gainsharing, as well as quality circles, labor- 
management committees and quality of worklife projects.
All of these models are complementary. The first four will 
be discussed in this section since they provided useful 
guidance to the study of cooperation and many variables and 
issues suggested by their developers were examined as part of 
this research. The effectiveness model will be presented in 
the next section which outlines the hypotheses investigated in 
this study.
Figure 2-1 outlines the stages of the cooperative process by 
modifying the Kochan-Dyer model to encompass a fourth 
stage (third in time), program operational success. This per 
mits a visual integration of all the models.
Figure 2-1
Stages in the Cooperative Process: A Modification 




















Lawler and Drexler enumerated the factors working for 
and against joint union-management quality of worklife pro 
jects. Table 2-1 summarizes their work.
Table 2-1
Summary of Factors Working For and Against 
Joint Union-Management QWL Projects
Union-Management QWL Projects 
Factors working in favor Factors working against
1. QWL project would be more effective if coopera 
tively directed
2. Reduces resistance to change
3. Change will be more sustainable
4. Avoid legislation imposing collaboration
5. Union can achieve noneconomic benefits for 
members
6. Reduces adversary nature of relationship
1. Goal conflict
a) Union employment security, higher wages and 
benefits, job rights
b) Management profit, productivity, 
organizational effectiveness
2. Lack of a model to structure projects
3. Lack of knowledge about organizational change, 
development, and psychology; job redesign
4. Long-standing adversary relationship
5. Potential loss of power for managers and union 
leaders
6. Impact on collective bargaining agreement; modifi 
cation of traditional clauses
7. Time involved for planning and implementation
8. Differing expectations of project outcomes






SOURCE: Lawler & Drexler (1978).
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The Lawler-Drexler model accurately lists the reasons why 
union-management collaboration is not only desirable, but 
necessary. It would seem inconceivable that major organiza 
tional change could be effectively implemented in a unioniz 
ed setting without union involvement or tacit approval. 
However, there are still instances where management at 
tempts to bring about change without consultation or ap 
proval of the union which represents its employees. Union 
involvement not only reduces resistance to change, but pro 
vides greater acceptance of it, and can stimulate further 
change.
Some unions have come to view cooperative strategies as a 
complementary, rather than competing avenue for improv 
ing the welfare of their members. According to Glenn Watts, 
president of the Communications Workers of America, 
quality of worklife programs lead to:
. . . lasting improvements in job satisfaction 
among union members. And I believe if we respond 
to the challenge posed by QWL, it offers us in the 
Labor Movement the opportunity to deal with 
many issues which have been beyond the reach of 
traditional collective agreement. (Watts 1982)
Many Americans will no doubt question the suggestion 
that voluntary joint QWL programs will avoid legislation 
imposing collaboration. But just such a legislative scheme is 
under discussion in the European Parliament: the draft Fifth 
Directive and Vredeling draft Directive would impose forms 
of employee participation, information sharing, and con 
sultation in the member countries of the European Economic 
Community. Although similar provisions would not seem on 
the horizon in the United States, successful voluntary efforts 
would continue to reduce the likelihood of imposed col 
laboration.
The factors working against joint involvement are more in 
the nature of obstacles to be overcome. Readers should con-
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sider the items in this listing since many of the interventions 
reported in this research were less effective or not effective at 
all because of the failure to agree on goals, differing expecta 
tions, lack of qualified consultants, and failure to reduce the 
adversary nature of the parties' relationship.
Kochan-Dyer Model
Kochan-Dyer's model was the first effort to conceptualize 
the change and cooperative process in union-management 
settings. In contrast to the Lawler-Drexler work, the 
Kochan-Dyer integration of the organizational change and 
industrial relations literature is conceptualized into a series 
of testable hypotheses. As will be discussed further in the 
next section, one aspect of this research was to collect data to 
explore the validity of the Kochan-Dyer model. In chapter 5, 
some preliminary data on this model are presented.
Underlying the Kochan-Dyer model are three assump 
tions. First, that there are sets of interests (individuals, 
employer, and union) created as a result of the union- 
management relationship which are accepted as legitimate by 
the others. These interests are interdependent and each party 
pursues its own goals through a series of interactions within 
the context of this interdependent relationship. Second, 
because of the protections afforded unions in the society, 
competing organizations must share power. Third, since 
their respective goals are somewhat incompatible, this in 
evitably results in structurally-based conflict. The Kochan- 
Dyer model is summarized in table 2-2.
In the first stage of their model, Kochan and Dyer 
hypothesize that the parties will consider a joint venture only 
when there is strong internal or external stimulus for change. 
An internal stimulus is an outgrowth of the parties' previous 
interaction or a current workplace problem. Some examples 
of an internal stimulus include a bitter strike, distressed 
grievance procedure, high accident rates or a series of ac-
Table 2-2
Summary of the Kochan-Dyer Model of Organizational Change 





(a) Greater internal pressure
(b) Greater external pressure




Initial decision to participate
(d) Perceive change as being instrumental
(e) Parties negotiate/compromise over goals 
(0 No attempt to block program by coalitions or individual 
power holders





(g) Valued goals achieved in initial phase
(h) High probability valued goals achieved in future
(i) Initial goals not displaced by goals of higher priority
(j) Program stimulus remains strong
(k) Equitable distribution of benefits
(1) Union perceived as instrumental in attaining program benefits
(m) Program not infringing on traditional collective bargaining
 issues
(n) Program doesn't threaten management prerogatives
(o) Program not overlapping jurisdiction of grievance procedure
(p) Union leaders not viewed as being co-opted
(q) Program protected from use of bargaining tactics and
 maneuvers 
(r) Union leaders continue to pursue member goals on distributive








SOURCE: Kochan & Dyer (1976).
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cidents, technological change, low productivity, and prob 
lems of absenteeism, alcoholism, and substance abuse. Ex 
ternal stimuli develop outside the realm of the parties' in 
teraction. Some examples of external stimuli include federal 
legislation governing occupational safety and health, equal 
employment opportunity, and pension reform, as well as 
foreign and domestic competition. A strong stimulus can 
reduce goal conflict as the parties may come to view coopera 
tion as increasing their ability to maximize their joint out 
comes. In other words, environmental factors may force the 
parties to cooperate in order to avoid the difficulties that 
-would occur if they did not cooperate.
Because of traditional hostility toward joint union- 
management programs, the parties will first look to the 
traditional collective bargaining process for relief, regardless 
of whether the stimulus is internal or external. This is ap 
propriate in view of the fact that most union leaders and 
members of labor unions tend to view collective bargaining 
as the primary mechanism for resolving problems. Managers 
also tend to avoid many cooperative strategies for fear that 
collaboration might reduce management prerogatives. It is 
presumed that if the traditional process is capable of dealing 
adequately with the issues raised by the stimulus, there will 
be no need for organizational change.
Stage Two of the model addresses the factors which move 
the parties from an initial decision to participate in the 
change program to a commitment to embark upon a specific 
change effort. The program must be viewed as being in 
strumental, agreed-upon goals must be established, and 
there must be no attempt by coalitions to block the program.
Stage Three concerns program maintenance. Mutual com 
mitment to maintain the program over time (Stage Three) is 
said to occur when valued goals are achieved in the initial 
phase of the effort; there is a high probability of valued goals 
being achieved in the future; initial goals are not displaced by
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goals of a higher priority; the program stimulus remains 
strong; there is equitable distribution of the benefits; the 
union is seen as being instrumental in attaining program 
benefits; the program does not infringe on traditional collec 
tive bargaining issues or overlap the grievance procedure; the 
program doesn't threaten management prerogatives and the 
union leadership is not viewed as being co-opted; and the 
program is protected from the use of bargaining tactics or 
maneuvers, while the union leadership continues to pursue 
member goals on distributive issues.
Nadler, Hanlon, and Lawler Model
Nadler, Hanlon, and Lawler's model combines two fac 
tors (ownership of the project and goals) associated with the 
Lawler-Drexler and Kochan-Dyer models. However, it also 
breaks new ground by adding four operational and contex 
tual variables including consultant effectiveness, labor- 
management committee functioning, organizational climate, 
and organizational financial viability. Figure 2-2 outlines 
their model and the correlation coefficients between these 
variables and project effectiveness.
The data to test this model were collected at a conference 
of union, management, and rank-and-file workers involved 
in ongoing QWL projects. Project effectiveness was defined 
as improvements in quality of work, organizational func 
tioning and a global success measure. Self-report measures 
were used to assess all the measures. In spite of this limita 
tion and a relatively small sample (N = 64), this study 
presents useful data on cooperative program effectiveness.
It is interesting to note that a good labor-management 
relationship within the organization and on the labor- 
management steering committee were related to QWL pro 
ject effectiveness. Later on it will be suggested that a good 
labor-management relationship may be a precondition to 
change. The importance of employing an effective consul-
Figure 2-2
Nadler, Hanlon & Lawler Model of Factors Influencing the Success 
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tant is also underscored. Financial viability was hypothesized 
to be related to project effectiveness since financial resources 
are required to make QWL programs successful. These in 
clude monies for staff, consultants, time off for committee 
meetings, travel to conferences, etc. Yet financial viability 
was shown to be negatively related to the success of the pro 
ject. Nadler, Hanlon & Lawler (1980) suggest that there may 
be a curvilinear relationship, that is, where there are 
resources available for experimentation and where coopera 
tion is needed to insure survival.
Goodman's Model ofScanlon Plan Effectiveness
Goodman has offered an expectancy model to predict 
Scanlon Plan success. Figure 2-3 outlines his model, which 
would also seem applicable to other forms of gainsharing.
Figure 2-3 


















The expectancy component of Goodman's model con 
siders the effect of individual differences in the attractiveness 
of Scanlon outcomes (bonuses) and individual beliefs on in 
creased efforts (harder work, suggestion-making) that will 
lead to those desired outcomes. These are enclosed in the box
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in figure 2-3. Process variables, such as the reinforcement ef 
fect from the bonus or social reinforcement, are seen as in 
fluencing beliefs about the plan. Finally, the structural and 
environmental characteristics of the organization such as the 
task structure, superior-subordinate relationships, work 
group structure, labor-management relations, and financial 
condition are suggested to influence the process variables. It 
is noteworthy that Goodman treats the Scanlon Plan out 
come as the bonus. This is certainly a significant part of the 
Scanlon Plan. However, it could also be argued that the 
change in management style, the opportunity to become in 
volved in workplace decisions, and changes in subordinate- 
supervisory relations also constitute employee outcomes. 
Therefore, it may be that the expectancy model is even more 
appropriate to the other gainsharing plans (Rucker and Im- 
proshare) where there is greater emphasis on financial 
rewards than to the Scanlon Plan.
Research Objectives
This research investigated the structure, process, and im 
pact of joint union-management programs. This section con 
tains the research issues and hypotheses which served to 
focus the research. Many aspects of the study were ap 
proached as research issues rather than as testable 
hypotheses for two reasons. First, the strategy appeared to 
be consistent with the case study approach and would permit 
an in-depth descriptive analysis. Second, although the sam 
ple of firms was large in relation to previous studies on this 
topic, it was not believed to be sufficiently large to permit 
testing of all the hypotheses. Thus in the structural (chapter 
4) and process (chapter 5) portions of the study an attempt 
was made to measure the presence of many characteristics 
identified in the change models. Chapter 6, the impact por 
tion, includes both quantitative and case study analyses.
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Program Structure Research Issues
The program structure segment analyses the case study in 
formation as well as reviewing the literature on each pro 
gram. This portion of the study represents an attempt to 
engage in a comparative analysis of six widely used union- 
management interventions—Scanlon, Rucker, and Im- 
proshare Plans, Quality Circles, Labor-Management Com 
mittees, and Quality of Worklife Projects. The following 
aspects of program structure are considered.
(1) program philosophy/theory
(2) primary goals of the program
(3) subsidiary goals of the program
(4) structure for worker participation
(5) mechanism for employee suggestion-making
(6) role of supervision
(7) role of management
(8) productivity-sharing formulas
(9) frequency of payout
(10) role of union
(11) impact on management style
One of the overall findings of this research was that all the 
programs can be successful in some settings and ineffective 
in others. Moreover, in practice the "standard design" for 
each program became diluted and modified due to local 
necessity or preferences. The chapter on structure, which is 
entirely descriptive, should be very useful to students, 
managers, union leaders, and policymakers in comparing the 
merits and utility of each program.
Cooperative Process Research Issues
The segment on the cooperative process involved the col 
lection of data on the process of change and perceptions of 
cooperation. The Kochan-Dyer model provided the direction 
for most of this part of the research. Data were collected 
which permitted an assessment of the propensity of each fac-
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tor in their change model to occur in actual experience. Ad 
ditional process data predominantly related to other change 
models were also collected. Thus, the report contains infor 
mation on:
(1) the stimulus for change
(2) the process of change
(a) the efforts made to resolve stimulus issues in 
traditional bargaining
(b) the incidence of opposition coalitions to block 
the change effort
(c) the use and role of neutrals or consultants
(d) the expected utility of the program to address the 
stimulus issues
(3) the operational issues in the design of change pro 
grams
(a) the overlap, if any, with the grievance procedure 
and the collective bargaining process
(b) the presence of job security guarantees
(c) opportunities for employee participation
(d) training for supervisors to implement the pro 
gram
(e) changes in skills-based training programs
(f) bonus sharing procedures
(4) union-management perceptions of the impact of 
change on
(a) overall union-management relations
(b) union-management relations on productivity 
issues
(c) the union's role in productivity improvement
(d) management's commitment to productivity im 
provement
The data were compiled from questionnaires completed by 
management representatives and local union presidents. Ad 
ditional qualitative data were derived from open-ended inter 
view questions and internal documents.
Models of Change 31
A Model of Labor-Management 
Productivity Program Effectiveness
A model of labor-management productivity program ef 
fectiveness was developed from the investigation of the first 
10 research sites (Schuster 1980). The driving variable in this 
model is employee commitment. According to Steers (1977), 
commitment is operationalized as:
(1) A strong belief in, and acceptance of, the organiza 
tion's goals and values;
(2) A willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of 
the organization;
(3) A strong desire to maintain membership in the 
organization.
Steers' model is presented in figure 2-4.
Figure 2-4 












2. Organizational Depend 










Desire to Remain 
Intent to Remain
Reprinted from "Antecedents and Outcomes of Organizational Commitment by Richard 
M. Steers in Administrative Science Quarterly, 22(1) by permission of Administrative 
Science Quarterly.
32 Models of Change
As noted in the introduction, all six cooperative union- 
management programs are structural interventions which at 
tempt to generate greater worker interest, involvement and 
effort toward achieving important organization goals. Thus 
the conceptualization of commitment is congruent with the 
underlying theory of each intervention. In addition, the out 
comes/results of the employee commitment model reflect the 
goals of the interventions. The interventions are designed to 
have a positive impact on job performance and to improve 
work attitudes and behavior. Finally, the antecedents of 
commitment, particularly the need for achievement, task 
identity, optimal interaction, feedback, group attitudes, 
organizational dependability, and personal importance are 
many of the conditions the union-management programs at 
tempt to establish and enhance.
Although there was no previous empirical evidence to sug 
gest that Steer's commitment model, Kochan-Dyer's model 
of change, Goodman's expectancy model, or some other 
construct explained the success or failure of the interven 
tions, these were believed to provide a solid foundation upon 
which to base this investigation. 1 The model developed to 
guide this research, presented in figure 2-5, accepts the 
Kochan-Dyer logic that cooperation is based upon a stimulus 
for change. Thereafter, union and company commitment 
will occur if the traditional collective bargaining process is 
ineffective at addressing the stimulus issues, change is 
perceived as being instrumental to resolution of the stimulus 
issues, the parties are able to agree on program goals, and 
there is no attempt to block the cooperative effort by coali 
tions or individual power holders. The nature of the stimulus 
can influence organizational commitment. For example, 
severe economic difficulties were more likely to bring about 
commitment to change than simply a desire to change the 
payment system.
Organizational values are thought to influence or 
moderate the manner in which the parties interpret the
Figure 2-5 
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stimulus variables. When faced with a difficult economic 
situation, some companies will take an extremely hard-line 
position, while others ask for help from the union and are 
willing to accommodate many union concerns.
Values are also important in determining the ap 
propriateness and degree of employee involvement. Ruh, 
Wallace and Frost (1973) have shown that management sup 
port for employee involvement was a key factor in retention 
of the Scanlon Plan. Conversely, Gilson and Lefcowitz 
(1957) demonstrated that a plantwide bonus program could 
fail because of a lack of employee interest in participative 
decisionmaking.
Organizational commitment is thought to lead to 
employee commitment and supervisory support for the 
cooperative effort. Employee commitment (discussed above) 
is a belief in the organization's goals and objectives, a will 
ingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organization and a desire to remain with the organization.
Supervisory support is critical because supervisory 
resistance to organizational change as well as opposition to 
union and employee involvement have been well- 
documented (see, for example, Schlesinger 1982). Super 
visory resistance is suggested to occur because (1) super 
visors do not want to give up power and control; (2) super 
visors do not believe workers are concerned about organiza 
tional performance needs; (3) supervisors do not believe that 
participation is an effective way to supervise; (4) supervisors 
do not trust the union not to take unfair advantage; 
(5) supervisors do not know how to manage under a new 
system and are not given adequate training; and (6) super 
visors do not trust upper management's sincerity and sup 
port (Bushe 1983).
The transition from organizational commitment to 
employee commitment and supervisory support can be in 
fluenced by the strategy used to introduce the program and
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the effectiveness of future communications concerning the 
effort. This has been labeled the "acceptance strategy."
Employee commitment is influenced by the program's 
operational components. These are the availability of oppor 
tunities to participate in workplace decisions, guarantees of 
employment security, and an equitable and periodic distribu 
tion of benefits from the program. The operational com 
ponents influence the perceived political security and 
member support felt by the union's leadership. Political 
security and member support moderate the relationship be 
tween union commitment and rank-and-file commitment. 
Where the union is seen as being instrumental to attaining 
program benefits (e.g., a bonus), and union leaders are not 
perceived as being co-opted, there will be higher levels of 
member support. The seriousness of the stimulus may also 
strengthen the political security of union leaders and provide 
more leverage and influence with members.
The model contains four general areas of program effec 
tiveness. Program effectiveness is operationalized as improv 
ed productivity, stabilized or increased employment, an im 
proved labor-management climate, and improvements in 
general organizational effectiveness criteria. The technology 
of the firm is believed to influence or moderate the degree to 
which employees can effect these performance indicators.
Research Hypotheses
Not all of the elements in this model could be empirically 
tested. Research design considerations, sample size, partici 
pant cooperation, and the resources available to the project 
made testing of the full model unfeasible. Some issues were 
examined with a high degree of qualitative rigor, while three 
(organizational values, employee commitment and super 
visory support) were not directly considered. They did, 
however, receive considerable support in many of the inter 
views that were conducted.
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The Impact of Union-Management Cooperation
Union-management programs were initially assessed along 
seven dimensions. 2 These were: (1) improved productivity; 
(2) stabilized employment; and (3) improved product quali 
ty. Reductions in (4) absenteeism, (5) turnover, (6) tar 
diness, and (7) grievance rates were also expected. This sec 
tion outlines the hypotheses associated with this portion of 
the research along with a brief rationale. It should be noted 
that the study was longitudinal and all of the hypotheses 
were tested with at least 24 monthly observations prior to the 
program and 24 months following program inception. In 
fact, most of the time frames were considerably longer.
Hyp. (1) Firms with cooperative union-management pro 
grams will be significantly more productive dur 
ing the 24-month period following the inception 
of the program as compared to the 24-month 
period prior to inception.
Kochan and Dyer (1976) have hypothesized that the 
development of union-management cooperation is con 
tingent upon the presence of a strong stimulus for change. 
The academic and popular literature has highlighted the 
declining growth of productivity in the United States. Many 
of the firms studied in this research stated that productivity 
improvement was necessary for either immediate survival or 
to remain competitive. Most of the union leaders interviewed 
in this research also recognized the need to strengthen the 
economic effectiveness of their employers.
Previous research into the utilization and operation of 
numerous forms of union-management productivity pro 
grams has indicated that improvements in productivity are 
generally realized (Puckett 1958; Moore 1975). However 
nearly all the research in this area has been severely criticized 
due to defects in research design (Cummings and Molloy 
1977; Heneman 1979), limited methods of analysis
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(Heneman 1979; White 1979) and researcher bias (White 
1979). Most of the reported studies have been case studies 
(Davenport 1950; Lesieur 1951; Tait 1952) using anecdotal 
evidence of program effectiveness. This research took a 
significant step forward in utilizing a time-series research 
design, unobtrusive measures of effectiveness, and more 
sophisticated analytical techniques. The primary productivi 
ty measure, output per hour, was considered a significant 
improvement over previous studies.
Hyp. (2) Firms with cooperative union-management pro 
grams will have a stable or improved employ 
ment experience during the period following the 
inception of the program when compared to the 
24-month period prior to inception.
Employment or control over jobs for its members is a 
critical union goal (Perlman 1949; Thrasher 1976). It is no 
less important a concern for individual employees (Kochan, 
Lipsky & Dyer 1974). The economic survival of the firm and 
continuation of employment opportunities has traditionally 
been among the most common stimuli for union- 
management cooperation.
Improving the employment situation for its members is the 
critical outcome variable for the union. This is the case even 
when, as with gainsharing plans, there is the possibility of 
significantly increased earnings. A stable or improved 
employment experience is operationally defined as one in 
which the level of employment within the firm increases or 
remains the same over time.
Hyp. (3) Firms with cooperative union-management pro 
grams will improve the quality of their produc 
tion during the 24-month period following the in 
ception of the program as compared to the 
24-month period prior to inception.
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Hyp. (4) Firms with cooperative union-management pro 
grams will have lower rates of absenteeism dur 
ing the 24-month period following the inception 
of the program as compared to the 24-month 
period prior to inception.
Hyp. (5) Firms with cooperative union-management pro 
grams will have lower turnover rates during the 
24-month period following the inception of the 
program as compared to the 24-month period 
prior to inception.
Hyp. (6) Firms with cooperative union-management pro 
grams will have lower tardiness rates during the 
24-month period following the inception of the 
program as compared to the 24-month period 
prior to inception.
Hyp. (7) Firms with cooperative union-management pro 
grams will have lower grievance rates during the 
24-month period following inception of the pro 
gram as compared to the 24-month period prior 
to inception.
It was noted earlier that cooperative union-management 
productivity programs are designed as structural and 
behavioral interventions. All forms of productivity pro 
grams in some manner change organizational structure in 
order to produce greater worker interest and involvement in 
the operation of the firm. Frost (1978) and Frost, Wakeley 
and Ruh (1974), and Katz and Kahn (1966) assert that 
Scanlon Plans result in a new form of organizational 
climate. Others have sought to describe the effects of these 
changes for Scanlon Plans (Shultz 1951; White 1979) and 
plans of a similar nature (Fein 1976) in terms of the in 
dividual employee's desire and ability to contribute to the 
organization. Steers (1977) and Steers and Porter (1979) have 
conceptualized this behavior as organizational commitment.
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In addition, Macy and Mirvis (1976) include these variables 
in their proposed methodology for assessing the economic 
and behavioral effectiveness of innovative workplace pro 
grams.
Research conducted by Steers (1977) has found a relation 
ship between organizational commitment and a series of 
employee work attitudes and behaviors. These included 
desire and intent to remain with the organization, atten 
dance, quality of work and promotion readiness. Although 
the more macro nature of this research did not permit 
measurement of employee commitment, it did assess the im 
pact of these change programs on the hypothesized measures 
of effectiveness. In some cases, since the hypothesized 
changes did occur, this now provides a further justification 
for research which would attempt to explain the causal pro 
cess at an individual level of analysis similar to that con 
ducted by Steers.
Finally, although it might be concluded that improved 
productivity and quality are conflicting goals, this is not the 
case even with the gainsharing programs. All of the gainshar- 
ing programs only reward employees for acceptable produc 
tion, and because the costs of corrective actions are included 
in bonus calculations, there is an additional incentive to pro 
duce a quality product.
Factors Influencing Cooperative Union-Management 
Program Success
There are five variables included in this investigation as 
determinants of union-management productivity program 
effectiveness. Each of these determinants was identified 
from the research literature and was supported by qualitative 
evidence from an earlier phase of the study. These are 
guarantees of employment security; a structure for employee 
participation; the method, frequency, and amount of com 
pensation provided by the program; an effective acceptance
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strategy; and an appropriate workplace technology. Once 
again, a limited justification for each is provided.
Hyp. (8) Firms with union-management programs that 
provide guarantees of employment security to 
the union and its members will be more effective 
than those which do not.
(8) (a) The greater the degree of employment 
security guaranteed, the greater the effec 
tiveness of the program.
(8) (b) Cooperative programs which provide for 
employment security for union members 
will be more effective when the program and 
the commitment to guarantee jobs is made 
part of the collective bargaining agreement.
The expected outcome of a union-management productivi 
ty program is improved productivity and stabilization of 
employment within the firm. In spite of these desired out 
comes, workers have historically been hesitant to participate 
in joint efforts. One cause of this resistance has been a fear 
on the part of workers that increased productivity will result 
in higher production standards or a reduction in the firm's 
labor force. In the other instances workers have simply not 
responded to the program. There is evidence which 
demonstrates the ability of workers to establish and enforce 
production norms (Roy 1952). In these situations the pro 
ductivity plans have tended to fail. Guarantees of employ 
ment security also appear to significantly influence the suc 
cess of Japanese management efforts to improve productivi 
ty and increase organizational effectiveness.
In order to overcome worker opposition, employers have 
agreed to employment security guarantees. These guarantees 
have included provisions for attrition clauses and no-layoff 
pledges, and have been effective in several instances (NCP- 
QWL 1977). Because of the legal nature of the labor- 
management arrangement in the United States, it is
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reasonable to assume that job security guarantees which 
have been included in the collective bargaining agreement 
will be more warmly received by union members than non 
contractual guarantees.
Hyp. (9) Union-management programs that provide for 
formal opportunities for employee participation 
will be more effective than those which do not. 
(9) (a) The greater the degree of employee par 
ticipation, the more effective the productivi 
ty program will be.
A number of different productivity programs contain 
various formats for employee participation. The nature of 
the structure for employee participation varies widely. 
Scanlon Plans and Quality Circles provide for formal 
systems of employee participation through an interlocking 
system of labor-management departmental committees 
(Frost, Wakeley & Ruh 1974). The responsibilities of these 
committees are subject to wide variation. Some committees 
attempt to generate suggestions from individual employees 
and assist in explaining program operations. Oftentimes the 
committees have the power to implement changes in their im 
mediate jurisdiction (Cummings & Molloy 1977). These 
systems, therefore, offer individual employees the oppor 
tunity to exert considerably more influence and control over 
their work environment than would exist in more conven 
tional firms. Rosenberg and Rosenstein (1980) have provided 
evidence that participation can positively influence produc 
tivity.
At the opposite extreme are programs which merely seek 
suggestions from individual employees which are then 
reviewed by management representatives. Other programs 
are nonparticipatory, that is, no direct effort is made to in 
volve employees in the effort to improve productivity. These 
programs may not realize the full potential of the workforce 
or may be viewed as a gimmick by workers. This issue is an
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important one because there is some evidence that employee 
participation may be related to job satisfaction and satisfac 
tion to performance (Katzell & Yankelovich 1975).
Hyp. (10) Productivity programs which provide for 
group incentives will be more effective than 
those which reward the individual. 
(10) (a) The greater the frequency of financial 
payments to the employees, the more ef 
fective the productivity program will be. 
(10) (b) The larger the percentage financial 
payments to the employees, over and 
above regular earnings, the more effective 
the productivity programs will be.
Another feature of some union-management productivity 
programs is an incentive system based upon program ex 
perience (Lesieur 1958). If the programs produce im 
provements in productivity, a portion of the improvement in 
productivity is distributed to the employees. Kochan and 
Dyer (1976) have noted the importance of preserving 
organizational equity. The amount distributed to the 
employees varies according to the effectiveness of the pro 
gram and the formula used to distribute the improvements 
(Cummings & Molloy 1977).
Reinforcement theorists argue that individual incentives 
are more effective than group incentives because they more 
closely tie the reinforcement to the desired behavior (in this 
case greater work effort) (Luthans & Kreitner 1975). At the 
same time, proponents of Scanlon-type plans insist that 
group incentives are more effective because of their ability to 
foster greater worker cooperation and the lessening of in- 
trafirm competition (Katz & Kahn 1966).
Reinforcement theorists contend that the more valued the 
reinforcement (in this case the financial payout), the more 
effective it will be in producing the desired result (Luthans &
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Kreitner 1975). It therefore follows that the amount of addi 
tional financial benefit paid to the employees as a result of 
the program should influence the level of employee interest, 
cooperation, and effort. The larger the financial benefit 
derived by the employees from the program, the more effec 
tive the program should be. However, reinforcement 
theorists also state that the more frequent the reinforcement, 
the more effective it will be in producing the desired result 
(Luthans & Kreitner 1975). There is a conflict. The more fre 
quent the payout from the program, the smaller the amount 
of money paid out each time. This research provided some 
insights into that issue.
Hyp. (11) Union-management programs will be more ef 
fective when the union and management 
develop a successful acceptance strategy. 
(11) (a) A successful acceptance strategy will in 
clude an active program of training for 
first level supervision and union stewards. 
(11) (b) A successful acceptance strategy will in 
clude the utilization of external con 
sultants.
(11) (c) A successful acceptance strategy will in 
clude an effective communications pro 
gram to keep organization members in 
formed about the cooperative program.
Cooperative union-management programs involve signifi 
cant organizational changes. In order to insure that change is 
successfully implemented, unions and management need to 
develop effective implementation and acceptance strategies.
The failure to develop an effective strategy will prevent 
rank-and-file and supervisory employees from becoming ful 
ly informed of the program's goals, operations, and 
benefits. Training for first level supervision and union 
stewards is necessary due to the significant structural 
changes which may take place at that level of the organiza-
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tion. When the program involves a bonus system, the use of 
external consultants can insure that both actual and perceiv 
ed equity are maintained. In addition, both employees and 
supervisors will need to be kept informed of program 
developments and changes.
Hyp. (12) Union-management programs will have a 
greater impact on productivity where the 
technology of the firm is more labor intensive 
than where the technology is less labor inten 
sive.
The technological process of the firm is seen as a critical 
aspect of the productivity improvement process. Most of 
labor-management productivity improvement programs are 
designed as behaviorally oriented experiments to induce 
greater work interest, cooperation, and effort. Successful 
programs should demonstrate measurable changes in the 
level of the firm's production. As indicated earlier, this has 
generally been the result. However, since most of the 
research in this area has not been comparative in nature, lit 
tle is known of the compatability of particular productivity 
programs to specific technologies.
Research conducted by organizational theorists has found 
that successful firms in differing technologies have diverse 
structural forms (Woodward 1965). Labor-management 
change programs, and productivity programs in particular, 
should be viewed as changes in organizational structure. 
Therefore, following this theory that differing technologies 
require different organizational structures, a union- 
management productivity program should have an organiza 
tional structure that is appropriate for the technology of the 
firm.
A second factor is also relevant to this hypothesis. The 
more capital intensive or mechanized the firm's production 
process, the less impact increased worker efforts are likely to
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have. It is quite possible that where the level and method of 
production is nearly entirely machine set and operated, 
worker efforts will have little or no bearing upon produc 
tion. In contrast, where the technology of the firm permits 
wider latitude of worker imputs, expanded employee in 
terest, cooperation, and effort are likely to have a greater im 
pact on productivity.
NOTES
1. In this study it was not possible to collect individual attitudinal data to 
fully explore these models. A subsequent phase of the research is seeking 
to develop and test a conceptual model to explain the forces that in 
fluence employee work attitudes and behavior.
2. Three other effectiveness variables were later added. These included 
the frequency of productivity bonus payments, rater effectiveness, and 






Since the 1970s there has been an endless stream of ar 
ticles, books, and speeches by academicians and practi 
tioners exalting the benefits of union-management coopera 
tion, productivity and quality of worklife projects, and other 
workplace innovations. With few exceptions (see for exam 
ple Goodman 1979; Macy 1979) most of what has been said 
and written about cooperative efforts was not based upon 
empirical evaluations of these programs in the field. Instead, 
the historical approach to research on cooperation, the case 
study method, was maintained. In addition to suffering from 
all of the traditional difficulties associated with the case 
study method (see Campbell & Stanley 1963) the research 
suffered further from an absence of appropriate measures of 
effectiveness and analytical techniques, short time durations, 
and researcher bias (Heneman 1979; White 1979).
White, in attempting to explain the absence of empirical 
research on the Scanlon Plan, gave four explanations which 
would also be applicable to studies of other forms of 
cooperation. The low level of research activity, explained 
White, was due to (1) the difficulty and expense of doing 
research on organizations as the unit of analysis; (2) the in 
ability to use sophisticated statistical techniques due to each
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organization being N = 1; (3) the inability to maintain strict 
research designs; and (4) the failure of the academic evalua 
tion process to reward this type of work. Kochan's (1980) 
report to the Secretary of Labor earmarked change and 
cooperation as a labor-management relations research 
priority.
One objective of this research was to develop and refine 
strategies and techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of 
productivity and quality of worklife programs. This discus 
sion will hopefully assist researchers and practitioners to 
assess similar programs as well as to examine the impact of 
other workplace interventions.
In this chapter, the research design employed in the pro 
ject and some of the problems associated with it are discuss 
ed. This is followed by an examination of the methods used 
for selecting sites for participation in the study and the 
research strategy. Next is a discussion of the methods used to 
define and measure the key variables in the study, the tech 
niques that were employed to analyze them, and the poten 
tial limitations of the research. The chapter concludes with a 
series of significant methodological findings.
Research Design
This research was conducted as a field study which utilized 
a triangulation approach to assess the cooperative programs. 
Triangulation is the combination of several methodologies to 
study the same phenomenon (Jick 1979). Qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation procedures were employed. Donald 
Campbell (1979) has recently endorsed this approach to 
evaluation research.
The qualitative procedures included extensive structured 
and unstructured interviews with company and union per 
sonnel, examination and analysis of archival records and 
documents, and observations. The quantitative procedures
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included the measurement of plant performance (for exam 
ple, productivity, employment, etc.); the scaling of the 
operational components of the interventions (for example, 
the structure for employee participation, the frequency of 
bonus payments, etc.); and union and management percep 
tions of the cooperative effort.
Qualitative Data
The qualitative data collection served two purposes. The 
first was to permit a descriptive analysis of the interventions 
at each research site to be conducted with an emphasis on 
their structure and operation at the workplace. These data 
were later used for the comparative analysis of the six in 
terventions contained in chapter 4. The second use of the 
qualitative data was to provide contextual meaning for the 
quantitative assessments and to identify other possible 
changes in organizational operations (for example, new 
machinery or plant personnel) that might have had a major 
impact on plant performance during the time period of this 
investigation. That is, the qualitative data were used as a 
check on the internal validity of the research design.
The questionnaires used in this research were adapted 
from the instruments used by Kochan, Dyer, and Lipsky 
(1977) in their study of safety committees. Other structured 
and unstructured items were developed to assess the process 
of union cooperation. Several models of organizational 
change in unionized settings guided this portion of the in 
vestigation. There were separate union and management 
questionnaires, but the instruments had many common 
items. Examples of the documents and records that were col 
lected included the minutes of meetings, internal memoran 
dum, suggestion logs, previous evaluations (internal or exter 




The assessment of plant performance was made by utiliz 
ing a stratified multiple-group-single-intervention- 
interrupted time-series design (Glass, Willson & Gottman 
1975). An interrupted time-series design involves periodic 
measurement of an outcome variable both before and after a 
treatment effect or intervention is introduced. If the in 
tervention has had an effect, it would be indicated by a 
discontinuity in the pattern of the data in the time-series 
(Campbell & Stanley 1963; Cook & Campbell 1976). Inter 
rupted time-series designs are particularly appropriate for 
situations where the "measurement is unobtrusive and the 
respondents are not reacting to multiple testings" (Cook & 
Campbell 1976, p. 274). This research involved the measure 
ment of output per hour, level of employment, voluntary 
turnover, etc., all of which are unobtrusive (Webb, Camp 
bell, Schwartz, Sechrest & Grove 1981).
A stratified multiple-group-single-intervention time-series 
design has all the attributes of the interrupted time-series 
design. Its main difference lies in the use of multiple ex 
perimental units which are distinguished by some feature in 
those units. In this study the feature that distinguished the 
nature of the experimental unit was the type of union- 
management productivity program, that is, Scanlon, 
Rucker, and Improshare Plans, Labor-Management Com 
mittees, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife projects.
The strengths of a multiple-group-single-intervention 
design are two-fold. The design permits an examination of 
the pervasiveness of an intervention effect. In addition, 
Glass, Willson & Gottman (1975) suggest that it can lead to 
the development of a typology of units which react different 
ly to an intervention. In this research the units remained 
largely the same, but the type of intervention differed. Thus 
the operation and effectiveness of six cooperative interven 
tions could be assessed.
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In addition, the basic design was strengthened in several 
significant ways. First, the measures (for example, output 
per hour and level of employment) were subject to frequent 
calibration into monthly intervals as opposed to quarterly or 
yearly time frames. Second, qualitative data were collected 
to determine whether other forces, outside of the interven 
tion, influenced the impact of the cooperative program. 
Finally, by examining at least a four- to five-year time frame, 
cyclical variations could be taken into account.
Sources of Invalidity 
in Time-Series Designs
There are several potential sources of invalidity in time- 
series designs. The principal one being historical events. 
History constitutes a potential threat when events that are 
extraneous to the intervention occur during the time in which 
the data are being observed, measured, and analyzed. These 
events may produce a shift of the series which can be 
mistaken as an intervention effect. In ex post facto time- 
series designs of the type used in this research "the danger of 
historical invalidity is usually quite high" (Glass, Willson & 
Gottman 1975, p. 54). In the present study changes in the 
economic environment were the principal historical events 
which could have affected the key dependent 
variables—productivity and employment. A comparison 
group developed from national data on employment and 
voluntary turnover (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1979) for 
three- and four-digit SIC industries was used to control for 
the influence of economic changes unrelated to the program. 
No comparable productivity data were available.
Other potential sources of invalidity that might have in 
fluenced the performance variables (productivity, employ 
ment, quality, turnover, attendance, etc.) or the change pro 
cess were also addressed. "Reactive" interventions can occur 
when the system experiencing the intervention also
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undergoes other coincident changes. This is very likely to oc 
cur in complex social and economic institutions such as those 
under study here. Exhaustive historical analysis of possible 
confounding factors using qualitative data was conducted as 
part of table sites' case histories. Examples of systems 
changes associated with this research that might have had a 
greater impact on plant performance included:
(1) Substantial increases in capital investment;
(2) Shifts from production of goods with a higher labor 
content to products with less labor content;
(3) Changes in attendance control policies;
(4) Changes in key management personnel;
(5) Turnover of union leadership;
(6) Collective bargaining disputes.
Multiple-intervention interference can occur when the im 
pact assessment involves more than one intervention. Thus 
one site which had labor-management committees later add 
ed a second intervention—organizational behavior modifica 
tion. In another instance, a site with Quality Circles was 
scheduled to introduce a gainsharing mechanism. In these in 
stances, the subsequent intervention must be considered part 
of the labor-management effort. In addition, computer soft 
ware has recently become available which permits the dual 
effect to be modeled and each intervention component's im 
pact can be assessed (Pack 1977).
Instrumentation constitutes a source of invalidity when 
there is a change in the method of observing or measuring 
the dependent variable during the time frame of the series. In 
studies using archival data, this is a problem when there are 
alterations in record-keeping procedures. Interview data 
were used to guard against this possibility.
Construct validity problems can occur when the opera 
tional definition of the causal agent in an experiment can be 
subjected to differing interpretations, thereby confounding
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the strength of the investigator's conclusions (Cook & 
Campbell 1979). In this research it was possible that im 
provements in productivity were not the result of the labor- 
management intervention but were simply the result of the 
greater attention given to employees by management, that is, 
a Hawthorne effect. This concern was minimized by the 
duration (at least two years) of the post-intervention time- 
series.
External validity can be threatened when there is doubt as 
to whether the results of an experiment can be generalized to 
other populations and settings beyond those involved in the 
particular research (Campbell & Stanley 1963). This study 
focused solely on manufacturing firms. However, it did 
cover a wide region of the United States and examined varied 
manufacturing settings. No effort is made to generalize the 
findings beyond the manufacturing sector.
Of greater concern was the issue of self-selection by sites 
participating in the research. Had only sites with successful 
interventions agreed to participate in this research, the 
generalizability of the study would have been suspect. It ap 
pears, however, that a cross-section of successful and unsuc 
cessful programs was investigated.
The Research Sites
Site Selection
The acquisition of field research sites is never an easy task 
and this is particularly true in the labor-management setting. 
When the study began in 1978, the first 10 research sites with 
cooperative union-management productivity programs were 
selected from lists compiled in the 1977 and 1978 Directories 
of Labor-Management Committees published by the Na 
tional Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life. 
However, publication of the Directory ceased with the 1978 
publication and did not resume until the Department of
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Labor began publishing a similar listing of companies and 
unions in 1982.
As the number of research sites grew, several strategies 
were employed to identify additional companies and unions. 
First, lists of companies that had utilized consulting services 
to develop cooperative union-management programs 
(Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare) were acquired from the 
initial research sites. Second, the Buffalo Area Labor- 
Management Committee was asked to assist the project by 
providing the names and entry into three research sites. 
Third, participants at existing research sites were asked if 
they knew of other firms or unions engaged in cooperative 
experiments since these firms are frequently visited by others 
considering similar programs. Fourth, several unions with 
staff who maintain experts in cooperative programs were 
contacted. Finally, after the initial findings had been 
disseminated, several organizations contacted the in 
vestigator on their own initiative.
Description of the Research Sites
This section contains a summary description of the major 
characteristics of the research sites. However, readers are 
cautioned that each site was given assurances that complete 
confidentiality would be maintained. The investigator has at 
tempted to preserve the confidence entrusted to him by each 
site.
A total of 38 sites were visited and at least some data col 
lected. Five of these sites were nonunion. As shown in Table 
3-1 there is a very even distribution of gainsharing plans and 
Labor-Management Committees. Labor-Management Com 
mittees are categorized as serviced by an Area Labor- 
Management Committee or not serviced (i.e., functioning in 




Types of Interventions Studied
Number of Number nonunion 
____Type of program__________sites________sites____
Scanlon Plan 9 
Rucker Plan 7 2 
Improshare 8 1 
Other gainsharing 2* 2 
Labor-Management Committees
serviced by A L-MC 5** 
Labor-Management Committees
not serviced by A L-MC 4 
Quality Circles 2 
Profit Sharing 1
Total 38 5
*One labor-management committee later added a gainsharing plan thus yielding an addi 
tional "other gainsharing" program.
**One labor-management committee experimented with a series of quality of worklife pro 
jects.
The study investigated organizations with eight interna 
tional unions and one independent labor organization. Op 
portunities to study varied programs have existed. These in 
clude 9 Scanlon Plans, 7 Rucker Plans, 10 Improshare Plans, 
9 Labor-Management Committees, 2 Quality Circles, and 1 
profit-sharing plan. Table 3-1 summarizes the number and 
type of programs studied.
Table 3-2 summarizes six selected characteristics of the 
research sites including: product, SIC number, bargaining 
unit size, age distribution and sexual composition of the 
workforce, and the type of intervention.
All of the firms in the study are engaged in manufacturing, 
with a broad range of industries represented. Plants engaged 
in heavy industry from steel to tire production were studied 
as well as light assembly operations. Bargaining unit size 
ranges from 7-2300, with a mean of 620. There is also a wide
Table 3-2 
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*Nonunion plant. Bargaining unit in nonunion plants refers to total number of production and maintenance employees.
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range in the composition of the labor force studied. Some 
organizations have had no female workers, while several had 
50 percent of their labor force being female.
Table 3-3 summarizes some additional characteristics of 
the research sites in this study. These include the state, com 
munity size, the type of ownership, and technology of the 
research sites. The sites are located in 11 states, they are in 
very small communities as well as in large metropolitan 
areas. Over half the sample was composed of plants which 
were subsidiaries of larger corporations (21), with the re 
mainder about evenly divided between family-owned firms 
(8), and corporations (9). The plants had varied technologies 
ranging from fabrication of equipment in large stages to 
mass production operations. Two firms were dropped from 
the study when their level of involvement fell below a 
previously agreed upon minimum.
Control/Comparison Group
One area where the project was not as successful as had 
been expected was in obtaining the cooperation of control or 
comparison firms. Sixty firms were matched to 20 of the ex 
perimental firms (three per site) from the Dun and Bradstreet 
directories based upon Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) numbers and firm size. These firms were contacted by 
mail with postage-free reply opportunities included with the 
letter of introduction. Over 80 percent of the firms did not 
reply, and only one firm that did reply was willing to par 
ticipate in the study.
An alternate strategy was to use national data on employ 
ment and turnover from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
publication, Employment and Earnings. In many respects 
this data provides a more accurate description of the 
historical events (particularly national economic activity) 
which the control group is designed to reflect. The issue of
Table 3-3 



































































































Production of large batches
Mass production
Production of large batches
Mass production
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Fabrication of large equipment
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Production of small batches
in stages
Simple units to customer's requirements
Production of small batches
Mass production
Mass production
Production of large batches
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Fabrication of large equipment in stages
Production of small batches
Mass production
Simple units to customer's requirements
Production of small batches
Production of large batches
Simple units to customer's
requirements
Production of large batches
Production of small batches
Simple units to customer's requirements
Production of large batches
Production of small batches
Production of large batches
Production of small batches
Production of small batches








1. 1980 United States Census of Population, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Vol. 1 (April 1982).
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control or comparison groups is discussed further in this 
chapter in the section on methodological findings.
Research Strategy
In order to permit an intensive analysis of each organiza 
tion, on-site visits were conducted. At each site, management 
representatives were interviewed and company records and 
documents gathered. At most of the sites, union represen 
tatives were also interviewed. 1 In several instances the fact 
that the site was nonunion was not apparent until the site was 
actually visited. On-site follow-up visits and extensive 
telephone conversations and mail correspondence were 
utilized to complete the data collection process.
The research was divided into two parts. First was an ex 
amination of the structure and process of change in union 
ized settings. This included the investigation of variables 
such as the stimulus for change, the internal political process 
to establish change, negotiation of goals, the structure of the 
intervention with particular emphasis on the role of 
employee participation, the method, frequency, and amount 
of employee compensation in the form of bonuses, 
guarantees of employment security, and the nature of the 
organization's acceptance strategy. These data were analyz 
ed using descriptive statistics and correlational analysis.
The second part of the study was an analysis of the out 
comes of union-management productivity programs. This 
included an examination of the dependent variables: produc 
tivity improvement, the level of employment, and the general 
organizational effectiveness criteria. These were analyzed us 
ing the interrupted time-series design.
An opportunity occurred during the course of the project 
to investigate five nonunion firms with gainsharing pro 
grams. By seizing this opportunity, it was possible to com 
pare the unionized sector with the nonunion sector. These
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sites were approached in the same manner as the unionized 
firms.
Methods of Measurement
This section describes the manner in which the critical 
variables were measured. It begins with a brief listing of the 
demographic variables and the method for their measure 
ment. Following that are the measurements for the major 
study variables—productivity; employment; quality; 
absenteeism, turnover, tardiness, and grievances; employ 
ment security guarantees; the structure for employee par 
ticipation; the method, frequency and amount of compensa 
tion; the acceptance strategy; and several additional struc 
tural and process variables.
Demographic Variables
The demographic factors are noted as follows:
(1) The type of industry was classified by using three- and 
four-digit numbers from the manual of Standard In 
dustrial Classifications (SIC).
(2) Bargaining unit size was chosen over firm size as be 
ing a measure more indicative of the audience the pro 
grams were designed to reach.
(3) Program inception was measured from the date when 
the program became operational.
(4) Technology was measured by using the scale 
developed by Woodward (1965). The instrument 
characterizes the system of production used by firms 
on a 10-level scale according to the degree of integra 
tion in the production process.
Study Variable: Productivity
The measurement of productivity required a flexible ap 
proach. In this research several measures of productivity
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were utilized. The primary measure was employee output per 
hour. Two elements, labor input and amount of output, 
were necessary for the measurement of productivity 
(Greenberg 1973; Bureau of Labor Statistics 1976). Labor in 
put was measured by employee hours worked, while output 
was measured by the quantity of units produced. Hence 
employee output per hour was measured on a monthly basis 
by
where I = employee output per hour 
qi = quantity of output produced 
1 j = employee hours
Each firm was asked for this data as the most desirable 
method for measuring this variable. Approximately 60 per 
cent of the sites were able to provide this information.
For a firm or plant with a diverse output, a meaningful 
measure of employee output per hour required a weighted 
hours index (Greenberg 1973). This is the most sophisticated 
method of productivity measurement, but was only available 
at one site. An alternative to this was to analyze separately 
each product line using the output per hour formula above.
One of the most significant findings of this research was 
the lack of sophistication by many firms in measuring pro 
ductivity. In far too many cases, output per hour measures 
were not part of the organization's record keeping system. In 
several instances, this was due to the varied nature of the 
production process. In others, however, it appeared to repre 
sent a limited understanding of the concept of productivity. 
In these instances one of several measures was used:
Deflated Sales/Production Value or Sales/Production Value 
Actual Hours Worked Labor Costs
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In the presentation of this data in chapter 6, the specific 
measure of productivity at each site is stated.
Finally, in the gainsharing plans, the calculation of the 
bonus represented another measure of productivity. This 
measure is particularly appropriate in the Improshare Plans, 
since the Improshare measurement utilizes some of the prin 
ciples associated with the weighted hours index.
Study Variable: Employment
The level of employment was measured by the average 
number of workers employed by the firm during the week of 
the 12th day of the month. Because employment tends to be 
influenced by prevailing economic conditions, the threat of 
historical invalidity had to be addressed. A comparison 
group of national employment data collected by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (1979) on an industrywide (matched at 
four-digit SIC) basis was formulated. At several sites 
employment was measured during the last week of the 
month.
Study Variable: Quality
Quality was measured using the general formulas sug 
gested by Macy and Mirvis (1976):
Units Rejected or Scrap Dollars 
Total Units Produced Production Value
In each instance this measure was adapted slightly to be con 
sistent with the site's own measure of quality.
Study Variables: Unexcused Absenteeism,
Voluntary Turnover, Tardiness, and Grievances
Each of these variables was measured by the total number 
of occurrences each month, divided by average workforce 
size (Macy & Mirvis 1976). For example,
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Monthly Turnover Rate = I Turnover Incidents
Average Workforce Size
Since turnover is also sensitive to national economic condi 
tions, a comparison with national data, similar to the 
employment analysis, was conducted.
Study Variable: Employment Security
Employment security was defined as the amount of 
assurance the firm has given to its workforce that no 
employees or jobs would be forfeited as a result of the pro 
ductivity program. A two-level scale was used with "no 
assurances" and a "best efforts" contract clause at one ex 
treme (low security) and a "contractual no loss of 
employment/guarantee of hours" or attrition clause (high 
security) at the other extreme. The collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated at each site were evaluated against 
criteria based upon contract clauses published in the BLS 
(1971) 1425 series, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: 
Layoff, Recall, and Work-Sharing Procedures.
Study Variable: Employee Participation
Employee participation was measured according to the 
structural mechanism provided for in the intervention for 
participation. Responses were departmental committees, 
plantwide committees, a plantwide suggestion system, and 
no structure for participation. In addition, collection and 
analysis of the minutes of meetings and suggestion logs pro 
vided some insights into the actual participation that occur 
red.
Study Variables: Compensation Measures
The method of bonus payment (if any) in the intervention 
was categorized by individual, group, and plantwide 
payments. The frequency of incentive payments was
66 Research Design
classified into weekly, monthly, quarterly or annual periods. 
The size of the financial payout from the productivity pro 
gram was classified either by the actual bonus paid or as a 
percentage of the bargaining unit's average hourly wage per 
employee. Another measure of compensation was the 
percentage of possible periods in which a bonus was actually 
paid. This measure was derived by the number of periods in 
which a bonus was paid divided by the number of periods in 
which it was calculated.
Study Variable: Acceptance Strategy
The acceptance strategy was defined as the scope of 
techniques used to aid in implementation of the cooperative 
program. These included the use of consultants, supervisory 
and steward training, group process and skills-based train 
ing, and organizational communications activities. These 
variables were classified using a series of dichotomous ques 
tions requiring a positive or negative response as to their in 
clusion in the operation of the program. Open-ended ques 
tions were also posed to permit more complete analysis of 
these activities.
Additional Study Variables
The stimulus for, and process leading to, labor- 
management cooperation and other variables associated with 
the design of the programs were assessed by posing a com 
bination of open-ended and forced-choice inquiries to 
management representatives and union officials. A series of 
questions developed for use in this study was based upon the 
first, second, and third stages of the Kochan-Dyer (1976) 
model of organizational change in the context of union- 
management relations described in chapter 2. Other items 
were adapted from the questionnaire used by Kochan, Dyer, 
and Lipsky (1977) to assess the effectiveness of cooperative 
safety programs and from other change models described in 
chapter 2.




In this section, the manner in which the productivity, 
employment, and organizational effectiveness data were 
analyzed is briefly described. Readers interested in a detailed 
account of the time-series techniques used in this research are 
directed to Glass, Willson & Gottman (1975) and McCain 
and McCleary (1979). A more fundamental description may 
be found in Box and Jenkins (1970).
The interrupted time-series data were analyzed by fitting 
regression lines before and after the invocation of the pro 
grams (interventions) and then examining changes in the 
parameters (slope and intercept). Unfortunately, time-series 
data are not appropriate for ordinary least squares regres 
sion analysis. This is because ordinary least squares analysis 
requires the error terms to be independent. That is not the 
case with serial data which tends to be correlated. 2 Any 
observation in a time-series may be predicted to some degree 
by observations immediately preceding it or from previous 
random shocks (Glass, Willson & Gottman 1975). However, 
there are methods of compensating for this problem which 
eventually permit the data to be subjected to conventional 
least squares analysis. Those methods have been developed 
by Box and Jenkins (1970) and have been adapted for inter 
rupted time-series analysis by Glass, Willson and Gottman. 
Their methods and computer software were utilized in this 
research.
The interpretation of the time-series data involved com 
paring the actual time-series for the postintervention data to 
what could have been expected or forecast from the 
preintervention observations. Thus a change in level would 
be interpreted as an immediate change in the performance in 
dicator, while a drift change would be interpreted as a
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gradual shift in the time-series to a new level. Yet another 
possible occurrence is an abrupt level change, followed by a 
gradual decline in the drift. This indicates that the interven 
tion had had an initial effect but was beginning to lose its 
potency.
In order to increase the sensitivity of the test, two features 
were stressed. These were the insistence that there be suffi 
cient data points and that the data points be extended over a 
reasonable time frame. In this research, the data were plot 
ted on a monthly basis, thereby generating at least 48 data 
points. This was considered to be within an acceptable range 
(Glass, Willson & Gottman 1975). The use of at least a four- 
year time frame—two years before and after program incep 
tion—should have permitted all possible patterns of varia 
tion to be accounted for. 3
The statistical tables in chapter 6 include the error variance 
from the regression analysis and point estimates of the level 
and drift of the series at time t = 0 with associated t-statistics. 
The assessment of the impact of the interventions may be 
found in the point estimates of the change in the level and 
drift of the series following the intervention with appropriate 
t-statistics. In order to assist readers, some of the more in 
teresting data sets are shown visually using computer 
graphics.
Analysis of Other Study Variables
The thirty-three unionized sites were combined with the 
five nonunion sites to create a sample of 38. The relatively 
small sample size only permitted the use of descriptive 
statistics and correlational analysis. While the descriptive 
statistics and correlational analysis did not permit causal in 
ferences to be drawn or the determination of the relative con 
tribution of each of the independent variables, it did permit 
some tentative propositions to be drawn, as well as providing 
guidance for future research.
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Methodological Findings
As noted in the outset of this chapter, most of the previous 
research on union-management cooperation has been severe 
ly criticized. These criticisms have been based upon the 
almost exclusive use of case study methodologies, weak 
research design, absence of performance measures of effec 
tiveness, poor analytical techniques, the failure to report un 
successful cases, and researcher bias. Only a handful of 
studies have approached the subject matter in a scientific 
manner (see for example Goodman 1979; Kochan, Dyer & 
Lipsky 1977; Macy 1979; and White 1979).
One of the major goals of this study was to further 
develop and refine strategies for studying cooperation and 
change in unionized settings. The findings from this aspect 
of the study are presented and briefly explained in the con 
cluding portion of this chapter on methodology. These 
observations are the result of the field work conducted dur 
ing the study and ongoing monitoring of the cooperative 
union-management and quality of worklife literature. For 
additional discussion of these issues, readers are encouraged 
to see Schuster (1982).
Finding: The Case Study 
Approach Will Continue
In spite of White's observations, wholesale defections 
from case study methodologies are not likely to occur. Quite 
the contrary, the case study approach will remain a primary 
approach to union-management cooperation research (see 
for example Drexler and Lawler 1977; Goodman 1979; Macy 
1979). With some specific methodological refinements to 
enhance the scientific quality of this research, in-depth 
assessments of cooperative programs can add to our 
knowledge of the cooperative process.
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Finding: Industrial Relations Researchers 
Can Learn from the Program Evaluators
The generic study of change and intervention has long 
been a part of the discipline of program evaluation. Research 
on major forms of cooperative union-management ef 
forts—gainsharing, labor-management committees, and 
QWL projects—could benefit from the research design and 
data collection techniques of evaluation researchers (e.g., 
Cook and Campbell 1976; Cook and Reichardt 1979).
Finding: There is a Need 
for Longitudinal Studies
An increasing number of recent studies have been 
longitudinal, with time frames ranging from 6 months 
(Kochan, Dyer & Lipsky 1977) to 6 years (Macy 1979; 
Schuster 1984). This constitutes an improvement over 
previous work in the field, as long time frames are needed to 
assess cooperative experiments. Cook and Campbell (1976) 
have shown that organizational interventions may have a 
variety of different results over time.
In this study two plants utilizing Rucker Plans had abrupt 
increases in productivity following introduction of the in 
tervention. In one case, however, the increase was followed 
by stabilization, while in the second case there was a signifi 
cant decline. It was not until approximately 18 months into 
the Plan that these findings began to appear.
There tends to be a "life cycle" of events in union- 
management cooperation. Cooperation frequently begins as 
a result of stimulus variables existing in the environment of 
the relationship. It subsequently continues over time or dies 
out based upon the achievement of the parties' goals. Studies 
conducted over short time frames do not address the process 
and outcomes of cooperation when the newness and excite 
ment of the "experiment" have worn off. Thus they catch 
only a small portion of the actual life cycle.
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Finding: Studies Should Utilize 
Performance Measures
Researchers should focus on the more significant out 
comes of the cooperative process. There has been too much 
research on attitudes toward cooperation and the 
cooperative process in comparison to that which has examin 
ed performance. This is because many studies which attempt 
to test these measures fail due to lack of cooperation by the 
participants (Kochan, Dyer & Lipsky 1977; Schuster 1983). 
The same problem occasionally occurred in this research.
Even when a research site is willing to cooperate and pro 
vide data, the experience gained in this study indicates that 
this is only the first step toward measuring performance. 
One important finding of this research was the generally 
poor state of performance reporting sytems within firms. 
Many firms do not utilize an actual measure of productivity, 
that is, output per hour, but instead rely on financial 
measures which often tend to be very sensitive to inflation, 
price changes, and the costs of goods sold. Many firms also 
have inadequate measures of quality.
Personnel reporting systems appear to be in equally poor 
condition. Whether the organization maintained records of 
overall attendance, grievances, and related personnel records 
appears to be a function of the commitment of the personnel 
manager, or in large companies corporate policy. Even the 
plants of Fortune 500 firms were not found to have con 
sistently good measures of either productivity or personnel.
In several situations, the method of record-keeping chang 
ed, making the data unusable for time-series analysis. There 
were other instances where the firms provided data, but there 
would be a year's data missing in the middle of the time 
series. Once again, this made the data unusable.
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Finding: Studies Require 
Pre-Cooperation Measurement
Only a small number of studies (e.g., Goodman 1979; 
Schuster 1983), as well as this one, have examined "before 
and after" features of cooperative union-management pro 
grams. This procedure facilitates determination of whether 
the cooperative endeavor was having an effect. For perfor 
mance, but not for attitudinal variables, this determination 
can be accomplished by using archival data.
Finding: There is a Need for 
Control Group Research
One of the main ways of detecting threats to the internal 
validity of any experimental design is to observe whether the 
measured change of the experimental group may have also 
occurred in groups which have not received the experimental 
treatment. Thus, productivity may go up, accident rates 
decline, or employee attitudes improve for reasons entirely 
unrelated to the existence of the cooperative union- 
management endeavor.
At the present time, only two studies have used control 
groups (Driscoll 1982; Goodman 1979). This is probably due 
to the great difficulty of obtaining control sites since these 
locations have little to gain from their participation. It was a 
major difficulty in this study that was never surmounted and 
an alternate strategy was employed.
Finding: There is Difficulty in Obtaining 
the Parties' Cooperation
Gaining initial entry poses problems due to the sensitivity 
of the cooperative process and, often, the inherent distrust 
of the investigator by both union and employer represen 
tatives. The parties tend to fear that a university academic 
(or his/her graduate students) will enter into the process and 
somehow provide a destabilizing influence. There is a fear
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that the researcher will inadvertently disrupt the process. 
This is compounded by the fact that, generally speaking, the 
development of cooperative interaction is a slow, time con 
suming, and frequently costly process. Hence, unions and 
employers may not want to risk upsetting their developing 
cooperative relationship to aid the researcher.
Finding: The Values of the Investigator 
Must be Recognized
The personal values of the investigators involved in this 
line of research pose additional problems. Rosenthal (1966) 
has documented the importance of being cognizant of an ex 
perimenter effect which could influence research findings. 
White has catalogued the importance of research bias in 
Scanlon Plan research and writing. There tends to be 
presumption among researchers operating in this area that 
improving union-management attitudes is a desirable goal 
(Peterson and Tracy 1977). Another view, however, is that 
cooperation has worked more to the benefit of the employer 
and reduced union and employee effectiveness (Peterson, 
Leitko& Miles 1981).
Finding: There is a Need 
to Study Unsuccessful Cases
There are very few studies of failure in union-management 
cooperation (e.g., Gilson and Lefcowitz 1957). This research 
actively sought cooperative labor-management experiments 
which did not succeed.
Little is known of the dynamics that result in failure. As 
will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, significant data 
can be generated from investigating situations in which the 
cooperative process broke down. Unfortunately, in 
vestigating union-management relationships in which the 
cooperative process ended can frequently be more difficult 
than successful cases.
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Unsuccessful cases are generally more difficult to locate. It 
is also more difficult to get the participants to discuss an ex 
perience that they often prefer be left to rest. There is no 
evidence as to what happens following the failure of the 
cooperative process. In addition, it would be important to 
catalogue the issues the parties confront following 
breakdown of the cooperative process.
NOTES
1. At several sites the management objected to our interviewing union 
representatives. In several others, union representatives were willing to 
be interviewed but did not want to respond to the structured question 
naires.
2. The estimation of the parameters would not be adversely affected by 
least squares regression, but the standard deviations of the estimates 
would be. According to McCain and McCleary (1979), in social science 
time-series the bias in the standard deviation tends to be downward. 
Since the standard deviation is used in the denominator of the t-statistic 
test used to test for significance, the t-statistic would be inflated thereby 
increasing the likelihood of a Type I error (Cook and Campbell 1976).
3. Two of the sites had programs of longer duration and were evaluated 
on the basis of their continued effectiveness. The effective date of the last 
collective bargaining agreement was treated as the intervention point. 
This was done because in both cases the parties reaffirmed their commit 
ment to the productivity through the contractual agreement. Either labor 
or management had an opportunity to end the program at that point. In 







This chapter of the book is a comparative analysis of the 
six union-management interventions—Scanlon Plans, 
Rucker Plans, Improshare Plans, Labor-Management Com 
mittees, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife Pro 
grams—which were studied. 1 Although the focus of this 
chapter is on change and interventions in unionized settings, 
most of the discussion would apply to the application of 
these interventions in nonunion situations. The chapter is 
descriptive and utilizes the qualitative data collected as part 
of the case analysis portion of the study, supplemented by 
other literature on the subject. This is believed to be the first 
time that all of these workplace programs have been com 
paratively analyzed. The goal has been to provide a descrip 
tive analysis of these interventions primarily for use by 
policymakers and practitioners.
The chapter begins by briefly defining the scope of each 
intervention. This is followed by 10 topical sections in which 
the interventions are analyzed. Table 4-1 summarizes the 
analysis and reflects the organization of this chapter, which 
includes the following dimensions: (1) philosophy/theory of 
the interventions; (2) primary goals of the program; (3) sub-
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sidiary goals of the program; (4) structure for worker par 
ticipation; (5) mechanism for employee suggestion-making; 
(6) role of supervision; (7) role of middle and higher 
management; (8) productivity-sharing formulas; (9) fre 
quency of payout; (10) role of the union; and (11) impact on 
management style.
Defining the Interventions
At the outset of this chapter it is important to define the 
scope of the cooperative union-management interventions. 
One caveat to this section is that in practice there is signifi 
cant local variation in the design and implementation of each 
program. The presentation in this section may be considered 
the "generic" model. This discussion is preliminary to the 
in-depth discussion which follows.
The productivity or gainsharing plans (the terms are used 
synonymously) differ widely. Scanlon Plans involve an 
employee suggestion program, committee system, and bonus 
formula based upon the relationship between sales value and 
labor costs. Rucker Plans also have a suggestion program 
with a more limited committee system and a bonus formula 
based upon "value added" (sales value - cost of goods sold). 
Improshare Plans generally have no employee participation 
and their bonus formula is based upon engineering standards 
and total labor hours. It should be noted that Rucker and 
Improshare Plans are copyrighted programs. In practice, 
however, it is possible to copy the plans without the aid of 
the consultants. There are instances of companies and 
unions having done this, or where "locally developed" plans 
have incorporated Rucker and Improshare principles to fit 
particular circumstances.
The other three cooperative efforts, Labor-Management 
Committees, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife pro 
jects can be differentiated in several ways. Labor- 
Management Committees (L-MCs) are composed of the key
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management and union actors who meet periodically to 
discuss noncontractual issues, that is, issues not specifically 
addressed in the collective bargaining agreement. As these 
committees mature and a sufficient level of trust and con 
fidence is achieved, the L-MC's activities may be expanded to 
include subcommittees involving rank-and-file members and 
managers at lower levels in the organization. In addition, the 
committees' agenda may be expanded to examine contrac 
tual issues. Quality Circles (QCs) involve shop-level worker 
committees that attempt to use statistical and problemsolv- 
ing analysis to improve quality and productivity in their 
work areas.
Quality of Worklife (QWL) projects are more amorphous 
and varied and, therefore, more difficult to define. QWL in 
terventions can range from cafeteria improvements and 
work rules changes to flexible work hours, autonomous 
work groups, and job redesign and restructuring. Some 
might argue that all of the interventions discussed in this 
chapter are QWL projects and that what is being labeled 
QWL is simply a collection of less utilized and publicized ef 
forts. In this research, only autonomous work groups were 
actually investigated; the information on the other programs 
comes from the literature. Normally, L-MCs, QCs and QWL 
projects do not have gainsharing provisions, although there 
were instances in this research where gainsharing was added.
Philosophy/Theory of the Interventions
In this section the terms philosophy/theory are used 
somewhat loosely. What is intended is the reasoning underly 
ing the goals and structure of the interventions. In some 
cases, such as the Scanlon Plan, the philosophy/theory is 
better developed than in others, for example the Rucker 
Plans.
Of the three gainsharing plans, Scanlon Plans have receiv 
ed the most attention in the popular and academic literature. 
The philosophy of the Scanlon Plan is that the organization
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should function as a single unit, that workers are able and 
willing to contribute ideas and suggestions, and that im 
provement should be shared. The most well-developed 
discussion in this area has been by Frost, Wakeley, and Ruh 
(1974) who have stated that the Scanlon Plan is based upon 
organizational identity, participation, and equity.
Misconceptions exist when a firm attempts to partially ap 
ply Scanlon principles and structures. Several authors have 
indicated that it is the adoption of the Scanlon philsophy 
rather than a particular structure that is the crucial aspect of 
the program (Lesieur & Puckett 1968; Shultz 1951). 
Moreover, McGregor (1960) stated that the Plan was neither 
a formula, a program, nor a set of procedures, but was a 
"way of industrial life—a philosophy of manage 
ment—which rests on theoretical assumptions entirely con 
sistent with Theory Y." (p. 10) An organization's program is 
only a Scanlon Plan when there is an integration of the 
philosophy and structure into a package or system (Lesieur & 
Puckett 1968; Slichter, Healy & Livernash 1960) and only 
when the structure serves to implement the philosophy rather 
than the inverse.
Improshare Plans appear to have an entirely different 
philosophy. Although the originator of the Improshare Plan 
seems to support "consultative" management practices 
(Fein 1981), most of the Improshare Plans studied in this 
research did not have any shop floor participation. Im 
proshare in practice is more a traditional incentive program 
organized on a plant or large group basis. Thus the 
philosophy of the Plan appears to be to tie economic rewards 
to performance, without any attempt at meaningful 
employee participation at the workplace.
Rucker Plans might be viewed as falling somewhere be 
tween the humanistic philosophy of Scanlon Plans and the 
economically rewarded and driven worker under Im 
proshare. Thus, as will be seen, Rucker Plans have most of 
the same participatory elements of Scanlon, but in smaller 
doses or degrees. Managers unsure of the desired level of
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employee participation appropriate in their organization 
might select the Rucker philosophy as a midpoint.
The philosophy of Quality Circles closely resembles that 
of the Scanlon Plan. The premise of the QCs is that worker 
committees can solve production, cost, and quality problems 
when given proper training and support. As with Scanlon 
Plans, the QC approach is one of extensive employee in 
volvement in order to produce commitment and identifica 
tion with the organization. The major philosophical distinc 
tion between the QCs and the Scanlon Plan is the absence of 
a productivity gainsharing formula in the former. The QCs 
omit money as a potential motivator and rely on 
psychological rewards to drive the system.
The philosophy/theory of Labor-Management Commit 
tees is to improve the working relationship between the com 
pany and the union by focusing on attitudinal change. Once 
this state has been achieved, other significant organizational 
issues may be addressed and a meaningful discussion of 
long-standing traditional collective bargaining issues may 
occur.
The L-MC process is inherently slower than the process 
employed in productivity-sharing plans, QCs and some 
QWL projects. The latter three efforts accept the union- 
management relationship as it is and seek to implement im 
mediate workplace changes. In all three instances, improved 
labor-management relations is an assumed by-product of 
these efforts. Yet the cause of the demise of so many 
productivity-sharing, QC, and QWL efforts is that they fail 
to adequately prepare both parties for the major changes 
that are about to be implemented. Frequently, adequate at 
tention is not paid to improving the parties' relationship 
once the effort has been made operational. Worse yet are 
those instances in which management attempts to implement 
one of the change programs without involving the union.
In contrast, the initial goals of L-MCs are to produce a 
change in attitude between the union leadership and the 
management and between the workers and the management.
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The focus is on problemsolving activities and building trust. 
The L-MC process exposes the parties' entire relationship, 
historical, present, and future, for review and analysis. 
Problems can then be identified and jointly developed alter 
native strategies considered. This process is the mechanism 
for building trust and confidence. Thus successful L-MCs 
permit the building of a solid foundation upon which further 
cooperative endeavors such as productivity-sharing plans, 
QCs, and QWL projects may be undertaken.
This is because of the central role that union-management 
relations play in determining employee commitment to the 
firm. For many years, it was believed that dual allegiance, 
that is, employee loyalty to the union as well as the company 
was feasible (Purcell 1954; Stagner 1954). However, recent 
research by Fukami and Larson (1982) demonstrates that the 
potential for dual allegiance is modified by employee percep 
tions of union-management relations. Therefore, if an L-MC 
is effective in improving union-management relations, it 
should eliminate the obstacles to employee loyalty to the 
firm, thereby paving the way for even greater levels of 
change.
Quality of Worklife (QWL) programs are based on the 
premise that improving the working environment will 
heighten workers' state of "psychological well-being" at 
work, and lead to increased job satisfaction. Increased job 
satisfaction will then result in positive work attitudes and 
behavior and increased performance. QWL projects can 
focus on all elements of the work environment—physical, 
human, and systems. Projects to improve the physical en 
vironment might include upgrading and humanizing the 
physical plant. The manner in which people are treated, 
supervisory style changes, work rules revisions, and the 
scheduling of work impact on the human aspects of the 
workplace. Finally, the structure of jobs, and the organiza 
tion and flow of work are examples of systems changes.
It has been stated many times in the popular press, for ex 
ample Business Week ("The New Industrial Relations,"
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1981), that the management of the workplace is changing. 
These six interventions represent a change of philosophy by 
managers, union officials and employees. The six interven 
tions converge on many key issues, for example, improving 
the psychological well-being of employees, increasing 
employee involvement, and sharing of organizational im 
provements.
Primary Goals of the Program
Each of the interventions has a primary or overriding goal, 
plus numerous subsidiary goals. The primary goal of the 
three gainsharing plans is to improve the productivity of 
hourly employees, thus reducing labor costs. In contrast, the 
primary goals of Quality Circles are cost reduction and im 
proved product quality. Labor-Management Committees 
seek to improve communications and union-management 
relations, while QWL projects seek to improve the 
psychological well-being of workers and increase job 
satisfaction.
Subsidiary Goals of the Program
Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare Plans share basically 
the same subsidiary goals. All three seek to improve 
employee attitudes and work behaviors (for example, atten 
dance). The committee and suggestion systems of the 
Scanlon and Rucker Plans also seek to improve communica 
tions, achieve cost reductions, for example, in materials and 
supplies, and to make quality improvements. The oppor 
tunities for these latter improvements to occur under Im 
proshare, absent the creation of similar structures for 
employee participation, is very limited.
The subsidiary goals of Quality Circles and L-MCs are to 
improve work behaviors, quality, and productivity. In addi 
tion, QCs seek to improve attitudes and communication 
which are higher priorities and more central to the
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philosophy and goals of L-MCs. L-MCs seek to reduce costs 
but, once again, this aspect of operation does not have the 
same priority as with Quality Circles. There is a long list of 
subsidiary goals for QWL projects including improved at 
titudes, communication, work behaviors, quality, produc 
tivity, and cost reduction. Additionally, and in varying 
degrees, most of the interventions also seek to achieve decen 
tralized, flat and more humanistic organizations.
Most of the primary and subsidiary goals of the six in 
terventions overlap when they are combined. Yet, important 
distinctions exist in focus and priorities. These differences 
lead to differential outcomes. Hence companies and unions 
seeking quick and sizable productivity increases would be 
best advised to use a gainsharing strategy rather than Quality 
Circles or a Labor-Management Committee. Conversely, 
L-MCs would be far more appropriate for improving labor- 
management relations than gainsharing, QCs, and QWL 
projects. Quality Circles are better suited for cost reduction 
efforts and are less likely to be successful in producing direct 
labor savings.
Structure for Worker Participation 
and Mechanism for Suggestion-Making
One of the most interesting and important workplace 
developments of the 1970s was the increase in worker par 
ticipation or involvement. With the exception of most Im- 
proshare Plans, the other five interventions in varying 
degrees provide for employee participation. Extensive 
employee participation is also possible with an Improshare 
Plan, although it does not seem to occur very often.
Scanlon Plans
Scanlon Plans and Quality Circles provide for the most 
elaborate employee participation. Scanlon Plans have a two- 
tiered committee structure. Distributed throughout the 
organization (including clerical and office positions) at the
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operative level are Production Committees whose jurisdic 
tions generally correspond to departmental and shift respon 
sibilities. The functions of the Production Committees are to 
encourage idea development and to evaluate employee sug 
gestions. Suggestions which are within a specified cost 
($200-$500) can be implemented by the Production Commit 
tee as long as they do not affect the operations of other Pro 
duction Committees. The Production Committees normally 
consist of two to five rank-and-file employees elected by 
their peers, plus supervisory-level managers. In some 
Scanlon Plans, Production Committee members can invite 
other employees to attend committee meetings. The Produc 
tion Committees meet monthly on company time. The super 
visor retains the right to veto Production Committee deci 
sions, subject to employee appeal to the higher level Screen 
ing Committee.
The Screening Committee is composed of hourly represen 
tatives, the union leadership, and key persons in the manage 
ment hierarchy. The Screening Committee has five primary 
responsibilities, including oversight of the operation of the 
Production Committees in three ways. First, suggestions 
which cross the boundaries of Production Committees or ex 
ceed the cost guidelines of a Production Committee must be 
approved by the Screening Committee. Second, as alluded to 
above, suggestions rejected by the Production Committees 
can be appealed to the Screening Committee. Third, it in 
sures that issues or items raised by the Production or Screen 
ing Committees coming within the scope of the collective 
bargaining agreement, may not be discussed in those forums. 
Fourth, the Screening Committee considers current and 
future business problems, as well as other issues of organiza 
tional concern (for example, production difficulties and 
customer complaints). Fifth, the Screening Committee 
reviews the monthly bonus calculations.
Quality Circles
Quality Circles normally consist of 5 to 12 employees from 
the same department or work area. The circle members are
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volunteers. The circle is coordinated by a leader, normally 
the supervisor who has been trained in statistical analysis, 
group dynamics, and problemsolving techniques. The circle 
leader attempts to develop the same skills in the circle 
members. Quality Circles meet periodically (weekly, bi 
monthly, monthly) on company time.
The QC chooses projects they wish to work on. The circle 
then investigates the causes of the problems it has chosen and 
develops a solution to be presented and recommended to 
higher management officials. If the management officials 
approve the circle's recommendation, the circle implements 
the change and monitors the results.
In addition to the circles, most QC programs also have a 
Screening Committee to provide overall direction.
Comparing Scanlon Committees and Quality Circles. The 
Scanlon Production Committees and Quality Circles con 
stitute a significantly different form of organizational struc 
ture from that of more conventional organizations. First, in 
teraction patterns among workers and between supervisors 
differ from conventional firms because the role of the 
worker is expanded. Greater emphasis is placed upon his/her 
ability to influence organization policy and improve 
organizational effectiveness. At many of the research sites, 
reports were given that "workers were listened to" for the 
first time. Second, in both programs, but to a greater degree 
in Scanlon Plans, authority to make decisions is brought 
downward to the same level at which decisions will be im 
plemented. This is because Scanlon committees can imple 
ment their ideas up to a certain cost limit. On the other hand, 
the QCs may get more management recognition because they 
must present their recommendations to higher management 
officials. When implementing ideas, the Scanlon committees 
and QCs are equivalent.
Quality Circles tend to restrict workers to focusing only on 
their immediate work area. In contrast, because of the 
Scanlon suggestion system and more highly developed 
Screening Committee, workers have an opportunity to in-
Structure 87
fluence a larger spectrum of organizational issues. Addi 
tionally, the use of a bonus formula, found in all Scanlon 
Plans but rarely seen with Quality Circles, tends to provide a 
greater focus on the total economic state of the firm. The 
statistical and problemsolving training provided to QC 
leaders and members is better developed than that found in 
most Scanlon Plans and may aid in making them more effec 
tive in determining the causes of organizational problems. 
Here again, there is a convergence in approach as some com 
panies provided their Scanlon committees with "quality 
circles" training. At the same time, in many companies with 
Quality Circles, supervisors have authority to spend money, 
without further authorization, up to a specified limit 
($200-$500), thus enabling ideas to be acted upon at that 
level of the organization. In these situations, there is very lit 
tle difference between the Scanlon committees and Quality 
Circles.
Recently, several practitioners have suggested that 
Scanlon Plans are "the equivalent of Quality Circles with a 
bonus." This statement is only partially correct. From the 
point of view of structure and decentralized decisionmaking, 
the Scanlon Plan and "Quality Circles with a bonus" are 
potentially the same. In both cases, there are shop floor com 
mittees, a productivity-sharing bonus, and an effort to in 
volve employees in decisions which affect them at the 
workplace.
There are, however, several subtle but sharp differences 
between the interventions. First, a Quality Circle tends to in 
volve more employees (10-15) than do Scanlon Production 
Committees (3-5). Second, as will be discussed more fully 
below, the Scanlon bonus formula includes nearly all 
employees—production, office, managerial and profes 
sional. This is part of the Scanlon philosophy—the organiza 
tion should function as a single unit. In practice, the Quality 
Circles interventions that have added productivity-sharing 
formulas have only applied them to the hourly or production 
workforce. Here the similarity breaks down.
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In one Quality Circle's intervention, the circle's proposed 
solution was processed through the individual suggestion- 
award program and if meritorious, a group award is made to 
the circle members. This is very different from the Scanlon 
philosophy in which all improvements are shared by the en 
tire complement of employees. In addition when a nonfinan- 
cial measure of productivity is used, the kinds of informa 
tion typically shared with employees in Scanlon Plan firms is 
not made available.
Most important, organizations that have fully adopted the 
Scanlon ideology seem to exhibit a different set of attitudes 
and values from many of the firms with Quality Circles. 
Although difficult to establish empirically, managers in 
Quality Circles firms are more likely to maintain more tradi 
tional, authoritarian views on employee participation and in 
volvement.
Rucker Plans
Some Rucker plans have two committees, Production and 
Screening, while others have only the Screening Committee. 
In those instances where there are two committees, there is 
one Production Committee consisting of 10-15 hourly 
employees and an assortment of managers. The Production 
Committee meets monthly on company time and reviews the 
suggestion program and discusses production problems. The 
Production Committees tend to be used more for com 
munication rather than problemsolving.
The Rucker Screening Committee is composed of the 
hourly representatives, the union leadership, and key 
management personnel. The primary purpose of the commit 
tee is to supervise the bonus program. In addition, produc 
tion and long range economic issues may be discussed.
Improshare Plans
The Improshare Plans studied did not have formal systems 
of employee participation. In some firms there is a Bonus
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Committee to review the previous month's bonus calcula 
tions. Although the Improshare Plans that were studied had 
no employee involvement similar to that of Scanlon or 
Rucker Plans and Quality Circles, employee participation 
would certainly be possible with an Improshare Plan. 2
Labor-Management Committees
Labor-Management Committees are composed of key 
union and management officials who meet monthly to 
discuss issues of mutual concern. The L-MCs may include 
one to two rank-and-file employee members or may permit a 
small number of employees to visit the committee and par 
ticipate in its deliberation. The main body of the committee 
tends to closely resemble the negotiating committees of the 
employer and the union.
A mature L-MC program may be expanded to include a 
series of subcommittees. In these instances, there will be a 
greater level of employee participation. According to Robert 
Ahern, executive director of the Buffalo-Erie County Labor- 
Management Council (Ahern 1978) the general objectives of 
in-plant L-MCs are:
(1) to provide for regular broad ranging contact and 
communications between the parties during contract 
term;
(2) to focus that contact and communication on positive 
problemsolving, achievement oriented activity;
(3) to build informal relationships, trust and understand 
ing;
(4) to recognize the Union as a communication link with 
employee/members.
The initial goals of L-MCs are to produce a change in at 
titude between the union leadership and the management 
and between the workers and the management. The focus is 
on problemsolving activities and building trust. Thus the in 
itial agenda items tend to be limited. A more mature L-MC 
might be expanded to include the items listed below. The
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degree of cooperation, trust, confidence, and the nature of 
organizational problems will define the actual agenda.
(1) Communication of business and operation progress 
and problems
(2) Planning for the introduction of new machinery
(3) Defining and publicizing quality problems
(4) Improving quality of workmanship and reducing re 
work
(5) Training for new hires
(6) Using production time and facilities most effectively
(7) Reducing equipment breakdown and delays in repair
(8) Skill training for employees and supervisors
(9) Organizing car pools
(10) Redesign of jobs in specific departments
(11) Definition and resolution of broad problems in con 
tract administration
(12) Reducing absenteeism, tardiness and unnecessary idle 
time
(13) Developing alcoholism and drug rehabilitation pro 
grams
(14) Conserving energy and eliminating waste of 
materials, supplies and equipment
(15) Reducing unnecessary overtime
(16) Government mandated programs (OSHA, Affir 
mative Action)
(17) Improving cost performance
(18) Improving local health services
(19) Informing the community on company actions such 
as pollution control
(20) Productivity-Job Security Programs
(21) Gainsharing programs
(22) Cost reduction programs
(23) Security, safety, fund raising
(24) Sales support required. 
(Ahern 1978)
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Quality of Worklife Projects
In QWL projects the nature of employee participation will 
vary according to the program. Some QWL projects will 
have no participation, while others might have informal par 
ticipation or ad hoc committees to work on a particular pro 
ject. Many QWL programs also have a Steering Committee 
to provide overall direction and policy. In the case of 
autonomous work groups, there is a high level of employee 
involvement because workers organize the manner in which 
the work is to be done, and who is going to do it. In contrast, 
flexible work hours and compressed work week programs 
might have no participation.
Impact of an Existing 
Individual Suggestion Plan
Many of the firms in the study had pre-existing individual 
suggestion plans prior to the intervention. Under these plans, 
an employee who made a suggestion would have it evaluated 
by the appropriate manager(s). If the suggestion were ac 
cepted, the employee would receive a percentage of the first 
year's savings.
It is easy to see that programs such as this would conflict 
with most of the interventions. That would be particularly 
true of Scanlon Plans, Rucker Plans, and Quality Circles, 
and less so for Labor-Management Committees, some Quali 
ty of Worklife projects and nonparticipatory Improshare 
Plans. In the case of the former group, the most common 
solution was to terminate the individual suggestion plan. 
Although some employees claimed that they would no longer 
make suggestions, most employees did so in the belief that a 
bonus (Scanlon/Rucker) would follow. Moreover, most sug 
gestion plans had functioned so poorly in the past—taking so 
long to respond to employees ideas, paying very small 
bonuses to employees, often paying a bonus for bad ideas to 
encourage continued employee interest, alienating some peo 
ple whose ideas were rejected, and being very expensive to
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operate—that few people either among labor or management 
objected to the termination.
One Quality Circle program took an unusual approach. In 
that case, ideas emanating from the circles were treated as 
group suggestions, with the circle dividing the payout among 
its members. While this initially appears to be a feasible idea, 
not all employees who desired to be involved were in quality 
circles. There was a waiting list. Thus the unintended conse 
quence of this action was to produce two groups of 
employees—circle members who were "haves," and noncir- 
cle members who were "have nots." In another instance, a 
Rucker Plan firm with a suggestion program that had initial 
ly been very active found it could, after two years, rejuvenate 
its suggestion program by giving a small gift for the "Sugges 
tion of the Month."
Role of Supervision
There is a dramatic change in the role of supervision with 
the implementation of Scanlon Plans, Quality Circles and 
some Quality of Worklife programs, for example, 
autonomous work groups. Supervisors chair the meetings of 
Scanlon Production Committees, serve in the role of circle 
leaders in Quality Circles, and assume a significantly larger 
managerial role in autonomous work groups (Goodman 
1979). In contrast, supervision may have only a small role in 
the Rucker Plan (for example, serving as committee 
members and commenting on suggestions affecting their 
area), and Labor-Management Committees (occasionally at 
tending meetings as a visitor), while in Improshare Plans and 
some Quality of Worklife projects, supervision has no direct 
role.
The Scanlon Production Committees are the key operating 
mechanism in the Plan and the supervisor's effectiveness is 
central to the success of the Production Committees. As 
chairperson of a Production Committee, the supervisor 
coordinates employee participation through his/her conduct
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of meetings and processing of ideas. Much of the firm's ac 
ceptance of the Scanlon philosophy and its attitude toward 
employee involvement will be expressed through the super 
visor in this role.
Under the Scanlon ground rules, the supervisor maintains 
the discretion to veto ideas and suggestions emanating from 
the employees in his/her department and from the employee 
members of the Production Committees. Employees, 
however, can appeal the supervisor's rejection of an idea to 
the Screening Committee. This places the supervisor in a 
potentially vulnerable position as higher levels of plant 
management may overturn a supervisor's veto in Screening 
Committee deliberations. This possibility, once again, gives 
rise to a test of the firm's acceptance of the Plan's principles. 
If supervisory vetoes are never overturned, it is probably an 
indication that the Scanlon philosophy has not been fully ac 
cepted and implemented.
A final point is that in contrast to the other gainsharing 
plans, supervisors in the Scanlon Plan are direct participants 
in the bonus formula. This is part of the Scanlon philosophy 
that the organization works together as a single unit and 
shares the benefits from doing so. In the other two forms of 
gainsharing, Rucker and Improshare, supervisors are not 
normally participants in the productivity-sharing, but may 
receive bonuses through the employer's share of the 
improvement-sharing formula.
Supervisors normally act as circle leaders in Quality Circle 
programs. In this role, they organize the circles, train the 
employees to be circle members, and coordinate the circle 
meetings. Problems are selected, analyzed and recommenda 
tions made to higher levels of management. In order for 
supervisors to assume the role of circle leaders, they must be 
trained in group problemsolving, communication, and 
statistical analysis.
In autonomous work groups, workers take responsibility 
for assigning tasks, frequently with the coordination of the
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supervisor. The supervisor plays a critical role in coor 
dinating the functioning of the group. However, the direct 
responsibility for supervising production is not present, as 
this has become a worker responsibility. The supervisor is 
responsible for planning operations and insuring that the 
work group operates effectively.
Quality Circles, Scanlon Plans, and autonomous work 
groups may be threatening to supervisors. First, the firm's 
expectation that supervisors can direct these programs by 
chairing Production Committees, through circle leadership, 
and group coordination may expose fundamental 
managerial incompetency at this level of the organization. 
Interview data at many sites strongly indicates that company 
criteria for supervisory selection and subsequent training and 
development are very weak. Therefore, it should come as no 
surprise when supervision does not successfully assume this 
larger role.
Other factors may negatively impact on supervision. For 
example, employee ideas and suggestions may expose super 
visory inadequacies to higher levels of management 
(Helfgott 1962; McGregor 1960). Workers often become 
critical of management insisting that it become more effi 
cient. In effectively operating programs, however, the super 
visor's role can become more managerial. Rather than focus 
ing on the control aspects of the position, the supervisor can 
spend more time in the planning and coordination of tasks.
In the Rucker Plan, supervisors may serve as management 
members of the Production Committee. Since this commit 
tee is primarily a vehicle for communication, the supervisor's 
role is very limited. In addition, employee suggestions which 
are processed by the Idea Coordinator may be channeled to 
an affected supervisor for comment.
In Labor-Management Committees, supervisors may be 
asked to attend meetings as visitors in order to expose them 
to the process and to keep them informed of deliberations. 
Because L-MCs provide a direct line of communication from
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the union leadership and rank-and-file employees to the 
chief operating officers of the plant or company, supervision 
and portions of middle management may be bypassed in the 
process. This also can be threatening to these groups as well. 
When, however, the L-MCs add subcommittees, supervision 
and middle management will likely become directly involved 
as subcommittee members.
In Improshare Plans and other forms of Quality of 
Worklife projects, supervision has no direct role in the 
operation of the program.
The Role of Middle 
and Higher Management
Middle level and higher level management play a key role 
in all six interventions. These roles range from the monitor 
ing of the bonus formulas, to committee members, and to 
evaluating ideas. In this section, rather than focusing on the 
interventions, the material is presented by managerial role.
Calculation of the Bonus
In the three gainsharing plans, one or more managers are 
normally responsible for the assembly, preparation, and 
computation of the data necessary to calculate the bonus.
Program Coordinator/Facilitator
In the gainsharing programs and QWL projects, one 
manager normally assumes overall responsibility for coor 
dinating the program. In Quality Circles, this role is known 
as the facilitator. It is the responsibility of the QC facilitator 
to train the circle leaders and review the operation of the 
Quality Circles. In the gainsharing plans, this person nor 
mally attempts to maintain high levels of employee participa 
tion and involvement, along with responding to employee 
questions and concerns about the bonus formula.
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Committee Membership
Managers serve on the Screening Committees of Scanlon 
and Rucker Plans, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife 
projects as well as on the Improshare Incentive Bonus Com 
mittees. The role of managers is to give direction to the in 
tervention and stimulate further efforts. In addition, the 
potential for employee communication is very great and 
many of the managers who were interviewed indicated that 
they used the Screening Committees as much as possible for 
this purpose.
Perhaps the most significant role for managers is in the 
Labor-Management Committee process. Here the full scope 
of the parties' relationship comes under scrutiny. The suc 
cess of the L-MC process can be largely determined by the 
willingness of managers (as well as union leaders) to openly 
and candidly explore heretofore difficult issues. Through 
this format, companies and unions may address the need to 
change aspects of their contractual systems.
Evaluation of Ideas
In the Rucker Plan, one manager acts as the idea coor 
dinator for the processing of all suggestions. The idea coor 
dinator directs suggestions to the appropriate managers for 
review and follows the idea through investigation to provide 
feedback to the employees.
In Quality Circles, employees formally present their ideas 
to higher levels of management for review and approval. 
This is designed to give the employees recognition for their 
efforts.
In the Scanlon Screening Committees, middle and upper 
level managers evaluate suggestions only when they exceed 
cost limitations, overlap the jurisdiction of several Produc 
tion Committees, or are rejected by supervision. In the case 
of both Quality Circles and Scanlon Committees, managers 
may be called upon to provide information to a group work 
ing on a problem.
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Productivity-Sharing Formulas
The three gainsharing programs have elaborate and varied 
formulas for the calculation of productivity improvement. 
The Scanlon and Rucker formulas relate bonus earnings to 
financial performance, while Improshare is more a true 
measure of labor productivity. Scanlon Plans measure the 
relationship between sales value of production and total 
labor costs. Rucker Plans are based on the concept of pro 
duction value (gross sales minus materials, supplies, and ser 
vices) and its relationship to bargaining unit payroll. Im 
proshare Plans are premised on the calculation of a base pro 
ductivity factor involving engineered time standards and ac 
tual hours worked.
In the other three interventions there are no gainsharing 
provisions. All improvements, savings, and cost reductions 
are retained by the company, although they may be used to 
enlarge the "economic pie" in contract negotiations, thereby 
becoming part of distributive or wage bargaining. It should 
be noted, however, that it would be possible to implement 
the other interventions—Quality Circles, Labor- 
Management Committees, and Quality of Worklife pro 
jects—and later on or, presumably, simultaneously add gain- 
sharing. In fact, three such instances arose during this 
research. In one instance, the intervention called for 
autonomous work groups, followed later by gainsharing. 
This strategy never came to fruition as the employees voted 
in opposition to the effort. The second intervention, which is 
presently operational, involved a Quality Circles program. 
Eighteen months following implementation, gainsharing had 
been added. In the third instance, an outgrowth of a Labor- 
Management Committee was the creation of a gainsharing 
program. Thus, gainsharing may exist independently or in 
conjunction with other efforts.
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The Scanlon Bonus Formula
The Scanlon bonus formula is based upon a relationship 
between labor costs and sales value of production. One com 
mon formula is:
Base ratio = (Sales - returned goods ± changes in inventory) 
(Wages & vacations & insurance & pensions)
It is not uncommon to have the formula expanded to include 
other items over which workers have some influence and 
control, for example, materials and energy (Frost, Wakeley, 
and Ruh 1974). In these instances, it assumes an important 
element found in the Rucker formula. The great benefit of 
the Scanlon formula is that it can be easily understood by all 
members of an organization. A typical Scanlon accounting 
statement is presented in table 4-2.
At the end of each bonus period, actual costs are com 
pared with what would have been expected using the base 
ratio. If the actual costs are less than expected costs, the dif 
ference constitutes a bonus pool. A portion of the pool is 
held in reserve to offset those months in which actual costs 
exceed expected costs. At the end of the year, however, the 
pool is distributed according to a prescribed formula.
The formula for the period distribution (usually monthly) 
and the annual closing out of the reserve account differ. The 
most common basis is a 75% - 25% employee/company 
split (Cummings & Molloy 1977). Less common are 
50% - 50% and 100% - 0% divisions. The employee portion 
of the pool is distributed on a percentage basis, the base of 








Gross Sales $6,035 
Less: Sales Return (24)
Net Sales $6,011
Plus: Increase in Inventory 566
Less: Allowance for Quantity Adjustment (40)
Net Inventory Change 526 
Sales Value of Production 6,537 




Total Payroll 1,852 
Bonus Pool 172 
Reserve for Deficit Months (25%) 43 
Bonus Balance 129 
Company Share (25%) 32 
Employee Share (75%) 97 
Bonus Paid as a Percent of Participating
Payroll ($97 + $1638) 5.9 
The Bonus Check will be Distributed
on February 15, 1979 
Status of Reserve: January 31, 1979
Total Reserve $198
The reserve is established in order to safeguard the company against any 
months with lower than normal output. At the end of the year (April 30, 
1979), whatever is left in the reserve will be paid out with 75% going to 
the employees and 25% to the company.
The Rucker Bonus Formula
The Rucker bonus formula is based on the relationship 
between production value and payroll costs of production 
workers. Production value is the difference between the sell 
ing price of firm's products and the cost of materials, sup-
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plies, and services. Once determined, production value and 
payroll costs are combined to provide a ratio. Thus,
Sales Value
- Defective Goods Returned
- Materials, Supplies, and Services (e.g., utilities)
PRODUCTION VALUE
Then,
Bargaining Unit Payroll 
PRODUCTION VALUE
equals the "Plan Standard" by which improvements in pro 
ductivity are measured. Table 4-3 shows the Rucker monthly 
calculation.
Table 4-3
Rucker Plan Productivity-Sharing Results
February 1981
($OOOs)
Sales Value of Output
(What we will receive from customers for products
this month.) $2,571
LESS - Material and Supply Costs
(The cost of the materials and supplies used in producing
that output.) 710
Production Value
(The value added to those materials in converting them into
our finished products.) 1,861
Bargaining Unit Employees' Share of Production Value
at 37.74%
(What the payroll would have been if performance
was no better or worse than in the Base Period.) 702
Bargaining Unit Payroll
(Actual payroll for the month, including a one-month share
of fringe costs.) 698
TOTAL ADDED EARNINGS or (DEFICIT) 4.3
1/3 to Balancing Account




The Rucker measurement of improvement is more 
sophisticated than the Scanlon formula. The Rucker formula 
not only encompasses labor costs, but also materials, sup 
plies, and services and permits employees to share in savings 
from these items. The underlying premise is that it will 
motivate employees to be more conscientious in their use. 
Savings of materials, supplies, and services increases produc 
tion value and the employees share in this savings in an 
amount equal to the Plan Standard (in the example above 
37.74 percent). All savings in labor costs are allocated to the 
employees. Although improvements in employee use of 
materials and more careful utilization of resources can oc 
cur, spiraling costs of these factors of production adversely 
affected bonus earnings in at least two instances. On the 
other hand, several firms indicated that they felt that the 





Beginning of Month 2.3
Put in or (taken out) this month 1.4
End of Month 3.7
Eligible Hours 52,136
Cash Pay-Off Per Hour ($3900-^52136) .075 cents
Eligible Hours is based upon total straight time and over 
time hours worked. The total Eligible Hours is divided into 
the total bonus to be paid, producing the hourly bonus rate, 
which two sites labeled the Cash Pay-Off Per Hour. The ac 
tual bonus received by each worker is determined by 
multiplying his/her number of hours worked by the cents per 
hour payout.
The Improshare Bonus Formula
The Improshare Plan formula is based upon engineered 
time standards plus absorption of indirect hours and total
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actual hours worked. This concept is called the BASE PRO 
DUCTIVITY FACTOR (BPF) and is calculated as:
gpp_ Total Actual Hours Worked
Total Earned Standard Value Hours
(Standard Value x Total Number
of Units of Each Product) 
Example
BPF= 500,000 = 2777 
180,000
The time standard estimates per unit produced, multiplied by 
total pieces produced during the period yields the Earned 
Standard Value Hours. Actual Hours Worked includes all 
hours worked by production employees and nonproduction 
employees involved in shipping, receiving, maintenance and 
clerical operations.
Improshare productivity is calculated in the following 
manner:
Improshare Productivity = Base Value Earned Hours
Total Actual Hours Worked
which is same as
Earned Standard Value Hours x BPF
Total Actual Hours Worked 
Example




Base Value Earned Hours 12,000 
Total Actual Hours Worked 10.000
Hours Gained 2,000 
Employee Share 1,000 or
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Productivity gains are represented by hours saved or gained 
and are distributed between employees and the company ac 
cording to an established ratio, such as 50 percent sharing. 
The employees' bonus percentage is found by dividing total 
hours worked in the current period into man hours gained 
allocated to employees. Each employee receives a corre 
sponding percentage increase in gross pay. Table 4-4 presents 
an example of Improshare bonus calculations.
Table 4-4 
Improshare Productivity Calculations
Earned Standard Value Hours 2431 
Base Productivity Factor (1.48)
Base Value Earned Hours (2431 x 1.48) 3597 
Less Actual Hours Worked 3279 
Hours Saved 319
50% Employee Share 160 
Hours Saved Actual Hours Worked
(160 - 3279) 
Improshare Bonus 4.88%
The Improshare measurement system has several advan 
tages. First, it does not require the company to divulge pro 
prietary information which might fall into the hands of a 
competitor or might be used to the union's advantage in 
wage bargaining. Second, the Improshare formula can be 
applied to smaller groups within the plant, rather than to an 
entire workforce. Third, in situations where there are shifts 
in the labor content of production, the Improshare method is 
a superior system for capturing these changes. Its primary 
drawback is that it is more difficult for workers and 
managers to fully comprehend and understand than are the 
Scanlon or Rucker measures.
Produced or Shipped Dollars/Hours
The three gainsharing formulas are based upon an ac 
counting of organizational production. An important issue is 
when the production is to be recognized.
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Some firms credit production at the point of completion 
and placement into inventory, while others do so at the point 
of shipment to customers. Although this appears to be mere 
ly a technical issue, it has important organizational and 
psychological ramifications.
The optimal way to recognize production is at the point of 
completion. This ties the bonus, and in turn worker input, 
directly to the effort required at the point at which it was ex 
erted. In this way the performance-reward contingency has 
its strongest bridge. Unfortunately, it is often very difficult 
or impossible for an organization to measure its productivity 
in this manner. In other instances, a product produced 
recognition system could be financially dysfunctional.
There are three important reasons why organizations can 
not measure production at the time of performance. In small 
organizations, the information system is not sufficiently 
sophisticated to value changes in inventory each month. 
Recognition of production at the point of shipment is the 
easiest and frequently the only way to measure performance.
In other instances studied, the manufacturers of large 
equipment found that many products required a significantly 
longer production cycle than one month. Since these firms 
manufacture directly to customer order, they recognize pro 
duction at the point of completion, which is generally the 
same as shipment. Sometimes, the large scale nature of the 
production requires a moving-average formula or a quarterly 
calculation and payout system. Recognition of production at 
the point of shipment is also necessitated when price fluctua 
tions make the precise value of the production in doubt at 
the point of completion.
Financial considerations appear to play a major role in the 
decision of program designers to account for production at 
the point of shipment. This is a safer formula as the firm 
pays its employee bonus closer to point of receipt of payment 
for the product. In firms that experience periods where in-
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ventory is significantly increased, no bonus is paid until the 
inventory is shipped. In a recognition at point of production 
system, a bonus would be paid which could adversely affect 
the firm's cash position. Although not frequently recogniz 
ed, this probably represents yet another hidden cost of 
building inventory.
Recognizing accomplishment at the point of shipment 
rather than production breaks the tie between performance 
and reward. Thus there have been instances where a large 
bonus was paid during a period in which production was 
low, worker efforts minimal, and even several where many 
workers were laid off. This can raise the spectre of bonus 
formula manipulation and can reduce employee understand 
ing of the relationship between their efforts and organiza 
tional effectiveness.
Benefits from the Bonus Program
Puckett (1958) has summarized the beneficial aspects that 
underlie the measurement and design of the Scanlon bonus 
system. Many of his ideas are applicable to Rucker, Im- 
proshare and other forms of gainsharing.
(1) The group bonus promotes cooperation rather than 
competition.
(2) The calculation of the ratio has educational implica 
tions for the organization; that is, it forces members 
to be aware of, and understand, key variables.
(3) Labor costs are a measure closer to work force con 
trols.
(4) The standard is based upon the workforce's previous 
performance.
(5) There is a monthly payout, that is, results are provid 
ed as close as possible to when they are earned.
(6) The bonus is paid as a percentage of wages, that is, it 
approximates the contribution.
(7) The measurement process is a part of the productivity 
program. This opens up many dimensions for pro-
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ductivity improvement besides working harder. It is 
used to communicate results and for generating fur 
ther discussion.
Among the most important aspects of the bonus is the 
education of the workforce. In interviews with union officers 
and hourly workers, there was, in some firms, a greater 
understanding of the firms' economic position. However, 
the three formulas can be complex and some firms did a far 
better job of explaining to the workforce the operation and 
meaning of the performance indicators. The process of 
economic education is more fully addressed in chapter 6.
Bonus Formula Manipulation
One of the most sensitive issues in gainsharing plans is the 
fairness and equity of the bonus formula. In unionized set 
tings, all but two of the sites studied utilized external con 
sultants to develop the bonus formula. This appears to be a 
preferred strategy since neutrality in the development of the 
bonus formula is essential. In nonunion settings, consultants 
are sometimes, but not universally, used.
Through the life of a gainsharing program, the need may 
arise for a revision of the bonus formula. This occurs when 
there is new technology or other changes, for example, when 
the price of materials or supplies rises sharply or quality 
changes occur. Improshare Plans provide for a one time 
buyout when the formula works too well to the employees' 
advantage. Although none of the Scanlon or Rucker sites 
studied had buyout provisions, presumably a similar strategy 
would be available.
It is more common in Scanlon and Rucker Plans to utilize 
the consultants on an annual basis to review the soundness of 
the bonus formula. If changes are required, they can be im 
plemented by the consultants. If management and the 
employees/union are confident of the consultant's neutrali 
ty, this normally goes very smoothly.
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Frequency of Payout
Most Scanlon and Rucker Plans calculate and pay a bonus 
monthly, with a thirteenth payment being the end of the year 
distribution of the reserve. Improshare Plans normally 
calculate their bonuses monthly and payout weekly. There 
were, however, several sites which made their calculations 
weekly and paid a bonus on the same basis.
Some sites used a quarterly bonus calculation and distribu 
tion. This is done when the product production cycle is 
longer than one month, or where production or sales do not 
follow a relatively even flow throughout the year. Other sites 
used a weekly moving average formula with a monthly 
distribution system.
Role of the Union
As the bargaining representative for the employees in all 
of these situations, the role of the union cannot be ignored. 
In each instance the union must either agree to the interven 
tion formally, or at least give its tacit approval. Several firms 
attempted to implement programs (e.g., Quality Circles) 
without union approval, only to find an agitated union 
leadership working against employee support for the pro 
gram.
The companies and unions in this study frequently includ 
ed provisions for their intervention in the collective bargain 
ing agreement. In other instances a similar result was reached 
through a memorandum of understanding between the par 
ties. Informal union approval was given in at least two in 
stances.
Union leaders serve on the Screening Committees of the 
Scanlon and Rucker Plans, and Quality of Worklife pro 
grams. In this role, the union leadership has a direct impact 
on decisions affecting the operation of the program. The 
union may aid in giving shape and direction to the effort and
108 Structure
may provide support and encouragement to management to 
continue its efforts. In these settings the most important task 
for the union is to insure that the cooperative process does 
not invade the jurisdiction of the collective bargaining agree 
ment and, in particular, the grievance procedure. Union 
leaders would also normally serve on an Improshare Bonus 
Committee, or if there were no committee, would at least be 
briefed on the operation of the bonus.
The most significant role for the union exists in the Labor- 
Management Committees. The focus of the L-MC interven 
tion is on the attitudinal relationship between the key union 
actors and the key managers. The L-MC process exposes the 
parties' entire relationship, historical, present, and future, 
for review and analysis. The success of the L-MC process is 
determined by the degree of direct company and union com 
mitment to the process. With gainsharing and QWL projects 
the union can be a passive observer. However, the L-MC 
process requires active participation and may require 
changes in union organization and leadership roles.
Impact on Management Style
Scanlon Plans, Quality Circles, and some forms of Quality 
of Worklife projects require substantial changes in manage 
ment style. Management must truly want employee par 
ticipation and must be ready to listen to employee ideas and 
accept employee criticisms. The experience of many of the 
research sites studied indicates that once the process of 
employee participation begins, it is very difficult to return to 
the old style of traditional management.
Rucker Plans require only minimal changes in manage 
ment style, while it is clear that Improshare fits very well into 
a traditional, authoritarian organization.
Labor-Management Committees require that management 
change its approach to union-management relations and its 
methods of operations. An effective L-MC process requires 
management to be open with the union in discussing prob-
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lems, that it trust the union to be responsible in processing 
solutions, and that it be willing to listen to the union when it 
raises sensitive and embarrassing issues.
Conclusions
Each of these interventions can produce positive results. 
The key factor is to find an intervention that is most ap 
propriate for a particular organizational situation. Listed 
below are four issues of overriding importance.
1. What problems confront the organization? Im 
mediate improvements in productivity can sometimes 
be made with gainsharing. Quality improvements and 
cost reductions can be achieved with QCs, union- 
management relations can be positively affected by 
L-MCs, and QWL projects can improve job satisfac 
tion and lead to longer term improvements in perfor 
mance.
2. Which intervention best fits the state of the organiza 
tion and the values of its members? A poor labor rela 
tions environment is no place for a Scanlon Plan, 3 
Quality Circles, or many QWL projects. Nor do these 
programs seem appropriate for an authoritarian 
management style. Ruh, Wallace, and Frost (1973) 
have shown that favorable management attitudes 
toward employee participation can influence the suc 
cess of the Scanlon Plan. Do employees want greater 
involvement? Gilson and Lefcowitz (1957) have 
shown that lack of interest by employees can cause 
workplace involvement strategies to fail.
3. Is the management sufficiently competent to manage 
employee involvement? Some managements are not 
sufficiently competent to evaluate employee ideas and 
suggestions. In other cases, management is too 
threatened to accept change.
4. Is the union leadership politically stable and secure? 
Does the leadership view cooperation as an avenue
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for improving the well-being of the union's members? 
A cooperative strategy can become a political issue in 
a union with an unstable leadership situation. The 
union's leaders must view cooperation as capable of 
producing results that could not otherwise be achiev 
ed through collective bargaining.
NOTES
1. A major union-management intervention that was not part of this 
research in a substantial way was profit-sharing. It is hoped that this will 
be corrected in subsequent studies. Persons interested in profit-sharing 
should consider the work of B.L. Metzger (1981 and 1975).
2. There are reports of at least one or two companies with Improshare 
Plans that have highly developed structures for employee participation.
3. An exception to this might be where closing is imminent.
Chapter 5




In this chapter the questionnaire data on the process 
leading to cooperation and union-management perceptions 
of cooperation are presented. Completed questionnaires 
were available from all of the management interviews (33) 
and from 19 union representatives. There were 18 usable 
matched questionnaires. 1 The five questionnaires from the 
nonunion sites were omitted from this portion of the 
analysis.
The theoretical models discussed in chapter 2 served to 
guide this segment of the research. In particular, the 
Kochan-Dyer model of organizational change in unionized 
settings and the Schuster model of labor-management pro 
ductivity program effectiveness prompted many of the ques 
tions which were posed to union and management officials. 
This section examines the following process issues: (1) the 
stimulus for change; (2) the process leading up to the initial 
commitment to the change program; and (3) the operational 
issues in the design of the interventions. Following that 
discussion is a presentation of the perceptual data on the im 
pact of the union-management programs. Tables 5-1
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through 5-4 summarize the data. Each table contains both 
the union and management responses, with the union 
response in parentheses.
The Stimulus for Change
An effort was made to identify and assess the factors that 
caused companies and unions to enter into cooperative 
strategies. Union and management respondents were posed a 
single open-ended question which asked them to rank order 
the three primary reasons for discussions leading to the 
cooperative labor-management program. These responses 
were later summarized into 16 categories. Table 5-1 
demonstrates the wide variation in reasons for union and 
company participation in cooperative ventures. There were 
13 different reasons given for company involvement, and 14 
distinct explanations for union participation in cooperative 
programs.
Two major stimuli for company participation stand out: 
the need to improve productivity and the need to improve 
labor-management relations. Across all 33 firms the need to 
improve productivity was cited 26 times, while improving 
labor relations was indicated 16 times. Yet another common 
reason for the interventions was as a new compensation 
system (11 firms). Union participation in cooperative ven 
tures appears to be motivated by a desire to improve wages (5 
sites) and in recognition of the need to raise productivity (5 
sites).
When the management responses for the need to improve 
productivity are combined with the responses of economic 
survival (5 responses) and foreign and domestic competition 
(6 responses), there is clear evidence that economic dif 
ficulties of the 1970s and 80s have forced a reassessment of 
company policy toward collaboration with their employees 
and unions. That 11 firms cited a need to improve labor- 
management relations as the most important stimulus for
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cooperation, 16 overall, highlights the growing recognition 
among managers that this aspect of their company's opera 
tions may have been neglected for too long. Since Labor- 
Management Committees, Scanlon Plans, and to a lesser ex 
tent the other interventions require active participation by 
the chief operating officers of the plant or company, these 
groups of managers appear willing to commit themselves to 
working with employees and unions toward improvements in 
labor-management relations and increased organizational ef 
fectiveness.
Table 5-1
Management and Union Responses 































































































































The number of managers who cited as a stimulus the need 
to develop a new compensation (incentive) system raises a 
note of concern. An observation from this research, sup 
ported by several interviewees, was that too many companies 
rely on incentive programs to manage employee work ef 
forts, rather than on competent supervision. More impor 
tant, overemphasis on the incentive aspects of the gainshar- 
ing plans is contrary to the full thrust of these programs. The 
participation, involvement, sharing of ideas and informa 
tion, and building of trust in the organization, all integral 
aspects of gainsharing plans, may not be fully realized when 
the primary reason for the change is to replace an out-of- 
date incentive system or to create one where none existed 
before.
Several union respondents failed to fully answer this ques 
tion, but of those who did, a sizable proportion saw improv 
ing wages (7 responses) as the stimulus to enter into the 
cooperative program. A sizable proportion of union 
respondents (5 responses) also recognized the need to im 
prove productivity.
Thus both from the management and labor point of view, 
the stimulus for change and cooperation is based almost ex 
clusively upon pragmatic concerns, such as the need to im 
prove productivity, increase wages, strengthen the economic 
well-being of the company, improve labor-management rela 
tions, address payment systems difficulties, and solve other 
organizational problems. There was no discussion in any of 
the interviews of the need to increase worker control or to 
give cooperation and change of a more political emphasis, as 
might be found in Western Europe. The stimulus for 
American union-management cooperation and employee 
participation is entirely consistent with the ideology of the 
American industrial relations system. Cooperation is based 
upon a series of pragmatic responses to environmental prob 
lems impacting upon the employment relationship.
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The Process of Change
Table 5-2 presents the management and union responses to 
a series of forced-choice questions related to the process of 
change. Open-ended questions were used to supplement this 
analysis. The questions focused on: (1) whether efforts had 
been made to resolve the stimulus issues in collective 
bargaining; (2) the existence of coalitions to block the pro 
grams; (3) the use of neutrals and consultants; and (4) the 
degree to which the program was viewed as instrumental in 
resolving the stimulus issues.
The limited data in table 5-2 substantiate several 
theoretical propositions concerning union-management 
change and cooperation. Seventy-three percent of the 
management and 72 percent of the union respondents in 
dicated that they had unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the 
stimulus issues in collective bargaining. Thus, as predicted in 
the Kochan-Dyer model, change in union-management set 
tings is only likely to occur when the parties' traditional 
method of interaction (collective bargaining) is ineffective in 
resolving the stimulus issues. This finding has important 
practical and policy implications.
The existence of political opposition to a change program 
was also suggested by Kochan and Dyer as an obstacle to im 
plementation. As expected, the data in table 5-2 show this to 
be a more significant problem for the union (33 percent) than 
for management (19 percent). Companies will need to be sen 
sitive to internal union politics when collaborating on change 
programs.
Political pressures within the union can pose serious dif 
ficulties for even the most secure union leadership. Although 
this opposition oftentimes only represents a vocal minority, 
it can constrict the maneuverability of the leadership. Op 
position coalitions are a potential obstacle to cooperation in 
both the initial stages of discussion and once the cooperative 
program has been implemented.
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Table 5-2
Management and Union Responses 
to the Process of Change
Yes No NA
























Instrumentality of the Program
not very useful
questioned usefulness


















a. Includes only management responses.
In the sample of relationships studied, several ways were 
used to reduce the likelihood of this occurring. First, realistic 
understandings of what the cooperative process meant were 
achieved at the outset. This can defuse the initial assumption 
that the leadership has been co-opted or has sold out to 
management. Second, vocal skeptics were brought into the 
process as visiting attendees at meetings or by giving them 
committee responsibilities. Third, union members were kept 
informed through the posting of committee minutes and 
other union and company communications efforts. Fourth, 
and most important of all, management representatives were 
sensitive to this problem and in several instances avoided 
creating situations which might compromise the union 
leadership. Finally, some union leaders chose to play an 
oversight role rather than direct role in the operation of the 
program.
A very common problem is the lack of skill possessed by 
the parties in devising and implementing cooperative
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strategies. Several theoretical models suggest the necessity 
for qualified consultants. There is presently no shortage of 
consultants available to assist the parties. However, many of 
these consultants are not qualified to work in unionized set 
tings. There are inherent differences between union and 
nonunion settings which must be recognized when devising 
change strategies. There appears to be a limited supply of 
neutrals and consultants who possess both a wide array of 
behavioral science training and a thorough background in 
the mechanics and implications of the collective bargaining 
agreement.
The data in table 5-2 show that in 88 percent of the in 
terventions neutrals or consultants were utilized. In most 
cases the consultants appeared reasonably well-qualified in 
the labor relations area. In one instance involving a Labor- 
Management Committee which eventually recommended an 
elaborate Quality of Worklife program, interview data 
strongly suggested that the consultants did not fully under 
stand the labor relations environment. In this instance the in 
tervention failed. The Labor-Management Committees 
which were guided by the expertise of an Area Labor- 
Management Committee appeared to be more effective than 
those L-MCs which operated independently.
The item measuring instrumentality produced one of the 
most interesting findings. It is apparent that union leaders do 
not perceive labor-management cooperation efforts as being 
as likely to succeed as their management counterparts. Only 
26 percent of the union leaders viewed the effort as being 
"very useful," as compared to 59 percent for the manage 
ment respondents. Thirty-one percent of the union represen 
tatives were skeptical of the intervention as compared to only 
6 percent for the management respondents. Perhaps the 
management respondents believed that their organization 
and careers could derive greater benefits from cooperation 
than did their union counterparts. Moreover, since most 
change programs were first proposed by the company, 
management representatives would be more likely to view
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the effort as having a greater potential in solving organiza 
tional problems. Union leaders, being on the receiving end of 
a long stream of management proposals to improve an 
assortment of employee and performance difficulties would 
be more likely to be skeptical.
Operational Issues
The focus of this section is on the relationship between the 
intervention and the grievance procedure, guarantees of 
employment security, and opportunities for employee par 
ticipation, changes in training programs, and the structure of 
the bonus sharing formula.Table 5-3 presents the manage 
ment responses to the questionnaire items on the structural 
aspects of the change program. Only the management 
responses have been used because they constitute the larger 
sample and the data provided could be verified by other 
documents and records. On the gainsharing and training 
variables, the union sample was combined with the nonunion 
sample to equal 38 sites. Once again, there are several in 
teresting and important findings.
The theoretical (Kochan and Dyer 1976) and conventional 
(Ahern 1978) wisdom has been that the cooperative process 
should be kept separate from the negotiations process and 
grievance procedure. This principle is frequently raised as a 
means of reducing resistance to initial participation in a 
cooperative venture. Seventy-three percent of the 
cooperative efforts prohibit the program from overlapping 
the grievance procedure. This is considered an important ele 
ment in maintaining the proper relationship between the 
traditional collective bargaining process and the cooperative 
endeavor. However, at eight sites, the program did overlap 
the grievance procedure. As a practical matter, the 
cooperative process can only be kept separate from the 
negotiations and grievance procedures when the parties are 
addressing relatively minor problems. As the parties begin to 
discuss significant issues affecting their relationship, they 
will oftentimes find that it is difficult to achieve and main-
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tain this separation, as the cooperative and traditional pro 
cesses are frequently intertwined. An example of this would 
be the case of the Labor-Management Committee which ex 
amined the issue of limited promotion and job mobility op 
portunities within the bargaining unit—a meaningful and ap 
propriate issue for the cooperative process. Because parties' 
collective bargaining agreement clearly specified both man 
ning and job assignment rules, a potential conflict was thus 
created. The critical issue in these cases is how to maintain 
the integrity of the traditional process, while at the same time 
utilizing the cooperative process to the fullest extent. Three 
distinct problem areas were identified.
Table 5-3 











































































a. Includes both union and nonunion firms.
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The first problem area arises when a matter that is the sub 
ject of an active grievance is raised in the cooperative pro 
cess. An often-used strategy is for an active grievance to be 
treated as solely within the jurisdiction of the grievance pro 
cedure, whereas issues which cause or have caused grievances 
are appropriate issues for the cooperative process.
A second problem area occurs when change, particularly 
meaningful change, requires modification of, or additions 
to, the collective bargaining agreement. This occurs when the 
participants to the cooperative process determine that their 
relationship would be best served by incorporating their ac 
complishments into the "web of rules" of the collective 
agreement. A question often arises as to when and how this 
is to be accomplished. In some instances, a memorandum of 
understanding is executed and appended to an existing agree 
ment. In other cases, however, the parties delay change until 
the next round of negotiations and incorporate it into a new 
agreement.
The third problem area is whether the cooperative process 
should be suspended during negotiations. The fear expressed 
in these situations is that aggressive tactics at the bargaining 
table in the pursuit of distributive goals will upset the ten 
tative trust and good faith established in the cooperative pro 
cess. No clear solution has emerged, and situations could be 
found where either strategy has been successful. There is no 
doubt, however, that when the cooperative process is effec 
tive, it reduces the conflict inherent in the traditional collec 
tive bargaining process.
Although a great deal has been written about Japanese 
management systems and their provisions for guaranteed 
employment, the presence of meaningful job security 
guarantees on the American labor relations scene has yet to 
occur. Just three (9 percent) of the firms provided any form 
of employment security guarantees. Of these, one was a pre 
existing supplemental unemployment benefits plan, another
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was a "best efforts to maintain employment" provision, and 
in only one case was there a contract clause providing for 
"no loss of employment" as a result of the intervention. 
Twenty-eight sites (88 percent) had no provision for employ 
ment security. It should be noted, however, that job security 
was an often discussed issue by both union and management 
respondents. Yet, there does not seem to be very much in 
terest in attempting to institutionalize job protections.
One of the most dramatic changes taking place in the 
American industrial relations system is the increase in 
employee participation at the workplace ("The New In 
dustrial Relations" 1981). In this research, 27 (84 percent) 
firms provided for some structure for employee involve 
ment. Although this is only a general finding, it does indicate 
that a significant shift is taking place in management and 
union attitudes about the proper role for employee participa 
tion. Through the qualitative data collection, other questions 
such as the amount and quality of employee participation 
were addressed. Some of these findings will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
As was discussed in chapter 3 several of the interventions 
require changes in management style and an expanded role 
for the union. It would be expected that these changes could 
not be instituted without properly preparing the organiza 
tion. At 20 firms (61 percent), training programs for super 
visors and/or union stewards were part of the institution and 
maintenance of the change effort.
In addition, as employee involvement increased, employee 
skill training requirements were found to change. Two 
primary reasons surfaced in the qualitative data collected. 
First, employee involvement permitted workers to bring to 
the attention of company decisionmakers the need for addi 
tional training to adequately perform existing jobs. Second, 
one result of employee involvement at several sites was an ex 
pression of worker interest in job restructuring. For exam 
ple, at least one firm added inspection functions to produc-
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tion jobs which necessitated training on computer measure 
ment machinery.
To examine the gainsharing aspects of the interventions, 
the nonunion sample was combined with the union sample. 
Twenty-nine (74 percent) of the 38 sites had a bonus sharing 
program. Of these, 18 (67 percent) paid a bonus on a plant- 
wide basis and 9 (33 percent) on a group bonus system. Over 
half the gainsharing plans (14 sites) paid a bonus on a 
monthly basis, while nine paid a weekly bonus, and four 
paid quarterly.
Perceptions of the Impact of Change
Effective union-management cooperation should have a 
positive impact on labor-management relations and on the 
process of improving productivity. Respondents were given 
an eight-item, forced-choice instrument which asked: "To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the follow 
ing statements relating to union involvement on productivity 
issues?" Four other items dealt with perceptions of hostility 
and cooperation in the overall union-management relation 
ship, on the specific issue of productivity, on top manage 
ment commitment to productivity improvement, and on the 
role the union should play in the area of plant productivity 
improvement. The results are provided in table 5-4. Once 
again union responses are in parentheses.
The responses to Item 9 seemed to indicate that company 
and union respondents believed their relationships were 
somewhat to very cooperative (81 percent for management, 
83 percent for the union). More important, the parties 
agreed on the state of their relationship, as the correlation 
between management and union responses was .62 (p< .01). 
Similarly, the respondents seemed to believe that there was a 
good deal of cooperation on the specific issue of productivi 
ty. Seventy-three percent of the management respondents
Table 5-4 
Management and Union Perceptions of the Impact of Change
(1) The union involvement has reduced
friction between the union
and the company.
(2) The union involvement has
provided important information
for making decisions.
(3) The union involvement has resulted
in some major improvements in the
productivity of the plant.
(4) The union involvement has
resulted in higher productivity
in the plant.
(5) The union involvement has resulted
in a better understanding of other
labor-management issues.









































































The union has aided in bringing 
productivity issues to the attention 
of higher management officials.
The union involvement has aided 
in getting the workers to accept 
the suggested changes.
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tility or cooperation that 




(1/6%) (2/11%) (11/61%) (4/22%)
(10) In terms of your rela 
tionship with the union 
(mgt.) on the specific 
matters relating to 
productivity, how would 
you rate the degree of 
hostility or cooperation 
that occurs?
1/3% 3/9% 5/15% 18/55% 6/18%
.54*
(2/11%) (2/11%) (12/67%) (2/11%)
Not Weakly Generally




feel top management is
committed to improving
productivity in this
plant? (1/6%) (1/6%) (8/44%)




should play in the area of plant
Management Union
The union should not be involved in any way in making major 
productivity decisions.
The union should be consulted before management makes major productivity 
decisions, but management makes the final decision. 33/33%





and 78 percent of the union respondents believed that their 
relationship on productivity issues was at least somewhat 
cooperative. Here again, there was significant agreement 
between respondents with the same organization (r=.54, 
p<.05).
One general area where there was less agreement was on 
the commitment of top management to improving plant pro 
ductivity. Fifty-six percent of the union respondents did not 
believe management was strongly committed to productivity 
improvement. Only 6 percent believed that management was 
very strongly committed to productivity improvement, in 
contrast to 45 percent of the company respondents. Perhaps 
even more interesting, 29 percent of the management 
respondents did not believe that their superiors were strongly 
committed to productivity improvement.
There was universal agreement among managers on the 
role of the union on productivity issues with all 33 indicating 
that consultation was appropriate. Most union respondents 
agreed, however a substantial minority (33 percent) of the 
union respondents suggested that somewhat more involve 
ment in productivity issues was appropriate.
On the individual perception items, union respondents 
tended to claim greater credit for improvements than 
management respondents were willing to recognize. This was 
particularly true on the specific issue of bringing productivi 
ty issues to the attention of higher management (Item 7) and 
on raising plant productivity (Item 9). These two issues, 
however, were the only two where there was general agree 
ment between paired responses, r= .48 (p<.05) and r= .56 
(p< .01), respectively. In addition, union respondents believ 
ed their organization deserved more credit for making major 
productivity improvements (Item 3).
Although both union and management respondents felt 
that unions did provide important information for making 
productivity decisions (Item 2), there was significant
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disagreement among the paired respondents, r = -.34, (n.s.). 
Also, on general issues related to labor-management rela 
tions, there was disagreement and low correlation between 
the management and union respondents. In Item 1, more 
union respondents (50 percent to 22 percent) did not believe 
the cooperative effort had reduced friction between the 
union and the company, and fewer (17 percent to 31 percent) 
did believe it had reduced friction. The correlation between 
the paired respondents was also low, r=.13, (n.s.). On 
" reaching a better understanding of other labor- 
management issues" (Item 5), a similar pattern of responses 
was evident, with management perceiving more benefit from 
the effort than the union.
This supports a proposition which has rarely been argued: 
that union-management cooperation works more to the ad 
vantage of management than the union and the workers 
(Peterson, Leitko & Miles 1981). Such a continued finding 
would have very significant policy implications for the prac 
tice of industrial relations. On the other hand, it may be that, 
as Kochan, Dyer, and Lipsky (1977) found in their study of 
safety committees, there is a tendency for management 
respondents to give a more socially acceptable response. If 
that were the case, it would certainly diminish the value of 
these findings. However, since both successful and unsuc 
cessful programs were studied and there is reasonable 
variability in management responses, this probably did not 
occur in this research. In addition, on at least four key items 
there were significant correlations between the management 
and union responses.
Conclusions
There is wide variation in the stimulus or reasons for 
union-management cooperation. But clearly, improving pro 
ductivity, labor-management relations and wages are among 
the most important. In spite of this fact, cooperation will not
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occur if the stimulus issues can be resolved in collective 
bargaining. When the parties actually begin to move to a 
cooperative mode, neutrals or consultants facilitate the pro 
cess.
One outcome of the upswing in cooperation has been an 
increase in employee participation at the workplace. 
Although employers are more willing to encourage this in 
volvement, providing guarantees of employment security to 
workers appears to be as alien a concept as it has been 
historically. Consistent with this finding are two others on 
the potential and actual impact of cooperation. In both in 
stances, management respondents perceived that coopera 
tion was more instrumental in attaining program goals and 
believed there were more benefits from the cooperative ef 
fort than did the union respondents. In the next chapter, the 
impact of cooperation on organizational performance is 
discussed.
NOTES
1. Two other local union presidents were interviewed, but these question 
naires were not usable.
Chapter 6
The Impact of 
Union-Management Cooperation
This chapter presents the results of the impact assessments 
of union-management cooperation programs. The chapter is 
divided into two parts. First is an overall summary of the 
performance of the entire sample of 38 plants. Although not 
all the sites provided data on all of the variables, the 
assembled data constitute one of the most in-depth evalua 
tions available on this subject. In addition to the impact 
assessments, it was possible to consider some of the deter 
minants of success. Readers are referred to the Schuster 
model, presented in chapter 2, that guided this research.
In Part Two, individual case histories are presented to il 
lustrate the diversity of patterns in the practice of 
cooperative union-management relations. In this section, 
both successful and unsuccessful cases are included. Each 
case demonstrates why a plant effort was successful or some 
of the factors that contributed to its failure and demise. In 
addition to presenting statistical data of plant performances, 
visual data are utilized to further illustrate the impact of 
cooperative strategies.
Summary of Performance Changes
Impact Assessments
This section summarizes the performance changes at all 38 
research sites. Ten measures of performance were calculated.
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These were time-series level and drift changes for productivi 
ty, quality, employment, turnover, absenteeism, tardiness, 
and grievances, plus data on the frequency of productivity 
bonus payments, program survival after two and five years, 
and rater effectiveness.
Two notes of caution must be made concerning the sum 
marization of data. First, not all the sites provided data on 
all the variables. This was primarily the case on variables 
such as tardiness and grievances. Most firms do not keep 
records of this information, and many of those that could 
provide the information refused to do so because of the staff 
time needed to summarize it in a reasonable fashion. Second, 
as was discussed in chapter 4, some variables were not ex 
pected outcomes of the programs. Thus it would have been 
expected that productivity did not increase for some Labor- 
Management Committees since improving labor- 
management relations was the goal of the intervention and 
productivity improvement only a desired by-product.
Table 6-1 presents the summary of the level and drift 
changes. It should be recalled that a level change is an abrupt 
change in performance when the post-cooperation observa 
tions are compared with the pre-cooperation observations, 
while a drift change is a gradual change over time. Table 6-1 
categorizes the performance variables into three categories: 
Positive Impact, No Impact, and Negative Impact. 1
Of the 23 sites providing productivity data 11 (49 percent) 
had a positive level change, 10 (43 percent) had no change, 
and 2 (9 percent) were negative. On trend, 4 had positive 
changes, 12 had no change, and 7 a negative impact. Many in 
this latter group of 7 represent situations where there was a 
positive level change, followed by a decline. For the most 
part quality improved or was unchanged in both level and 
drift, although data were provided by only 4 sites.
A more interesting finding comes from the employment 
data. Historically, cooperation and productivity improve-
Table 6-1 
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ment have been feared by unions and workers as leading to a 
reduction in employment. Just the opposite was found in this 
case. In 23 of 27 firms, employment either increased or was 
unchanged following the intervention. Moreover, the long 
term effect was positive or unchanged in 21 situations. The 
analysis of this variable at each site was then compared with 
industry employment data. The result was that employment 
at the firm closely follows industry patterns and is probably 
most influenced by industry conditions. There were, 
however, several sites where the industry declined and the 
firm remained stable or increased. Interview data from 
management respondents suggest two reasons for this. First, 
that the cooperative effort, particularly gainsharing, had 
aided the plant in reducing unit costs, thus increasing its 
ability to compete and enabling it to acquire a larger market 
share. A second reason was a hesitancy to lay off workers 
because the benefits of cooperation might be lost. Union and 
worker militancy might increase as a result of the bitterness 
of a layoff.
The level of turnover declined in two instances and was 
unchanged in five. Tardiness declined in the one instance in 
which it was measured. Grievance rates were only improved 
in one of four sites studied, yet there were consistent reports 
of improved union-management relations. One interesting 
finding was that absenteeism was largely unchanged (71 per 
cent) in level but did improve in two of seven instances. 2
Table 6-2 summarizes the bonus payout frequency, sur 
vival (after two and five years), and rater effectiveness. Pay 
ment of a bonus is one measure of organizational productivi 
ty improvement. Of the 23 sites providing bonus data, 16 (70 
percent) paid a bonus more than 50 percent of the time. 
Thirty-two (84 percent) cooperative programs survived the 
first two years, but four (11 percent) failed and two had not 
yet reached the two-year anniversary. Cooperation con 
tinued for five years in 14 of 16 sites where it had passed the 
two-year mark. Finally, rater effectiveness, defined as the
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extent to which the program was meeting its stated goals and 
objectives, was categorized by a single rater as being "very 
or somewhat successful," "not much effect," or "somewhat 
or very negative." Twenty-two (59 percent) cooperative ex 
periments were characterized as having had a positive effect, 
11 (29 percent) had not much effect, and 5 (13 percent) were 
rated as having had a negative effect.
Table 6-2 







































Determinants of the Effectiveness of Cooperative 
Union-Management Programs
In chapter 2, five factors thought to influence cooperative 
union-management program success were slated for em 
pirical investigation and were also utilized in the descriptive 
analysis later on in this chapter. These were guarantees of 
employment security; a structure for employee participation; 
the method, frequency, and amount of compensation pro 
vided by the program; an effective acceptance strategy; and
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an appropriate workplace technology. Some of these issues 
were also discussed in chapter 4 in the section on operational 
issues.
Because of the small sample size, it is not possible to con 
clusively report findings on the determinants of success. 
Although cross-tabulations were performed, and Chi-square 
statistics calculated, in many cases there were too many cells 
with too few observations to provide a meaningful analysis. 
However, the descriptive statistics do point to at least several 
variables that might be possible determinants of success. 
Each of these is briefly discussed as it relates only to produc 
tivity improvement, since sample size for most of the other 
variables is insufficient even for this level of analysis. 
Readers are cautioned that these results must be treated as 
preliminary.
Employment security
Guarantees of employment security were believed to in 
fluence program success because of historic worker fears 
that productivity improvement would reduce employment 
opportunities. The widespread reporting of Japanese 
management practices with their limited forms of lifetime 
employment have been suggested as a model for the 
American scene.
Contrary to the hypothesis, only three firms provided any 
type of employment security guarantees. One Scanlon Plan 
firm had a provision stating that no employees would lose 
their jobs with the company as a result of a Scanlon sugges 
tion. Another firm provided supplemental unemployment 
benefits as part of a national agreement, but this was 
unrelated to the cooperative program. A third site had provi 
sions for a "best efforts" clause which would have 
guaranteed very little job security. No additional firms pro 
vided any other guarantees of employment security. This is 
not to suggest that the subject was never discussed. It was a 
topic that both union and management respondents in
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sizable numbers raised. Many firms told their employees that 
increasing the economic performance of the company would 
have a positive effect upon their future employment pros 
pects. Many union leaders entered into cooperative ventures 
with a strong hope and expectation that just such a result 
would occur.
Nevertheless, the evidence points to an absence of formal 
or informal provisions dealing with employment security 
issues.
The structure for employee participation
It was hypothesized that opportunities for employee par 
ticipation would influence cooperative program success. 
Moreover, the greater the degree of employee participation, 
the more successful the program would be. Because of small 
cell sizes, this variable was combined into two factors: 
departmental committees and plantwide/no opportunities 
for employee participation.
Twenty-seven organizations permitted some form of 
employee participation. However, the results for this prop 
osition were largely inclusive. Of the 17 sites with some form 
of employee involvement in which productivity data were 
available, 8 had realized a position change in productivity 
level, seven had no change, and two were down.
Examining the relationship between participation and pro 
ductivity may be too narrow in focus. Many of the firms 
with elaborate structures for worker involvement realized 
many nonproductivity improvements (such as quality and 
product design changes) through employee suggestions and 
projects. In many situations, simply providing employees the 
opportunity to be involved can produce a changed workplace 
environment. On the other hand, because Labor- 
Management Committees provide for limited forms of 
employee involvement, they were treated in the same manner 
as those sites with departmental committees. Unless L-MCs
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evolve to the stage of establishing departmental or sector 
subcommittees, they provide very little meaningful employee 
involvement. Thus, great care must be taken in interpreting 
these inconclusive findings.
It must be noted that of all the interventions studied, the 
Scanlon Plan seemed to have the strongest staying power. 
Whether this had to do with the bonus formula, the high 
level of employee participation, or some other factor is not 
known. What can be said, however, is that other 
productivity-sharing plans provided bonuses and had many 
other features similar to the Scanlon Plan. What appears to 
make the Scanlon Plan different is the commitment to, and 
institutionalization of, a high level of employee involvement.
The method, frequency, and amount of compensation
Since many cooperative union-management programs 
provided employees with an opportunity to share in produc 
tivity improvements, it was suggested that the manner in 
which employees were compensated would influence pro 
gram success. It was hypothesized that large group (or plant- 
wide) sharing mechanisms, distributions of payouts, and, if 
available, large bonuses, would lead to program success.
Of the 38 firms (combined sample) studied, 28 contained 
some financial sharing provisions. There were 19 sites with 
plantwide distribution of productivity bonuses in which pro 
ductivity data were available. Of these 19, 9 experienced an 
upward movement in productivity level, 8 were classified as 
unchanged, and 2 were down. Of the 4 sites with no sharing 
provisions, 2 experienced a productivity gain and 2 did not.
There were 18 sites with plantwide sharing provisions. 
Productivity data was available for 11. Of these 11, produc 
tivity increased in 7, was unchanged in 3, and was lower in 1. 
There were 9 sites with group distribution of bonuses. Of the 
7 where productivity data were available, productivity was 
higher at 1 site, unchanged at 5 sites and lower at 1.
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Thus, it would appear, subject to sample limitations, that 
cooperative programs with plantwide sharing provisions are 
preferable to those with group sharing provisions. The ra 
tionale for a plantwide distribution strategy is to encourage 
teamwork, cooperation, and ease of bonus administration. 
Plantwide sharing of bonus earnings eliminates a major 
problem that was detected at those plants with group-based 
distributions. The group-based plans generally provide dif 
ferential bonus earnings and this can create a problem of in 
ternal equity and a high level of dissension regarding the pro 
gram. This is particularly true when there is skepticism as to 
the accuracy of the bonus sharing formula or standards of 
performance.
An effective acceptance strategy
An effective acceptance strategy was defined as one that 
included an active training program for first-level supervi 
sion and union stewards, use of external consultants, and an 
effective mechanism to communicate the activities of the 
cooperative program.
Twenty sites (61 percent) had training programs for super 
visors and stewards to facilitate the implementation of the 
cooperative program. This is very important since such train 
ing programs tend to produce a better understanding of the 
goals and implications of the cooperative programs. Train 
ing programs at this level of the organization can also work 
to dismantle some of the hostility that often exists between 
supervisors and stewards.
Productivity data were available at 12 of the 20 sites with 
training efforts. Of these 12, productivity increased at 8 sites 
and was unchanged in 4. Of those 13 sites where no training 
was utilized, productivity data were available for 10. Of 
those, productivity increased at 2, was unchanged at 6, and 
was lower at 2. Thus, it would appear that training programs 
should be conducted as part of any cooperative labor- 
management intervention.
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Neutrals or consultants were involved in 28 of the 33 in 
terventions (85 percent). Productivity data were available for 
20 sites. Of these, 10 experienced a productivity gain, 8 were 
unchanged, and 2 were lower. Third parties play an impor 
tant role because companies and unions often do not fully 
understand how to organize the cooperative processes. Ex 
pert consultants are almost always essential in designing 
productivity-sharing formulas. Not only do they provide 
financial expertise, but they also enhance the fairness and 
equity of the bonus.
There was a great deal of variability in how each of the 
sites communicated the activities of their program and it was 
decided not to attempt to categorize them. It is possible, 
however, to note some of the more effective approaches. The 
successful productivity-sharing plans took the employees 
away from their work stations on company time to explain 
the mechanics of their plans. These sites also printed 
booklets describing their plans in detail and including many 
commonly asked questions and answers. Many firms with 
productivity-sharing plans stop work to publicly announce 
the bonus each month and thereafter spend considerable 
time explaining to their employees in plant and departmental 
meetings why a bonus was earned or why the company and 
employees failed to perform at a level to earn a bonus.
Most firms, regardless of type of cooperative program, 
utilize bulletin boards and circulation of minutes of meetings 
to keep participants informed of activities in other areas. 
Elected members of employee committees are often permit 
ted to bring visitors (other workers) to committee meetings 
to increase their understanding of the cooperative process. 
One large innovative firm has made the agendas of its labor- 
management subcommittees part of its management infor 
mation system. Thus, the plant manager receives a periodic 
update of activities. When a project has failed to receive a 
management response after 30 or 60 days, the plant manager 
begins to ask questions.
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Technology
Technology was hypothesized to influence the success of 
cooperative union-management programs for two reasons. 
First, although these interventions change the structure of 
the organization, it was believed that the structure and 
technology should be congruent. Second, and most impor 
tant, it was believed that in more capital intensive or 
mechanized operations, workers would have fewer oppor 
tunities to provide inputs into the production processes. This 
would reduce the effectiveness of the cooperative effort, par 
ticularly where a significant degree of employee participation 
was expected.
The technology variable was measured using a Woodward 
scale and later recast into more mechanized (mass produc 
tion industries—production runs of over one week) and less 
mechanized (more customized operations and those with 
production runs of less than one week).
Productivity data were available for 10 sites that were less 
mechanized and 12 that were more mechanized. The results 
were contrary to what was expected. Of the less mechanized 
sites, 3 had productivity gains and 7 were unchanged. Of the 
more mechanized sites, 7 had productivity gains, 3 were un 
changed, and 2 were lower. One interpretation of this find 
ing may be that cooperative interventions can be effective in 
a variety of situations; however, when workers increase their 
efforts, the impact on productivity is greater in more 
automated assembly situations.
Other factors related to success
Type of ownership appeared to influence success, with the 
subsidiaries of large corporations more likely to achieve in 
creases in productivity than family owned or corporate 
enterprises. Perhaps these firms have more resources and 
more capable management to facilitate the implementation 
of the interventions. In addition, productivity level changes
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were more likely to occur with older work forces, but trend 
changes were more likely to result with younger work 
populations.
Case Studies of Cooperation
Ten case studies are presented in this section. 3 Each case 
study was chosen because it offers some lesson or set of con 
ditions to foster cooperation. Several cases were selected 
because they highlight the difficulties and pitfalls that caused 
the interventions to fail.
Case study 1 is the classic case of cooperation to save the 
plant and the jobs of the workforce. Case study 2 
demonstrates that a cooperative strategy can be used to 
motivate the workforce and improve the quality of worklife. 
Case study 3 provides evidence that it may take time for the 
full benefits of cooperation to be realized. Case study 4 
demonstrates the successful implementation of a labor- 
management committee. Case study 5 combines three union- 
management relationships that have been in existence for 
more than ten years.
Cases 6-10 highlight the difficulties and problems of 
cooperation. Case study 6 shows how a successful effort can 
lose its effectiveness when fairness and equity in the bonus 
formula are lost. Case study 7 demonstrates that not all in 
terventions may be appropriate to all organizational settings 
and union-management relationships. Case study 8 outlines 
the failure of a labor-management committee to adequately 
address the organization's problems, while 9 shows how 
traditional labor-management issues can interfere with the 
implementation and acceptance of QWL concepts. Finally, 
case study 10 is a warning of the potential misuse of gain- 
sharing.
Each case study contains a brief description of the plant 
and its cooperative effort. For each case there is a statistical 
summary table which includes point estimates of the level
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and drift of time-series at time t = 0 with associated 
t-statistics. Estimation of post-intervention change in level 
and drift with associated t-statistic permits an assessment of 
the impact of the cooperative union-management efforts. 
The numbers identifying each firm correspond to the site 
numbers in table 3-2 and 3-3, thus enabling readers to fur 
ther examine the characteristics of each plant.
Case Study 1: Cooperation to Save the Plant
Site 8 was a manufacturer of abrasive cut-off wheels for 
cutting steel and other metals. The plant employed 140 pro 
duction workers. In the late 1960s, the plant began to suffer 
financial difficulties. During the period 1968-71 there were 
four wildcat strikes and several work slowdowns. The plant 
had operated with negotiated production standards which 
were the source of considerable tension between manage 
ment and the union. In 1971, after contract negotiations fail 
ed, the corporation announced plans to close the plant for 
economic reasons.
As a result of the decision to close the plant, the state 
government and the international union district director 
became involved. Through a series of hastily arranged tripar 
tite negotiations, conditions were reached under which the 
plant could remain open. Prior to the decision to close, the 
Scanlon Plan had been under consideration but was rejected 
by the corporation. Plant management was able to convince 
corporate officials of the viability of the Plan as an alter 
native to closing. The union also offered its full cooperation 
to improve productivity and an end to negotiated work stan 
dards. In return, management agreed to contractual 
language which would preclude the layoff of workers as a 
result of suggestions from the Scanlon committees.
The philosophy of the Scanlon Plan was expressed in the 
program handbook:
The SPIP recognizes each employee as an in 
dividual—each able to contribute to the group
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something more than just day-to-day work. The 
plan provides a way to communicate ideas and sug 
gestions to management, and to share in the 
benefits of the improvements. Under the SPIP, the 
Opportunity is provided for people to say how their 
own jobs might best be done. It means all 
employees thinking a little bit more about who gets 
the job after his or her operation and how the job 
might be made easier for them. The plan means 
that the older, more experienced employee gives his 
ideas on how the job should be done to the new 
employee. It means that the younger employee may 
be more physically able to help or make his con 
tribution to the older employee. It means that 
management makes decisions on what is good for 
the company and not on what is good for any in 
dividual.
Site 8's experience was analyzed for the period January 
1969-December 1973, with the intervention point being 
March 1971, the start of the Scanlon Plan. As table 6-3 in 
dicates, there was an abrupt rise in productivity to a higher 
and statistically significant level (t= 8.14, p< .001) following 
introduction of the Scanlon Plan. This change is shown even 
more dramatically in figure 6-1. Readers may notice that the 
sharp increase in productivity began in the month prior to 
the formal installation of the plan. This can be explained by 
the threat posed by the shutdown and the decision of the 
company to pay a bonus for the prior month's productivity 
performance. For the first three years of the Plan, bonuses 
averaged 4.0 percent, 4.4 percent, and 9.3 percent. The firm 
was unable to provide monthly employment data. Instead, 
annual data were provided. There was a layoff of 20 percent 
of the bargaining units' employees in the six months prior to 
the institution of the Plan. Following the introduction of the 

















Level T-Stat Lev Chg T-Stat
Productivity 19.94 30.97 6.89 8.14 + 










This is a classic case of union-management cooperation to 
save the business and in turn save the jobs of union 
members. Scanlon enthusiasts have claimed that productivi 
ty can "go through the roof." Although that is unlikely to be 
a universal result, this firm certainly experienced a marked 
increase in productivity, along with no reduction in employ 
ment following the Plan's introduction. In subsequent years, 
the Scanlon Plan continued to be successful and ten years 
following its installation remained active.
Case Study 2: Cooperation to Motivate the Workforce 
and Improve the Quality of Worklife
Site 4 is a plant of a large multinational corporation. The 
plant housed two separate operating divisions. The larger 
division manufactured original equipment for jet aircraft 
engines, while the smaller division rehabilitated service-run 
turbine parts to provide additional flying hours for the air 
craft. From an organizational perspective, the two divisions 
were distinct units. Each had a separate division manager 
with key operating personnel reporting to one of these 
managers, and both were independent profit centers. 
However, the divisions shared common staff departments, 
for example, accounting and personnel. More important, 
there was only one union representing all the employees at
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the site and they were covered by a common collective 
bargaining agreement. There was one Scanlon Plan encom 
passing all employees of both divisions.
In two other situations in this study in which the manage 
ment structure was similar, both companies opted to utilize 
separate plans. Thus one company had two Rucker Plans in 
nearby plants, while another company utilized four Im- 
proshare Plans with four operating divisions on the same 
site. In both instances, the employees constituted one 
bargaining unit with a single collective agreement and 
separation into distinct plans caused friction, particularly 
when differential bonuses were earned. The single-plan 
strategy utilized at this site would seem to be the preferred 
one.
The plant had 900-1000 nonsupervisory production 
employees who had organized an independent union in 1952. 
The history of labor relations at the plant had been relatively 
peaceful. Strikes had been rare and of a short duration. 
Although the union was an independent one, it had 
negotiated continuous improvements in its contracts. Wages 
and benefits were among the highest in the community.
The stimulus for the Plan stemmed from corporate en 
couragement for workplace innovation and the desire of 
local management to motivate a somewhat older workforce 
and to improve productivity. The plant's top management 
was strongly committed to the Scanlon philosophy. The 
union leadership also saw benefits (greater role in the opera 
tion of the plant, increased wages) for its members. This led 
to the development, implementation and continued 
strengthening of the structure for employee participation. 
This site permits a detailed examination of the Scanlon Plan 
in operation.
All Scanlon Plans have a two-level committee struc 
ture—Production Committees designed along departmental 
lines and a higher level Screening Committee. There were 26 
Production Committees: 14 first shift, 10 second shift, and 2
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third shift committees. There were also committees of 
salaried and clerical workers. The Production Committees 
ranged in size from two to five employees elected (one-year 
term) to serve on each committee and one managerial 
employee appointed as chairperson by the company. The 
committees met at least once a month on company time. To 
increase employee participation, each elected member was 
permitted to invite an employee from his/her area to attend 
Production Committee meetings. The Production Commit 
tees were responsible for discussing problems and respond 
ing to suggestions within their jurisdictions. There were five 
possible dispositions for employee suggestions:
(1) Accept and implement a suggestion. This can be done 
when the cost does not exceed $225. When a sugges 
tion is accepted, it is the responsibility of the commit 
tee to inform the suggestor.
(2) Reject the suggestion. The Production Committee is 
responsible for informing the suggestor of the reasons 
for the rejection.
(3) Accept the suggestion and put it under investigation. 
This is done when there is not enough information to 
determine whether the savings involved would offset 
the costs of putting it into effect.
(4) Accept the suggestion and refer it to the Screening 
Committee. This occurs when the implementation 
costs exceed $225.
(5) Reject the suggestion and refer it to the Screening 
Committee. These are situations in which there is a 
difference of opinion between the chairperson of a 
Production Committee and an employee member 
over the merits of a suggestion. It should be noted 
that the chairpersons of the Production Committees 
are appointed by management and maintain veto 
power over decisions reached.
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In most Scanlon Plans, when a suggestion falls within the 
jurisdiction of another Production Committee, it is normally 
referred to the Screening Committee for a decision. At this 
plant the approach differed. Where there was a potential 
jurisdictional conflict concerning a suggestion, it was the 
responsibility of the chairperson to obtain approval from 
other Production Committees. Only when there was an ac 
tual conflict was the suggestion referred to the Screening 
Committee. Thus an attempt was made to maintain decision- 
making at the lowest level of the organization.
Selection of employee members for the Screening Com 
mittee was also a function of the Production Committees. 
The Production Committees selected an hourly represen 
tative to attend an organizational meeting of the Screening 
Committee. The first and second shifts had 14 and 10 Pro 
duction Committees, respectively. At the Screening Commit 
tee organizational meeting the 11 representatives from the 
first shift must select five persons from their group to serve 
on the Screening Committee. The second shift had four 
seats. The third shift and office each had one seat. Those 
Production Committees with no active members on the 
Screening Committee are permitted to send a guest each 
month.
The Screening Committee (organizational chart below) 
had 21 members. The 21 included 11 elected employee 
members, 9 managerial employees, and the union president 
and a union representative appointed by him. The Screening 
Committee meets at least once a month also on company 
time. Its responsibilities include assisting the Production 
Committees, reviewing the monthly bonus calculations with 
a view toward identifying problems and opportunities, and 
considering potential business problems. As with the Pro 
duction Committees, management maintains decisionmak- 
ing authority on the Screening Committee.
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Two General Managers to Serve as Committee Chairpersons
Manufacturing Manager Union President 
Industrial Engineering Manager Union Board Member 
Engineering Manager 1st Shift Production Committee 
Production Control Manager Representatives (5) 
Quality Control Manager 2nd Shift Production Committee 
Personnel Representatives (4) 




Through the first 45 months of meetings, employees had 
made 1884 suggestions. Seventy percent had been accepted 
and 7 percent were under review. In the first three years of 
the Plan, bonuses averaged 5.9 percent, 6.5 percent, and 7.1 
percent, respectively.
Productivity and employment data for Site 4 were analyz 
ed for the periods January 1973-December 1977, and 
December 1972-December 1977, respectively, with the in 
tervention occurring in May 1975. This analysis is summariz 
ed in table 6-4. Productivity was measured separately for 
each division. For the manufacturing division there was a 
significant upward shift in the level of the time-series follow 
ing introduction of the Plan (t = 2.09, p<.05). Over time 
there was a positive, although not statistically significant, 
upward trend in the series (t= .60). The productivity analysis 
for the repair division revealed that the productivity increase 
was more gradual, as indicated by the change in drift 
(t = 3.38, p<.001). Employment remained stable, with 
almost no change in the level (t=.31, n.s.) or the drift 
(t = -.06, n.s.).
This Scanlon Plan demonstrates that internal, 
noneconomic factors can be a sufficiently powerful stimulus 
to induce effective union-management cooperation. A 
critical factor in the success of this Scanlon Plan is the com-
Productivity 
manufacturing 
(N = 65, df=61)
Productivity repair 
(N = 65, df=61)
Employment 





Level T-Stat Lev Chg T-Stat Drift T-Stat Dft Chg T-Stat
.92 4.81 .40 2.09* 0.03 .81 0.02 0.66
3.59 15.88 0.49 1.56 -0.06 -5.15 0.06 3.38 +
105.81 26.84 1.21 0.31 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05
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mitment of top management toward employee involvement 
in the daily and long range operation of the company. This 
commitment has manifested itself in the creation of an en 
vironment and structure to produce the desired outcome. 
Also important has been the maintenance of a sense of equi 
ty by virtue of the payment of bonuses stemming from pro 
ductivity increases.
Case Study 3: Evidence of a Delayed Effect
Site 16 (100 bargaining unit employees) designs and 
manufactures automated, continuous roll-to-roll processing 
machinery systems for converting the physical composition 
of paper, boards, film, foil, plastics and textiles into finished 
products. In recent years, labor relations had not been good. 
In 1973, there was a 12-day strike, and in the subsequent 
round of negotiations (1976) a 17-week strike occurred. Both 
company and union representatives agreed that problems 
and inequities in the plant's individual incentive system were 
the cause. During the strike, employees, mostly skilled 
machinists, took jobs elsewhere. After the strike, turnover 
continued at a high rate when a large company opened near 
by offering similar employment at much higher rates of pay.
As the 1979 negotiations neared, both sides prepared for 
another strike. In addition, the company argued that under 
the existing incentive program, workers were earning too 
high a premium for "below standard" performance, while 
the union reported that the existing payment system (base 
plus incentive) did not permit employees to realize sufficient 
earnings.
During the 1979 negotiations, the company proposed the 
introduction of the Rucker Plan. The union, which had vast 
experience at the national level with productivity-sharing 
plans, agreed to the Plan subject to the establishment of a 
new hourly pay rate. An agreement was reached to establish 
a six-month average of individual earnings under the old in 
centive system, plus an 8 percent pay increase.
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The Rucker Plan did not deviate from the traditional 
Rucker form as discussed elsewhere. There was a suggestion 
program, a committee system, and the productivity-sharing 
bonus formula. Employee suggestions are the responsibility 
of the Idea Coordinator, the manager of industrial engineer 
ing, who assigns the suggestion to an appropriate manager or 
professional employee for study, analysis, and a recommen 
dation.
There was a single employee committee, the Group Incen 
tive Committee (GIC), with 10 employees chosen by manage 
ment serving four-month rotating terms. Initially three 
criteria were used for selection: geographic dispersion, status 
among the hourly workforce, and in some cases initial op 
position to the Plan. The union president is a permanent 
committee member. The GIC meets twice a month on com 
pany time. At the first meeting each month, the committee 
discusses ideas that have been submitted and at least one ma 
jor subject, for example, a scrap or turnover. The second 
monthly meeting reviews actions taken as a result of the first 
meeting and discusses the most recent bonus.
The productivity bonus formula was based upon a five- 
year analysis of the plant's financial performance. The 
Rucker formula is based upon the relationship between 
bargaining unit payroll and production value. The following 
calculations are made to achieve a base:
Production Value = Sales Value of Output - Materials and Supplies 
Rucker Base= Pay and Benefits of Bargaining Unit Personnel
Production Value
The relationship was 22.09 percent. The productivity bonus 
is then measured by
Production Value x Base - Actual Pay and Benefits.
One third of an earned bonus is set aside for deficit account 
ing periods. Because the plant produces large equipment in 
stages, the bonus is calculated and paid on a quarterly basis,
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in a separate check. The only nonbargaining unit employees 
in the Plan are supervisors, but they are paid from company, 
rather than bargaining unit, earnings. Under the Rucker for 
mula, improvements in quality increase production value 
which is shared with the employees. The results showed that 
there was a modest increase in productivity. 4 More in 
teresting was the impact on employee absenteeism and quali 
ty, which are reported in table 6-5.
Employment was analyzed for the period January 
1977 - May 1982. There was a sharp increase in employment 
following introduction of the Plan (t = 3.40, p< .001), with a 
slight downturn thereafter (t=.97, n.s.). The industry also 
experienced a corresponding but smaller increase in employ 
ment (t= 1.23, n.s.), but then a substantial deterioration in 
trend over time (t = -2.83, p< .01). Thus the plan had greater 
employment stability than did the industry.
Absenteeism (unexcused absences-=-workforce size) was 
analyzed for the period January 1977 - May 1982. There was 
no change in the level of absenteeism and only a modest im 
provement in the trend. Quality (the percentage of rework 
hours to direct labor hours) was analyzed for the period 
April 1978 - May 1982. Once again, there was no change in 
the level of quality following the intervention, and a limited 
improvement in the trend. In both instances, interesting and 
potentially important findings occurred from the three- 
month delayed analysis. Absenteeism declined significantly 
(t = 2.07, p<.05) and continued a negative trend (t = -.85, 
n.s.). The improvement in quality was also very significant 
with a substantial improvement in the trend (t = -2.37, 
p< .01). These results are shown visually in figures 2 and 3.
Cook and Campbell (1979) have suggested that the impact 
of an intervention into a complex organizational situation 
might not be immediately felt. When considering change in 
unionized settings there may be a delayed effect on employee 
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terim period in which employees become fully aware and 
educated, and a delay required for a high level of acceptance, 
trust and expertise to develop. This demonstrates that it may 
take time for productivity and Quality of Worklife programs 
to mature and realize their full capacity for improved 
employee performance.
Although it was not possible to directly measure the quali 
ty of the labor-management relationship, the last two rounds 
of contract negotiations (1979 and 1982) were concluded 
peacefully. Because the two previous experiences (1973 and 
1976) resulted in strikes over issues which the Plan was 
designed to address, it may be concluded that the Plan at 
least partially contributed to improved lab or-management 
relations.
Since the inception of the Plan, there have been over 400 
suggestions processed with 70 percent having been accepted. 
Quarterly bonuses have been paid less than 50 percent of the 
time but have been very large (in excess of 20 percent three 
times).
The success of this intervention was influenced by several 
factors. First, there was a strong stimulus for change. The 
two preceding rounds of contract negotiations had resulted 
in labor disputes, one of which lasted 17 weeks. There was 
also a concern about high labor turnover and low wages. 
Second, both the company and the union were committed to 
a jointly approved solution to the problem. Third, the par 
ties utilized competent consultants for the development and 
implementation of the Plan. The consultants helped to main 
tain equity in the bonus formula. Fourth, the level of 
employee participation, although not as great as with other 
interventions, for example, Scanlon Plans and Quality 
Circles, appeared to be congruent with the preferences of 
both the employees and the management. Finally, the union 
was directly involved in the supervision of the Plan through 
membership on the Group Incentive Committee.
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Case Study 4: The Successful Use 
of a Labor-Management Committee
Site 23 is a tire manufacturer with 800 bargaining unit 
employees. During 1976, the industry suffered from over 
capacity, and in 1977, the plant was threatened with a loss of 
jobs due to industry competition.
In 1977 the Union's Bargaining Committee and the top 
plant management met to discuss ways and means to im 
prove productivity. As a result of these discussions, the 
union agreed to renegotiate work rules through the formal 
collective bargaining process. After the 1977 negotiations 
were concluded, the union and the company continued to 
maintain monthly meetings to discuss problems and to avoid 
personality conflicts. These meetings continued until 
mid-1978 when top management stopped attending the 
meetings and instead, was represented by middle managers. 
Thereafter, regular meetings were discontinued.
In March 1980, economic conditions forced the layoff of 
250 employees. Meetings were begun to discuss ongoing dif 
ficulties. Plant management projected a loss of more than 
$11 million. The company told the union that approximately 
$5 million of the projected loss was due to labor costs, pro 
ductivity, and operating difficulties, while over $6 million 
was due to difficulties in sales, marketing and distribution.
In November 1980, the Union agreed to $1.05 an hour 
wage reduction, by virtue of an immediate curtailment in the 
cost-of-living adjustment of $.55 and a $.50 deferment in 
future cost-of-living payments. To offset this decrease, the 
company and union agreed to a gainsharing program which 
would compensate the employees for their loss. In addition, 
the parties requested that the community's Area Labor- 
Management Committee (A L-MC) begin working with them 
to fully develop the Labor-Management Committee (L-MC) 
concept. This case offers the opportunity to view the L-MC 
process in action.
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The Labor-Management Committee is an extension of the 
collective bargaining process and is composed of top 
management members, including the plant manager and 
members of his operating staff and the local union president 
and other key elected officials of the local. The top manage 
ment official and the local union president act as the L-MC 
co-chairpersons. There are also departmental and ad hoc 
subcommittees. The L-MC is designed to bring these actors 
together to improve the working relationship between the 
company and the union by fostering attitudinal change. 
Once this has been achieved, other significant issues can be 
addressed and the L-MC becomes a vehicle for organiza 
tional change.
The role of the A L-MC is to provide technical assistance 
to aid the parties in implementing and making effective the 
in-plant L-MC. The A L-MC provided, at no cost to the 
company or union, an expert third-party consultant. This in 
dividual helped guide the parties through the initial stages of 
gaining commitment and acceptance of the concept and, 
thereafter, helped them to develop a process for addressing 
substantive problems. The eventual goal of the A L-MC is to 
educate the principals so that they are able to function in 
dependently, that is without the assistance of the third party.
At the outset, the L-MC process is designed to get each 
side to understand the opponents role and the difficulties 
each faces. The goal is to reach a stage where the adversary 
process is de-emphasized and the parties are able to jointly 
address problems facing the company, the union, and the 
workforce. It is expected that the parties will acknowledge 
this change, as was the case at Site 23.
The initial process forces the parties to work together. The 
L-MC begins modestly by developing the local mechanics of 
the process (meeting times, places, participants, etc.); getting 
the individual actors to agree to meet; setting a flexible agen 
da; and informing everyone, management and union, of the
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activities taking place. Most L-MCs initially focus on minor 
irritants such as physical improvements to work and non- 
work areas. Because there had been a short-lived L-MC ef 
fort three years before at Site 23, many of these issues were 
easier to resolve. The important point, however, is that the 
L-MC process teaches both sides to behave in a more 
sophisticated manner. Although either side can always revert 
to its existing rights under the collective bargaining agree 
ment (e.g., the company could assert its right to manage the 
business), the process requires that the parties be more atten 
tive to their counterpart's problems, concerns, and point of 
view.
At Site 23, the parties moved more quickly into substan 
tive issues of productivity, attendance, quality, management 
control systems, scheduling, and implementing departmental 
committees.
There are six departmental subcommittees consisting of 
two to four employees and two to four managers. Stewards 
and rank-and-file members represent the union on these 
committees. Ad hoc committees are created to examine 
specific problems.
The L-MC and departmental subcommittees have the ef 
fect of collapsing the organizational structure. The union 
leadership and its members have direct and frequent contact 
with top management decisionmakers. Information and 
problems are allowed to surface and potential solutions can 
not be ignored. At this site, an effort is made to force the 
subcommittees to make decisions rather than sending them 
to the main committee. The main L-MC also consults the 
subcommittees on issues with plantwide implications. Thus 
communication and involvement are increased.
An example of the change and innovation at Site 23 is the 
manner in which employee attendance was addressed. To 
complement the existing negotiated disciplinary procedure 
for absenteeism, the parties established an Attendance
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Review Council. The Council consisted of three rank-and- 
file volunteers and three supervisors who counseled 
employees with irregular attendance. Where needed, correc 
tive services were provided. The Council could not discipline 
employees but did replace a contractually negotiated absence 
point system for employee discipline. The Council in no way 
abrogates management's right to discipline or discharge 
employees under the collective bargaining agreement.
At this site, the L-MCs departmental subcommittees and 
ad hoc committees closely resemble the structure of the 
Scanlon Committees and Quality Circles. There is, however, 
a very significant and important distinction. With Scanlon 
Plans, Quality Circles, and Rucker Plans, the union primari 
ly has an oversight responsibility. The local union president 
serves on the Screening Committees with perhaps another 
union official, but for the most part, this is the extent of 
direct union involvement. In most Scanlon and Rucker Plans 
and Quality Circles, there is a conscious effort to keep union 
stewards off the committees. The rationale is to separate the 
cooperative process from the traditional adversary processes 
of the grievance procedure and negotiations machinery. In 
this regard, L-MCs are very different; the union is an equal 
partner in the operation of the entire process. An effort is 
made to immerse stewards along with rank-and-file workers 
into the process. Organizational change conies as a direct 
result of this involvement and the union, as the co-partner in 
the L-MC, is both responsible for failures, as well as entitled 
to claim credit for success. In short, both sides have owner 
ship of the effort. This should be contrasted with many of 
the other interventions studied which were in large part 
management directed with union oversight responsibility.
The L-MC process at Site 23 helped the parties overcome 
several difficult issues which might have caused the demise 
of other cooperative efforts. An example was the gainshar- 
ing program. The bonus formula was based on equivalent
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pounds per man hour augmented by savings on waste. This 
formula was the most accurate measure of productivity of all 
the sites investigated in this research. However, the formula 
required the plant, which had been performing at about 80 
percent of standard, to be above 100 percent of standard for 
a two-month period, and three six-month periods, 
thereafter. Employees would receive 50 percent of the cost 
reductions that resulted from increased productivity above 
the 100 percent.
Thus there was to be a biannual bonus with no reward for 
incremental improvement and poor weeks and months dur 
ing this period offsetting good performance in other months. 
No bonus was earned for any period during the first 12 
months. Productivity during this period initially improved, 
but performance never reached the point at which a bonus 
could be achieved.
This caused disenchantment and led much of the 
workforce to abandon hopes of earning a bonus. After a 
period of four to six months, productivity, which had in 
creased to approximately 90 percent, declined to previous 
levels. The cause of this problem was the construction of the 
formula. Rather than rewarding and reinforcing incremental 
improvement, only the excess above the 100 percent goal 
would entitle the employees to receive a bonus. The period of 
time for measurement of performance, six months, was 
unusually long. This combination had the effect of creating a 
disincentive when no bonus was earned. At several other 
sites studied, this might have caused cooperation to be ter 
minated. However, because the relationship between the 
company and the union had improved—in particular, the 
personal relationship between the key actors had been 
strengthened—the parties were able to discuss their problem 
and arrive at a mutually successful solution. That solution 
was to reward incremental improvement using a four-week 
moving average payout system. In the second year of the
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gainsharing, bonuses ranged from $.09-$.46 per hour, with 
an average of $.30 per hour.
Table 6-6 sumarizes the plant's performance. Productivity 
measured as equivalent pounds per hour, was analyzed for 
the period January 1979 - July 1982. Productivity increased 
slightly following the intervention (t= .93, n.s.), but increas 
ed significantly over time (t = 4.12, p<.001).
Employment and turnover were measured for the period 
January 1978 - June 1981. Employment, after remaining un 
changed following the program's introduction (t = -.48, 
n.s.), showed a positive gain over time (t= 1.43, n.s.). At the 
same time, industry employment remained unchanged 
(t= .23 and .44, both n.s.). Both plant turnover (t= .37 and 
-.29, both n.s.) and industry turnover (t = -.96 and .19, both 
n.s.) remained unchanged.
Quality for both the major and minor products at the 
plant was measured by a ratio of scrap dollar value to output 
dollar value. The major product's quality was analyzed for 
the period January 1978 - December 1981. Scrap for the ma 
jor product was unchanged following the program's start-up 
(t = -.78, n.s.). Over time, though, the decrease in scrap ap 
proached statistical significance (t = -1.53, n.s.). The amount 
of scrap for the minor product decreased to a similar degree 
initially (t= -1.52, n.s.), while the trend remained unchanged 
over time (t =. 11, n.s.).
Absenteeism was measured for the period January 
1978 - June 1982. Absenteeism remained unchanged 
throughout the time-series analysis (t=.82 and -.50, both 
n.s.).
This site is a very good example of a L-MC being used to 
change the organization. First, attitudinal change took 
place, along with the development of a structure for change. 
Thereafter, the parties began to address obstacles to 
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change efforts studied, the union shares ownership of the 
process with the company.
There has been an improvement in organizational perfor 
mance, but this gives rise to the "black box" issue. Was it 
the gainsharing or the L-MC that produced the im 
provements? The answer is probably both. Certainly the 
gainsharing rewarded improved performance, but the L-MC 
process facilitated and created an environment in which 
organizational efficiency could be fostered. Moreover, many 
of the improvements in productivity were the result of the 
work done by the departmental and ad hoc subcommittees. 
Finally, the Area Labor-Management Committee provided 
much of the expertise to help the parties make the L-MC pro 
cess work.
Case Study 5: Three Cases of Long Term Success
This segment combines the experiences of three companies 
with long term cooperative efforts. All three have Scanlon 
Plans. The Plans are 15, 12 and 29 years in length, respec 
tively. All three Plans operate in the traditional Scanlon for 
mat.
Site 28 employs 370 hourly workers and produces 
automated assembly systems, special balancing machines, 
and vertical automatic production lathes. The Scanlon Plan 
was an outgrowth of a 13-week strike over union demands 
for a wage increase and a group incentive system.
Both the company and the union were familiar with the 
Scanlon Plan. The plant was at one time owned by a local 
manufacturer who had a "successful" Scanlon Plan in 
another location. No serious consideration was given to 
alternative systems. The Scanlon Plan was seen as a 
mechanism for tying increased earnings to productivity. 
Since the union proposed the concept, gaining employee ac 
ceptance was not difficult.
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The Plan began in January 1968 and has eight Production 
Committees and one Screening Committee. Even though the 
Plan has matured, it continues to process 100-150 sugges 
tions per year with an annual acceptance rate from 50-70 per 
cent. Ideas that do not exceed $300 can be implemented by 
the Production Committees. Suggestions that will cost more 
than $300 require Screening Committee approval. Aside 
from this situation, the plant manager actively discourages 
any suggestions going beyond the Production Committee 
level.
The committee system has developed into the most effec 
tive line of communication between management and the 
employees. Through the committees, management makes a 
determined effort to keep the employees aware of the finan 
cial position, including profitability, of the company. 
Management officials felt that the committee system has 
made the employees "... much more aware of what it takes 
to run the company," and that the employees see a relation 
ship between productivity and profitability, this helping to 
create an atmosphere of trust and understanding. Both 
management officials and the union chairperson agreed that 
the opportunity for employee participation had played a key 
role in what they felt had been the considerable success of the 
Plan. They also claimed that the Plan was responsible for 
improving union-management and employee relations. The 
Plan has paid frequent bonuses.
Site 28 demonstrates the contribution of the Plan over the 
long term and how interest is maintained. The committee 
system has reinforced work-skill training, as well as training 
employees in solving production problems and increased 
leadership skills. In addition, since the Plan had aided in put 
ting management and labor in touch with each other's goals, 
objectives and feelings, it serves as an excellent vehicle for in 
troducing change into the plant and increasing the probabili 
ty of acceptance. Employee participation makes employees
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sensitive to the problems faced by management, as well as 
making management more aware of employee concerns. The 
parties maintain a high level of commitment to the Plan's 
philosophy. Biannual Scanlon Plan "brainstorming" ses 
sions are held to maintain enthusiasm for the Plan.
Because of the date of the start-up of this Scanlon Plan, 
and the nature of production, productivity data were not 
available. However, the Scanlon bonus, which may be used 
as a proxy for productivity, was paid in 103 of the 156 
months of the plan. Table 6-7 presents the average monthly 
bonus.
Table 6-7 
Site 28 Bonus Summary
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Average 
Monthly 
Bonus 5.21% 7.03% 17.85% 1.23% 12.33% 8.62% 17.89%
________1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980_____
Average 
Monthly 
Bonus 23.32% 2.28% 20.97% 23.23% 29.12% 34.21%
As can be seen from these results, the plan has survived 
two initial years of modest bonuses (5.21 percent, 7.03 per 
cent), as well as years in which the bonus has been very 
meager (1.23 percent in 1971 and 2.28 percent in 1976).
Employment was analyzed for the period January 
1966 - December 1981. Employment was found to be stable 
(t=.46, n.s.) following introduction of the Plan, with the 
trend unchanged (t=.15, n.s.), as well. Industry employ 
ment had a markedly downward trend. Thus employment 
was more stable. The grievance rate (grievances •*• average 
workforce size) has declined. There have been no strikes
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since the Plan was introduced. Table 6-8 summarizes the per 
formance data for all three sites.
Site 30 is a subsidiary of a large, multinational corpora 
tion. The company manufactures high-nickel alloys in two 
nearby plants and employs 2000 hourly and salaried 
employees. It is significant not only because its Scanlon Plan 
is 12 years old, but also because it is one of the largest 
Scanlon Plan firms.
The development of cooperation at both plants was largely 
due to union pressure. The company had for many years 
operated a Bedeaux individual incentive plan, covering all 
hourly workers. The union could contest a standard through 
the grievance procedure or at the next contract negotiation. 
However, the company made the final determination on any 
standard, since incentive issues were nonarbitrable.
Organized opposition to the Bedeaux Plan surfaced as ear 
ly as 1957, when the union pressured management into re 
nouncing the use of disciplinary measures against employees 
for failure to meet the incentive standards. They blamed it 
for infecting labor-management relations, claiming that it 
wasn't related to effort and skill, and that it had the effect of 
pitting worker against worker. The union leadership claimed 
Bedeaux led to dishonesty among the workers, as well as en 
couraging them to disregard quality, which often caused 
more work for other employees.
In 1968, the union suggested that the Bedeaux system be 
dropped in favor of a profit-sharing plan. The company re 
jected the idea, but did spend the next two years investigating 
a number of plantwide incentives. At that time, management 
found the Scanlon Plan the most suitable. The installation of 
a Scanlon Plan seemed even more attractive in light of a 1967 
opinion survey of the company's salaried employees. These 
employees criticized the company's internal communica 
tions, its unresponsiveness to suggestions, and the tenuous 
relation between performance and incentive earnings.
Table 6-8





























































































The union also conducted its own investigation of possible 
alternatives to Bedeaux, and concluded independently that 
Scanlon could meet their criteria of equity, good bonus 
payments for all employees, improved labor-management 
relations, and an opportunity for workers to make sugges 
tions and be sure that management would listen.
In late 1970, the Plan was begun at the smaller plant which 
had no incentive system and was generally a much simpler 
operation. The company also provided the union with a let 
ter of commitment to develop a jointly acceptable plan for 
the large plant. In August 1972, the Plan was adopted for a 
two-year trial period, with 74 percent of the hourly workers 
and 90 percent of the salaried employees voting in favor. 
Thereafter, the employees at the smaller plant voted to tie 
their Scanlon Plan into that of the larger plant.
This Scanlon Plan is unusual because of its large number 
of production committees and its three-tiered committee 
system.
Presently, there are 30 Production Committees, 11 Screen 
ing Committees, and a Planning and Review Committee. 
The Production Committees offer the greatest opportunity 
for employee participation. These committees, developed 
along departmental lines, are composed of management and 
employee representatives, with a management representative 
acting as chairperson; average membership numbers six per 
sons. The employee representatives are elected by fellow 
employees in each department for staggered one-year terms, 
with successive terms permitted.
The Production Committees seek ways to improve their 
department's efficiency. The committees meet at least once a 
month, and are responsible for soliciting, receiving and 
disposing of suggestions within a reasonable time. The Pro 
duction Committees can either accept or reject suggestions, 
or refer them to the appropriate Screening Committee. If a
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suggestion is accepted, the committee can institute it if the 
cost does not exceed $200. However, if the suggestion re 
quires a capital purchase, the suggestion must be referred to 
the Engineering Screening Committee for further investiga 
tion.
When a suggestion requires an expenditure in excess of 
$200, or there is disagreement over it at the Production Com 
mittee level, the suggestion can be referred to the appropriate 
Screening Committee. Each Screening Committee represents 
a "group" in the plant, e.g., manufacturing, accounting, ad 
ministration, etc. Every Screening Committee is chaired by a 
manager, with at least one employee representative for each 
Production Committee within a group. These committees 
are responsible for disposing of those suggestions referred to 
them. The Screening Committees can usually take action on 
suggestions costing more than $200 unless a capital purchase 
is required. These committees, which meet monthly after the 
bonus results are announced, also discuss the results and 
ways of improving bonuses, as well as ways to solve prob 
lems raised through employee participation.
The Planning and Review Committee discusses the events 
surrounding the monthly bonus before it is announced. The 
Planning and Review Committee's monthly agenda also in 
cludes comments on what helped or hurt production, 
business competition, monthly billings, production 
backlogs, and sales prospects. This committee consists of the 
executive vice-president (representing the president), 11 
other management officials representing each group (in 
cluding four from the largest group, manufacturing), the 
two local union presidents and eight hourly representatives 
from the production Screening Committees. Due to the size 
of the Planning and Review Committee, the employee 
representatives must alternate attendance in order to keep 
the meeting manageable. However, if a particular Produc 
tion Committee is not represented at the Planning and
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Review meeting, they can attend a meeting immediately 
following the monthly Planning and Review meeting, where 
the company's comptroller explains the bonus results. Final 
ly, although the Planning and Review Committee does not 
normally handle suggestions, it will dispose of those which 
may entail great expense or effort across group lines. The 
Planning and Review Committee, with the approval of the 
vice-president of manufacturing, can authorize any non 
capital expenditure up to $5,000.
Employee understanding and acceptance of the Plan was 
facilitated and maintained by several strategies. The com 
pany exhibited its good faith by meeting the union on its own 
ground before and during the Plan's operation. Manage 
ment officials would travel to the union hall to answer ques 
tions and discuss problems that arose in early stages of the 
Plan's operation. Along with distribution of Scanlon infor 
mation pamphlets, there were general meetings where union 
and management officials would exhibit their cohesiveness 
on the merits of the Plan. To maintain acceptance of the 
Plan, efforts are made to keep the workforce informed of 
the Plan's operations. Minutes are kept and made available 
for all Production Committee meetings. Suggestions made 
through these meetings receive written responses as quickly 
as possible. The company newsletter is utilized to maintain 
an awareness of the Scanlon Plan. Many articles attempt to 
inform the employees on the inter-relationships of the Plan 
and the business environment and how the Plan's perfor 
mance affects the company's financial situation.
Productivity was measured by pounds per man hour for 
the period January 1970 - December 1981. The productivity 
time-series exhibited a positive upward level change (t= 1.35, 
n.s.). Over time, productivity has remained stable (t=.22, 
n.s.). Employment at Site 30 showed a statistically signifi 
cant decrease in level following the intervention (t = -2.36, 
p<.01), while industry employment remained stable 
(t = -.32, n.s.). Over time, however, the plant experienced a
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highly significant upward trend in employment (t = 4.24, 
p<.001), while industry employment remained unchanged 
(t=.70, n.s.).
The annual number of employee suggestions has ranged 
from a high of 1,086 in 1973 to 227 in 1980. The employees 
have earned a bonus 83 percent of the time.
Site 9 is a family-owned manufacturer of steel lockers and 
shelves. The company employs 150 bargaining unit 
employees and has one of the oldest cooperative efforts in 
the United States.
The Scanlon Plan was first suggested by the union in 1952 
during collective bargaining. No agreement could be reached 
and it subsequently took two years for agreement on the 
Plan's implementation because the company chose to move 
cautiously. When the Scanlon Plan was finally instituted it 
was to improve the relationship between the company and 
the union and the company and its employees; as a method 
for resolving problems that existed at the time; and as a 
financial incentive. In contrast to other Scanlon Plans of its 
era, this Plan was not begun because of economic solvency 
problems.
The history and philosophy of the Plan are highlighted in 
the employee handbook:
While we have not earned a bonus every month 
since 1954, the overall record of the Scanlon Plan 
has been exceptional. It was originally introduced 
to promote further cooperation between Manage 
ment and Union employees, by allowing all 
employees a "voice in the business." By cooper 
ating effectively through the Scanlon Plan 
the . . .Company has been able to improve produc 
tivity and remain competitive with much larger pro 
ducers of our type of product. Every suggestion is 
valuable because every employee including yourself 
will benefit to some degree.
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Since the program at Site 9 had been in operation for 24 
years, analysis of its program under the format chosen for 
this research would have been inappropriate. It was decided 
to analyze the Plan in terms of its operation and continued 
effectiveness. This in some respects poses interesting ques 
tions with regard to identifying the factors or variables which 
permit long term institutionalization of the programs. This is 
an important issue since it is commonly believed that 
cooperative programs, like the Scanlon Plan, decline over 
time.
There are five Production Committees organized on a 
departmental basis, including one each for the office and 
engineering, the night shift and a small facility a short 
distance from the main plant.
The five committees are:
1. Fabrication department
2. Painting and shipping
3. Office and engineering
4. Essex Street (small facility two blocks from main plant)
5. Night shift
Each committee has four members, three union members ap 
pointed for a term of two years and the foreman. Appoint 
ments to the Production Committee are made jointly by the 
union president and the personnel director on the basis of 
previously expressed interest as evidenced by the offering of 
suggestions. The Production Committees meet monthly on 
company time to generate and evaluate ideas. The commit 
tees have the authority to implement suggestions up to a 
dollar value limit of $100, as long as there is no overlap be 
tween committees. Although the Plan was more than 20 
years old, during the period January 1976 - May 1979 
employees made 868 suggestions and 654 (75 percent) were 
implemented. The annual suggestion rate was 1.5-3 sugges 
tions per employee each year. This demonstrates that 
employee participation need not dissipate over time. Major
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areas of suggestions have come in the areas of machine die 
and tooling, painting methods, and paper work systems.
The Screening Committee meets twice a month also on 
company time. In contrast to other Scanlon Plans which 
tend to hold only one Screening Committee meeting per 
month, this firm breaks its Screening Committee functions 
into a short monthly meeting to discuss and evaluate the 
bonus and a longer meeting to review operations and 
business conditions. There are nine employees and four 
management representatives on the Screening Committee. 
Eight employees are selected jointly by the union president 
and the personnel director.
The Screening Committee tends to operate in three areas. 
The first is to oversee the operation of the Production Com 
mittees and to resolve any jurisdictional or cost conflicts 
which arise. The second is the responsibility for the manage 
ment of the bonus and its allocation. Finally, the third area 
of operation is as a device for improved communication be 
tween the company and the union. Screening Committee 
discussions have centered on resolving or explaining prob 
lems and planning for potential opportunities. The company 
uses the Screening Committee to provide advance notice to 
the employees of the onset of slow periods. Also discussed 
are the reasons why the company may have lost a contract, 
areas of current production problems, and long range prob 
lems the company expects to encounter. The Screening Com 
mittee is also used as a vehicle for seizing upon oppor 
tunities. Examples of this type of usage include the explora 
tion of better work methods and the preparation for busy 
periods.
The traditional Scanlon bonus formula is utilized. In a 
Plan that has been in place for a long period of time, 
periodically there is a need to review the historical relation 
ship between labor costs and sales value of production. 
Technological change or a shift in the relationship between
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materials costs and labor costs may alter the financial basis 
of the Plan. The bonus is reviewed by an experienced 
Scanlon consultant. The consultant's neutrality, credibility 
and financial expertise in Plan accounting helps insure that 
equity is maintained.
The employees are kept informed about the Plan through 
several devices. All bonus reports are posted on company 
bulletin boards. Committee representatives provide 
employees with information, both through formal feedback 
on suggestions and ideas and informally. In addition, 
departmental meetings are conducted by the foremen; sug 
gestions are interchanged across committees and are made 
available to anyone who is interested; and finally there is an 
annual dinner to honor employees who have served on the 
Production and Screening Committees. Because of the long 
term nature of the Plan, the company has developed a 
reputation in the community as a good place to work. This, 
combined with the relatively good wages paid, has enabled 
the company to attract better quality employees. Over the 
years, the company has had few hiring problems and low 
labor turnover. As well, the Scanlon Plan has resulted in a 
monthly bonus over 90 percent of the time. This stability has 
aided in effectuating the operation of the Plan.
Productivity and employment were analyzed for the 
period January 1975 - April 1979, and March 1975 - May 
1979. The intervention point was the reaffirmation of the 
Plan by virtue of its continuation following the close of col 
lective bargaining in Jaunary 1977. In examining Plans of 
long duration, it would not be expected that abrupt level 
changes in performance would take place. That was the case 
with Site 9. Productivity and employment tended to be 
stable, although the direction of the t-statistics for both level 
changes were negative. This can be explained by the severe 
drop in economic activity experienced by the firm through 
the first five months of 1977. The trend in productivity was
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modestly positive (t = -.65, n.s.) while the trend in employ 
ment was slightly downward (t = -.62, n.s.).
These three sites demonstrate that long term cooperation 
is possible. Site 30 shows that it can occur in a large, 
multiplant environment. Site 28 shows that the Scanlon Plan 
has the capability of serving as the centerpiece of an 
organization's human resource management efforts. Site 9 
proves that the plan has the capability of enduring very long 
periods of time (30 years).
What conditions were present? First, the Scanlon Plan was 
suggested by the trade unions, indicating the support that the 
Plan, originally developed by the United Steel Workers, en 
joys among some unionists. Management also investigated 
and determined that the Plan would fit into the culture of the 
organization. The Plans have been successful in moving deci- 
sionmaking down to the shop floor and the commitment to 
employee involvement has not been breached. In all three 
sites, extensive efforts are made to keep workers and 
managers informed. Finally, all three plans, while not paying 
bonuses every month, have consistently done so.
Case Study 6: The Failure to Maintain Equity
Sites 5 (450 hourly employees) and 7 (250 hourly 
employees) are plants within the same division of a large in 
dustrial conglomerate. The plants manufacture different 
types of chain, are geographically separated by 45 miles, 
have distinct sets of managers, and are represented by dif 
ferent locals of the same international union who bargain 
separate collective bargaining agreements. At the same time, 
however, there were some common features associated with 
the initiation and operation of the Plans which can be 
presented simultaneously.
Eight years prior to the institution of the Rucker Plan, the 
company and the unions had agreed to eliminate the plants'
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incentive systems. During the 1970s, both plants were being 
adversely affected by foreign competition. The Rucker Plan 
was introduced to improve productivity (and the firm's com 
petitive position), to provide additional earnings for 
employees' efforts (the company had taken a firm stance in 
bargaining with the union on wages), and to improve com 
munications.
The overall structure of the two Rucker Plans was the 
same. Each had a suggestion system, two employee commit 
tees, and a bonus formula. In the Rucker Plan setting, 
employees submit suggestions to an Idea Coordinator. The 
Idea Coordinator pursues the suggestion with appropriate 
managerial personnel and feeds back a response to the 
employee.
The employee committees are divided into Production and 
Steering. The Production Committees primarily consist of 
rank-and-file workers; they review all suggestions (accepted 
and rejected) and discuss such problem areas in the plant as 
quality, materials and pricing. At Site 5 employees were 
elected to serve on the committee for three-month periods, 
whereas at Site 7, employees were chosen by management 
with the approval of the union for six-month intervals. The 
Screening Committees, composed of top union and company 
officials, addressed questions similar to those above, but 
also considered more significant matters. Some of these in 
volved marketplace and general economic considerations, 
pricing decisions, product design, the introduction of new 
products, and the bonus calculations.
The bonus formula is based on the relationship between 
bargaining unit payroll costs and production value. Produc 
tion value is calculated by subtracting defective goods 
returned and the costs of materials, supplies, and services 
from the sale value of goods sold. At Site 5 this relationship 
was determined to be 37.74 percent while at Site 7 it was 
40.91 percent. Although there were substantial increases in
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productivity, at both sites few bonuses were paid. This was 
due to a divisional management decision not to raise prices. 
At a time of rapidly rising costs for materials, supplies, and 
services, this decision eliminated most of the potential 
bonus. Table 6-9 summarizes the performance for both sites.
The productivity (output per hour) and employment data 
for Site 5 were analyzed for the periods January 
1975 - October 1978 and January 1974 - December 1978, 
respectively. The intervention point was July 1976, the in 
troduction of the Rucker Plan. The results indicate that 
employment was unchanged (t= .58, n.s.) while the industry 
was slightly downward. The more interesting finding is that 
the level of productivity increased (t = 2.30, p< .05), but that 
the trend was negative (t = -2.53, p<.01). This would in 
dicate that the plan had had an initial positive effect, which 
had dissipated rather quickly. In 1976, there were three 
bonus months (13.2, 28.6, and 37.4 cents per hour). For 
three years (1977-79), only one monthly bonus was paid 
(2.56 cents per hour).
At Site 7, productivity (output per hour) and employment 
were analyzed for the period January 1974 - October 1978 
and January 1974 - March 1979, respectively, with the in 
tervention point being July 1976. The productivity improve 
ment that occurred was quite pronounced. There was an 
abrupt upward shift in the level of productivity (t = 4.99, 
p<.001) followed by a stable trend (t = 0.14, n.s.). This is 
shown in figure 6-4. Employment was unchanged following 
introduction of the Rucker Plan, but a downward trend 
prior to the intervention was reversed, following a pattern 
similar to the industry.
At this site bonuses were larger, but were not paid regular 
ly. In 1976, no bonuses were paid; in 1977, there were two 
bonus months of 14.8 cents and 56.8 cents per hour; in 1978, 
two bonuses of 46.8 cents and 33.4 cents per hour with a 2.79 
cents per hour end-of-the-year bonus were paid.
SiteS
Productivity 
(N = 46, df=42)
Employment 
(N = 60, df=56)
Site?
Productivity 
(N = 58, df=54)
Employment 
(N = 55, df=51)
**p<.01, +p<.001
Table 6-9
Sites 5 and 7 Summary 
(Case 6)
Level T-Stat Lev Chg T-Stat Drift T-Stat Dft Chg T-Stat
12.91 18.74 1.94 2.30* 0.05 0.85 -0.18 -2.53**
624.72 28.97 12.58 0.58 -6.21 -1.35 8.52 1.31
3.37 24.16 0.98 4.99+ 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.14
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At both sites, the suggestion programs, which had initially 
been quite active, experienced steady decline and became 
mostly inactive. Finally, just prior to the three-year anniver 
sary of the Rucker Plan, a four-month strike took place dur 
ing the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. 
The failure of the Plan to pay consistent bonuses was a key 
factor in this prolonged strike.
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A question arises as to why productivity increased, but a 
bonus was not paid. In order to understand this, the Rucker 
bonus formula must be re-examined. The formula is
Sales Value of Production




to establish the existence and size of the bonus pool. Ideally, 
the price of the product, as well as the prices paid for 
materials and supplies, and labor costs should move in the 
same pattern as they had in the base period, normally two- 
five years prior to the plan. Any deviation in this pattern can 
lessen a bonus earned or possibly create a bonus when one 
was not deserved. In the case of the two plants, there was an 
increase in volume of production, thus raising the sales value 
of production. However, because the price of the product re 
mained constant, the growth was not as large as it would 
have been with a price increase. More important, there were 
sharp increases in material costs, energy, and other items us 
ed in production. Payroll also increased due to negotiated 
wage increases, the quarterly cost of living adjustment, 
health care cost increases, and other "roll-up costs." All of 
these cost factors combined to offset productivity and 
volume gains to eliminate much of the potential bonus.
This result is not unique to the Rucker measurement 
system. It is theoretically possible with the Scanlon Plan as 
well. With an Improshare Plan, the bonus is based on 
engineered time standards and actual hours of work. 
Therefore, shifts in the price of production, costs of goods 
sold, and labor costs have no bearing on the bonus.
In the Kochan-Dyer model of organizational change in 
unionized settings, an important factor in institutionalizing 
union-management cooperation over time is the equitable 
distribution of benefits stemming from the endeavor. Equity
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was not present in this situation. At the outset, the Rucker 
Plan was strongly supported by the employees at both sites. 
However, as a result of the failure to pay a bonus, interest 
had lessened. A good indication of this was the decline in the 
suggestion program. At Site 5, the decline in productivity 
which occurred, after an initial significant improvement 
would appear to lend support to the Kochan-Dyer theory.
Of greater concern, however, is the lack of control 
workers have concerning their earnings in these group 
productivity-sharing plans. This problem is not limited solely 
to Rucker Plans. Herein are two cases in which worker pro 
ductivity has increased, yet additional earnings have not 
been forthcoming. Management's ability to affect the bonus 
in a nonmanipulative manner highlights the fact that 
workers may not be in control of their destinies in these 
situations.
Case Study 7: A Failure to Match the 
Labor-Management Relationship 
With the Intervention
Site 6 manufactured steel casters and wheels and employed 
129 hourly personnel. The Scanlon Plan resulted from com 
promises made by the company in collective bargaining with 
the union. The company had proposed the institution of an 
individual inceptive system. The union rejected this proposal 
and alternately proposed the development of a Scanlon Plan. 
Although the company preferred a different group incentive 
plan, at the union's insistence it agreed to the Scanlon Plan.
The Plan followed the traditional Scanlon design with a 
suggestion system, four Production Committees, and one 
Screening Committee. The bonus formula included both 
hourly, clerical, and salaried employees. An analysis of the 
minutes of Screening Committee meetings indicated that 
most of its deliberations involved discussing suggestions sent 
to it by the Production Committees. In contrast to other
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Scanlon Plans studied, there was almost no discussion of 
long range and environmental issues.
A bonus was paid in 9 (4.8 percent), 10 (3.4 percent), and 2 
(0.02 percent) of the 13 (annual) possible bonus periods in 
the three years of the Plan's existence. Only in the first year 
was there an end-of-the-year surplus in the reserve (5.5 per 
cent). In the last year (1979), the Plan paid only one bonus of 
2.5 percent (February).
In July 1979 management unilaterally withdrew the office 
and salaried groups from the calculation of the bonus claim 
ing that any bonus that was being earned was the result of ef 
forts by those groups. This raised the specter of bonus for 
mula manipulation, and following six more bonus periods 
without positive results, the union exercised its right to ter 
minate upon 30 days notice, thus ending the Plan.
The productivity and employment experience for Site 6 
was analyzed for the period January 1975 - December 1979 
and January 1974 - December 1979, respectively, with the 
intervention occurring in December 1976. There was a 
positive, although not statistically significant increase in pro 
ductivity (t=1.47, n.s.) following the introduction of the 
Plan. Over time, a downward drift in productivity was 
reversed and shifted upward (t = 2.35, p< .05). Employment 
remained unchanged (t = -0.59, n.s.) and tended to follow an 






Level T-Stat Lev Chg T-Stat
Productivity 64.25 19.28 6.20 1.47 
(N = 54, df=50)
Employment 

















Drift T-Stat Dft Chg T-Stat
2.97 2.40 -0.52 -0.31
*p<.05
The Scanlon Plan at Site 6 appears to have been moderate 
ly successful in improving productivity. The demise of the 
Plan after three years exemplifies the effects of deviation 
from Scanlon Plan theory. First, the Scanlon Plan is much 
more than an incentive system. It is a different philosophy of 
conducting an organization's operations. This aspect of the 
Plan was missing here. Decisionmaking authority was never 
truly placed in the hands of the Production Committees. Ap 
proximately 40 percent of the Production Committee sugges 
tions were referred to the Screening Committee. The Screen 
ing Committee never became a vehicle for higher level com 
munication between the company and the union. Contrary 
to the Scanlon philosophy that the entire organization works 
together, the separation of the office and salaried workforce 
from the bonus formula is additional evidence that this 
management had not completely accepted the full basis of 
the Plan. Finally, adjustment of the bonus in midyear, for
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factors other than extensive technological or financial 
reasons, seriously imperiled the requisite sense of organiza 
tional equity needed to facilitate the cooperative process.
The Scanlon Plan is not an appropriate intervention when 
the motives of the partisans are solely to replace an out-of- 
date individual incentive system with a plantwide bonus 
plan. Nor is the Plan likely to be successful when used as a 
mechanism to replace lost earnings resulting from a conces 
sion bargaining agreement or wage moratorium. This 
Scanlon Plan was installed into a labor-management rela 
tionship in which the philosophy of management did not fit 
the values inherent in the Scanlon philosophy.
Case Study 8: The Failure of Cooperation 
to Take Hold
Site 2 manufactures carburetors for automobiles and farm 
machinery and electromagnetic clutches for business 
machines, mail sorting equipment and for farm and in 
dustrial machinery. In 1966, the plant employed 1700 people 
and was the major employer in the community. Shortly 
thereafter, the company lost its tariff protection and began 
to be adversely affected by foreign competition in its major 
product line. This pressure caused the company to move pro 
duction of that product line out of the country. The move 
resulted in a 25 percent reduction in the plant's business and 
a loss of 700 jobs.
The major loss of jobs and further potential economic 
threats in the highly competitive automotive components in 
dustry led the parties to begin a series of informal discussions 
concerning future economic conditions and what solutions 
might be possible. As a result of top management pressure, a 
special meeting between the company and union's nine- 
member bargaining committee was held in June 1972.
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The union asked the company what was needed to insure 
the plant's economic viability. The company responded that 
it needed a wage cut. From June 1972 - November 1972 
negotiations began on a company proposal for a wage reduc 
tion. In November 1972, agreement was reached on a 
moratorium on all wage increases. This lasted for one year. 
In addition, the company and the union agreed to create a 
Joint Management-Labor Study Committee (JM-LSC). The 
Study Committee's mission was incorporated into the collec 
tive bargaining agreement as a memorandum of understand 
ing. The agreement stated that the goal of the JM-LSC was
... to investigate solutions to productivity and 
employee utilization problems. The responsibility 
of the Committee is to study and evaluate such 
problems and recommend solutions (emphasis add 
ed by editor). 5
The JM-LSC consisted of six members (three union and 
three management) and would meet on an as-needed basis. 
The Committee participants were:
Union Management
1. union president 1. manager of industrial relations
2. union committeeman 2. director of manufacturing
3. hourly employee 3. manager of manufacturing engineering
The parties stated that the philosophy of the cooperative 
effort was
. . . that only through a constructive new approach 
to productivity and employee utilization problems 
can they (the parties) achieve a competitive opera 
tion, offering good employment opportunity with a 
reasonable expectation of job security. 6
Although a part of the plant's difficulty stemmed from an 
antiquated incentive system, a far more serious problem oc 
curred when corporate management provided a wage in-
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crease for the salaried staff shortly after plant management 
and the union had agreed to the wage moratorium. In spite 
of strong objections by the plant manager, the corporation 
instituted a 5 percent wage increase for the salaried 
employees. According to the personnel manager, the action 
by the corporation clouded the developing cooperative rela 
tionship between the company and the union. He further 
stated that it was his belief that the subsequent ineffec 
tiveness of the JM-LSC, was in large part the result of the 
distrust generated by this action.
Analysis of the minutes of the JM-LSC meetings and in 
terview data indicate that the committee operated in several 
areas. The JM-LSC considered matters related to work 
scheduling, overall staffing requirements, job classifications, 
full utilization of employees, and general business condi 
tions. At the committee's initial meeting (January 10, 1973) 
eight areas of productivity improvement were identified. 
Minutes of the meeting indicate that some of the areas were 
employee centered items while others dealt with more effi 
cient management of operations. The employee centered 
areas appear to demonstrate a general belief on the part of 
management that some of the firm's economic problems 
were related to employee attitudes and behavior. Manage 
ment referred to the problems of late starts and early quits, 
absenteeism, and abuses of breaks and rest periods. The 
areas identified for managerial improvement were: utiliza 
tion of manpower and equipment, utilization of service and 
skill trades manpower, creation of new incentives, and pro 
duction procedures including methods to reduce downtime.
During the initial meetings, the company and the union 
worked to improve communication between the parties and 
with the employees. The minutes indicated that the parties 
held a "broad and general discussion" on the areas iden 
tified for productivity improvement. At the union's sugges 
tion, management sent letters to its employees which outlin-
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ed the current business prospects and made reference to pro 
ductivity needs. This was followed two months later by an 
additional letter which discussed the introduction of a new 
product line.
The JM-LSC identified difficulties related to poor 
management. For example, in a discussion of excessive 
downtime it was pointed out that this was the result of short 
ages of purchased parts, lack of tooling, and removal of pro 
duced parts. These shortages made it most difficult to keep 
work ahead of the employees or to permit them to be kept 
active for an entire shift. This according to the committee 
resulted in overtime work at the end of the month.
The union also made several suggestions which manage 
ment rejected. The first was a union proposal to put 
nonincentive jobs in a key section on to the incentive system. 
This was put under investigation, and after a detailed study 
no decision was made to make the change. In another in 
stance, the union suggested, but the corporation opposed, a 
large capital expenditure to permit the purchase of 
machinery, equipment and tooling to permit expansion into 
a recently developed market.
From the initial meeting, one of the goals of the plant's 
management was to change work habits and patterns. In this 
regard, the union leadership appeared willing at the outset to 
assist. In a discussion of absuse of the rest period the com 
mittee concluded that "the most logical solution to the prob 
lem is a more conscious awareness in enforcing it on the 
floor."
Thereafter, the parties addressed the issue of "pegged per 
formance" on incentive jobs. They agreed to a joint pro 
gram of supervisory and employee meetings to explain the 
nature of the problems besetting the plant and to request 
employee cooperation in doing away with pegged produc 
tion.
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Shortly thereafter, the union's cooperative attitude seems 
to have lessened as a result of major layoff. On June 20, 
1973, the union informed the company that it should not ex 
pect improved productivity when "disturbances are created 
by a removal of the majority of the third shift. . . ."At the 
same time, the union complained that several other areas of 
the plant were working regular overtime which they claimed 
caused absenteeism and a decline in individual productivity. 
The union further stated that there were limited oppor 
tunities for increased production due to employees being on 
short work weeks. Finally, the union pointed to management 
ineffectiveness, e.g., the delay in getting tools and stock and 
the movement of completed stock. Thereafter, when the 
company raised the absenteeism problem and a sudden 
decline in productivity, the union stressed the short term 
recall and layoff, short work weeks, lack of materials or 
parts, and excessive tool problems.
At one point, the company committeemen proposed a 
reclassification of a position from one department to 
another at the same rate of pay. The company claimed the 
proposed change was needed because of its inability to pro 
vide a full day's work due to the variance in set-up times. 
The union committeemen took the position that the subject 
was an inappropriate one for the Productivity Committee 
and one better suited for the Bargaining Committee. They 
further stated that in principle they saw no need for change.
At this point of the committee's experience, a crucial stage 
was reached. The corporation had authorized the purchase 
of new cost savings equipment. The company reminded the 
union of the need for normal work effort by operators dur 
ing time studies to establish production standards, and the 
need for a proper attitude by the operators in order to pro 
tect operators from loss of normal earnings. In addition, this 
would have permitted the division to demonstrate its ability 
to meet its goals and targets. However, within a month
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thereafter, the union was to complain of a lack of employee 
confidence in the setting of new rates for the newly purchas 
ed machinery.
As the JM-LSC progressed through the summer of 1974, it 
became apparent that there was a great deal of redundancy 
in the issues discussed. The company continued to discuss its 
problems with absenteeism, while at the same time, the 
union continued to stress difficulties caused by management 
personnel. There is no doubt that the initial meetings of the 
JM-LSC were helpful in highlighting issues for future 
development. However, the level of action taken to develop 
ideas and programs for the resolution of productivity prob 
lems never occurred.
The parties at this plant were never able to reach a truly 
cooperative stage. In addition to the problems created by the 
salaried employees' pay increase and third shift layoff, 
several other factors may help explain the absence of 
cooperation. First, the members of the JM-LSC were for the 
most part the same individuals who regularly negotiated con 
tracts and settled grievances. The tone and conduct of the 
meetings were reported to be representative of that which 
took place at the bargaining table. In contrast to most labor- 
management committees the plant manager never took part 
in the committee's deliberations.
A second factor appears to be the inability of the parties to 
reach a stage beyond that of the union placing the blame for 
productivity difficulties on management, and vice-versa. If 
the parties had been able to resolve or show progress on even 
a minor problem, perhaps a more cooperative shift would 
have been engendered. Related to this seems to be the 
animosity toward hourly employees held by the manage 
ment. In other companies investigated for this study, more 
progressive management policies tended to produce more 
responsible behavior on the part of the employees. In this
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particular case, the management response to dysfunctional 
employee attitudes and behaviors was a "hard-nosed" desire 
to "enforce the rules."
Finally, job security became an over-riding issue for the 
union and its members. There were recurrent rumors that ad 
ditional production would be moved overseas. Management 
was never successful in dispelling these rumors.
During 1973, the JM-LSC met 12 times. In 1974 the 
number of meetings totaled only six. In the minutes of the 
last several meetings it is clear that very little was being ac 
complished due to one side or the other rejecting its counter 
part's proposals. Following the last meeting, both the com 
pany and the union mutually agreed to allow the committee 
to die out with the caveat that they would meet again if either 
side felt that there was something to discuss. Although the 
JM-LSC continues to be part of the collective bargaining 
agreement, neither side has called a meeting in nearly 10 
years.
Site 2 was only willing to provide employment data. The 
employment experience does demonstrate the severity of the 
problems faced by this plant and the strength of the stimulus 
for cooperation. The employment data were analyzed for the 
period November 1970 - October 1974 with the intervention 
point being the start of the JM-LSC, November 1972. As 
shown in table 6-11, there was a statistically significant 
reduction in employment following the start-up of the com 
mittee (t = -8.59, p<.001). Moreover, in contrast to other 
sites in the study, Site 2's experience was dramatically dif 
ferent from the industry at large. Figure 6-5 demonstrates 
that as the plant's employment was falling sharply, there was 





Level T-Stat Lev Chg T-Stat
Employment 
(N = 48, df=44)
576.08
Drift
37.65 -170.97 -8.59 +
T-Stat Dft Chg T-Stat
9.65 9.44 -17.59 -12.15 +
+ p<.001
This site demonstrates that a strong stimulus for change, 
i.e., loss of jobs and a further potential reduction in employ 
ment was not enough for cooperation to be successful. 
Moreover, creating a cooperative structure without a change 
of attitude among the principals will not result in meaningful 
labor-management cooperation. It is clear that neither labor 
nor management demonstrated a sufficient degree of trust or 
candor to permit the type of problemsolving interaction to 
truly resolve the significant problems facing the company. 
The behavior of the participants seemed to closely parallel 
that which would be expected in actual collective bargaining. 
An expanded committee membership might have alleviated 
this.
The JM-LSC might have been more effective had a neutral 
been involved. Other plant committees have benefitted from 
third party involvement, particularly when provided by an 
Area Labor-Management Committee. The neutral might 
have been able to set up a more problemsolving oriented 
commitee structure and procedure. The presence of a neutral 
might have permitted a more open exchange of views and the 














Finally, it was not possible to buffer the cooperative pro 
cess from other workplace issues. The pay raise for salaried 
employees, the layoffs of additional workers, and the reduc 
tion in hours for others made commitment by the union 
leadership difficult and led the union participants to take 
hard-line positions on many issues.
Case Study 9: Mixing QWL Concepts 
with Traditional Union-Management Issues
Site 3 manufactures ball bearings and at the time of this 
research had 699 production employees. Labor relations at 
this plant have been mixed. Prior to 1969, there were several 
small walkouts. From 1969-1974, relations were quite 
peaceful. The 1974 contract negotiations resulted in a two- 
week strike, while the 1977 contract was settled peacefully.
In 1973, the division's business declined and 200 jobs were 
moved from the plant to a facility in the South. At that 
point, the union agreed to the creation of a joint in-plant 
committee, but only assigned lesser ranking officials to it. 
The company assigned the works manager (plant manager) 
and the personnel director. The committee had met for three 
months when an in-plant dispute occurred which resulted in 
an end to the cooperative relationship.
In 1975, the plant needed to make changes in order to in 
sure its economic survival. There had been a severe layoff 
and 300 of the plant's 800 jobs were moved to the southern 
plant. The union president who was said to be committed to 
the quality of worklife concept raised the idea of a 
cooperative labor-management program with his consti 
tuents. In December 1975, at a general membership meeting, 
the rank-and-file voted to approve the creation of a six- 
member (three union/three management) Union- 
Management Study Group on Productivity and Quality of 
Worklife. One proviso was that any agreement that was
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reached had to be brought back to the membership for their 
approval.
The company chose the works manager, manufacturing 
manager, and personnel and industrial relations manager to 
serve on the committee, while representing the union were 
the local president, chairman of the office bargaining unit, 
and one committeeman from the factory. The Study Group 
was defined as
... a joint effort by the Union and Company to 
explore new ideas and better ways of doing things 
for the benefit of both the employees and the com 
pany by using the natural resources of the plant 
employees, both Union and Management in a 
voluntary way sharing gains jointly. 7
The Study Group had no decisionmaking authority, but 
could make recommendations compatible with the Group's 
mission, which covered four areas:
(1) Productivity Improvement
(2) Quality of Worklife
(3) Reward/Pay Systems
(4) Human Relations
To develop relations that encourage teamwork and 
understanding between people ... to provide an 
honest, open communication system that promotes 
a sense of responsibility, pride, satisfaction, and 
recognition for achievement.
The Study Group's first meeting was held on January 29, 
1976. At that time, agreement was reached that the group 
should not focus on union-management distinctions, but in 
stead each committee member should be free to discuss ideas 
freely and openly.
The Group also decided to utilize outside consultants. The 
consultants offered several ideas including the elimination of
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status symbols, the use of people to generate "on the floor 
ideas" and the creation of a formalized system of com 
munication.
From the beginning, the Study Group decided to formally 
communicate with the rank-and-file. The Study Group met 
with groups of 40 employees (management and union) for 
one hour on company time. Each member of the Study 
Group was assigned a specific QWL issue to discuss, with 
sufficient time permitted to allow employees to ask ques 
tions. At the end of the meetings, each employee was asked 
to write down what they liked or disliked about each area of 
discussion. The Study Group concluded that the biggest fear 
the employees had was job security. Finally, the Study 
Group met with the foremen and stewards, since the Group 
believed they were an important communications link to the 
employees.
Minutes of the Study Group's meeting of March 4, 1976, 
indicate that an experimental work redesign project was re 
jected by the employees involved. The department had voted 
to reject a team approach. The minutes of the Study Group 
offer a valuable lesson.
Everyone agreed that the issue was one of security 
and not with the team concept itself . . . everyone 
agreed it was necessary to let the responsibility and 
the vote rest with the turning teams as responsible 
adults.
Thereafter the Study Group formed seven plant subcom 
mittees of 6-12 persons, all volunteers. These committees 
met for one hour, two times per week, for three weeks to 
develop ideas for their immediate work areas. The subcom 
mittee chairpersons received in-house team building training 
while the subcomittee members, stewards, and supervisors 
were briefed on the expected operation of the subcommit 
tees.
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Problems arose in the subcommittees. Several chairper 
sons resigned because of pressures brought by the people in 
their areas. In addition, the skilled trades group dropped out 
and soon thereafter, the first member of the Study Group 
resigned, also as the result of pressures from shop floor.
The Joint Study Group visited other firms, at company ex 
pense, to gain ideas and exposure to other cooperative ven 
tures.
After six months the efforts of the Joint Study Group 
resulted in the following changes:
(1) Elimination of assigned parking
(2) Addition of piped-in music on the shop floor
(3) Installation of clocks on the walls
These minimal changes upset office and staff personnel who 
felt that their status had been reduced in the process. As a 
result, the office bargaining unit successfully negotiated for 
the reinstitution of assigned parking. It was reported that the 
supervisory staff were also sympathetic to the issues raised 
by the office unit.
The Study Group completed its work in early 1977. The 
final product of the group's efforts, dated March 8, 1977, 
was an agreement known as the Experimental Quality of 
Work Life Program (EQWLP).
The Experimental Quality of Work Life Program pledged 
the company and the union to work towards the following 
goals:
(1) To make jobs more meaningful and work more satis 
fying for employees, salaried and hourly, by en 
couraging concepts which allow for direct input by 
employees, thus promoting teamwork, responsibility, 
trust, pride, satisfaction and recognition of achieve 
ment.
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(2) The development of a program that will work 
towards improved productivity, and if increased pro 
ductivity results ways of rewarding employees by 
sharing the benefits of increased productivity will 
become legitimate matters for inclusion in the pro 
gram.
Thus, in spite of previous opposition, the Study Group 
recommended a program that would contain elements such 
as shop floor committees, job redesign, autonomous work 
groups and gainsharing. Employee participation in the pro 
gram was to be voluntary. The decision to participate was to 
be made within designed work groups, with the final decision 
determined by majority rule. After "a fair trial period" any 
group would have been permitted to terminate its program, 
once again by a vote. It should be pointed out that the com 
pany would have been permitted to terminate a group with 
30 days notice.
The EQWLP provided for significant job protection and 
income security provisions. The job protection language was 
explicit.
No worker or groups of workers will lose pay or 
seniority or be laid off from the plant as a direct 
result of this quality of work life experiment con 
ducted in the plant whether they are a participant 
or not.
The company and the union also agreed that an equitable 
means would be found to adjust for employees whose jobs 
would have been made unnecessary or "surplused" as a 
result of the program. An exception to the employment 
security provisions was made for jobs lost as a result of 
adverse business conditions or technological change.
The parties agreed that for each work group that im 
plemented the EQWLP, a method of wage payment be 
found that would provide for ". . . earnings equivalent to 
those previously enjoyed or greater." The provisions of the
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collective bargaining agreement were protected. No activities 
under the program would have been permitted to "con 
travene, change, or otherwise affect any provisions of the 
current collective bargaining agreements ..." without prior 
approval of each party. Each party was given the right to ter 
minate the EQWLP program upon 60 days notice. If this oc 
curred, any provisions previously agreed to would have been 
"contravened," and the pre-program and status quo 
reestablished. Any workplace changes that might have been 
made unilaterally by the company under the collective 
bargaining agreement would be permitted to remain in force 
at the discretion of the management.
The company agreed to pay the principal costs of the pro 
gram. These included (1) provisions for group meetings; 
(2) the services of expert consultants (jointly chosen); (3) the 
conduct of employee meetings on company time; (4) the 
costs of new training programs; and (5) the costs of pro 
viding company information deemed necessary by the Joint 
Study Group.
The Joint Study Group was to oversee the operation of the 
EQWLP. It was to have been a ten-member panel (five union 
and five management members). The union members were 
specified under the agreement as being the
(1) union president;
(2) chairman of the office bargaining committee;
(3) chairman of the factor bargaining committee; and
(4) two other elected union officials selected by the union 
president.
The Joint Study Group was empowered to designate other 
working committees to develop methods for problem resolu 
tion, and to develop additional communication programs to 
further the objectives of the EQWLP. Finally, provisions 
were made to amend the program by mutual agreement.
The EQWLP was defeated by a vote of the union's 
membership—129 in favor, 540 opposed. Three factors help 
to explain the outcome. First, there was a split on the union
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negotiating committee. The local president and several 
members of the bargaining committee were not in agreement 
on the merits of the program. Negotiating committee 
members were not directly involved in the development of 
the EQWLP and there was on-going opposition by various 
groups of workers which tended to influence some commit 
tee members. Second, the EQWLP became intertwined in in 
ternal union politics. The vote on the program came shortly 
before a union election and the opposition used the program 
as a political issue against people who had worked to develop 
the EQWLP. Third, the union reported that many super 
visors, roughly 50 percent of whom had come from the 
bargaining unit, had opposed the program. Supervisors 
feared their jobs would be threatened, and it may be that 
their subtle opposition convinced many employees to oppose 
the program.
The management reported that it had done a poor job sell 
ing the program to supervision, office employees, and the 
rank-and-file. Convincing arguments on the need for this 
type of change were lacking. It was never made clear why 
this particular strategy was selected. It should also be noted 
that the stimulus for change, a difficult economic recession, 
had begun to subside. The job security provisions may not 
have convinced a skeptical workforce that had already seen a 
sizable number of employees lose their jobs to a nonunion 
southern plant that the remaining jobs would be preserved.
Finally, both sides placed considerable responsibility for 
the program's failure on the consultants. According to com 
mittee minutes, both sides seemed to feel that the corporate 
consultant and one of the academic consultants were pushing 
them too fast and that this was causing a great deal of stress.
It was felt that the consultants were not sufficiently ex 
perienced in labor relations, nor did they fully understand 
the internal operations of unions. Evidence that the process 
was moving too fast and was facing demise included: the in-
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itial defeats of an experimental project, the resignation of a 
union steering committee member, and other indicators of 
shop floor opposition that the change process was moving 
faster than political support within the union.
The operation of the program had the potential of offset 
ting hard won contract rights. A majority vote of a work 
group would be needed to implement a change effort. This 
created uncertainty. For example, the collective bargaining 
agreement provided for job assignments based on seniority. 
There was no guarantee that individual worker job rights 
would be preserved if a majority of a work group voted for 
change. There was a fear that people at different pay grades 
would be doing the same job. Other workers feared a loss of 
earnings if the individual incentive system were eliminated, 
in spite of guarantees to the contrary.
This cooperative effort failed for several reasons. There 
was a dispute among the union's leadership as to the merits 
of the program, one leader having resigned from the com 
mittee. Kochan and Dyer have suggested that if coalitions 
develop to block the cooperative venture, gaining an initial 
commitment will be less likely. The evidence from this case 
strongly supports this contention as opposition surfaced 
from several groups including union members of the com 
mittee, supervision, and the office bargaining unit. Second, 
workers were very sensitive to job security issues and will be 
very resistant to change unless this important issue is ad 
dressed in a meaningful way. Third, the process of change 
may have moved too quickly, particularly in view of the op 
position. It may take more than a well-meaning committee to 
reduce years of distrust. Finally, the stimulus for change (the 
recession) subsided with improved economic conditions. 
Again, Kochan and Dyer posit that if the stimulus for change 
lessens, so will the party's desire for change.
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Case Study 10: The Misuse of Gainsharing
This case represents the misuse of gainsharing. The plant 
was composed of four separate operating divisions of a large 
multinational manufacturing corporation. Site 12 (250 in 
direct employees) 8 manufactured gas compressors; Site 13 
(95 indirect employees) manufactured air compressors; Site 
14 (20 indirect employees) manufactured small compressors; 
and Site 15 (23 indirect employees) manufactured valves and 
regulators. Each division was an independent profit center, 
with the division managers reporting to different corporate 
vice-presidents. In spite of the management structure, there 
was only one union representing all the employees and a 
single collective bargaining agreement. There was a centraliz 
ed industrial relations function. In contrast to other com 
panies in this situation, however, there was no single actor 
on site with the authority to settle differences of opinion 
among the division managers.
As a very traditional manufacturing firm, the company 
was highly committed to individual incentive systems. Most 
of the direct labor employees were on Halsey, Rowan, or 
other individual incentives. Indirect workers were paid hour 
ly wages and thus had significantly lower earnings than in 
centive employees. In contract negotiations, the union made 
a strong case for upgrading the pay of indirect employees, 
and management made a commitment to raise the wages of 
this group. Rather than a direct pay increase, management 
proposed, and the union agreed to an Improshare Plan. The 
expectation of the company was that the Improshare Plan 
would help increase employee performance to offset the pay 
increase.
Because of differences in the nature of production, style of 
management, and management preferences in the four 
operating divisions, there were four Improshare Plans. Each 
Plan was composed solely of indirect employees, but the
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Plans were similar in that they were composed of the same 
types of employees (e.g., material handlers) who had pre 
viously received the same wages. The Plans differed in their 
accounting procedures and plan standard (called Base Pro 
ductivity Factor). In most incentive plans, individual, group, 
or plantwide, there is a fairly direct relationship between per 
formance and reward. However, for these groups of indirect 
employees the relationship between effort and reward was 
very tenuous. The individual worker was never able to see 
how his/her efforts related to the earning of a bonus. Fac 
tors such as the level of business activity and the efforts by 
the direct labor force were more likely to influence the earn 
ing of a bonus.
The site utilized two operating committees. The most ac 
tive was the Division Committee, which met on a monthly 
basis. This committee was comprised of the following 
members: the personnel manager; the operations manager 
and the manufacturing manager; one financial analyst and 
one industrial engineer from each division; the union time 
study observer; two bargaining unit members; and the union 
president. There were no provisions in the plans which stated 
the committee's purpose, scope, or authoritative power.
The committee meetings were generally used to discuss 
operational problems. For example, when work was subcon 
tracted between groups, the committee had to decide how to 
account for the effected group's earned hours. The Commit 
tee also monitored the bonus percentages of the groups. This 
might involve comparing the current bonuses with previous 
figures or evaluating various factors that impacted on the 
bonuses.
The union president stated that the meetings were basically 
a "gripe session." Methods, ideas, and/or suggestions 
relating to productivity improvement were never discussed. 
There was general agreement between all of the interviewees
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that the sessions were generally "facts and figures" 
meetings; there was never any constructive discussion of pro 
ductivity issues.
The other operating committee, designed to handle large 
group matters and major problems was the Ad Hoc Commit 
tee. The membership of this committee included: the group 
operations managers, an internal consultant manufacturing 
engineer manager, the director of industrial relations, the 
union president, and the Grievance Committee. The Ad Hoc 
Committee was very active in the developmental stages of the 
plans. Thereafter, it would only convene if a major revision 
was required, such as a change in the time standard, or 
possibly the Base Productivity Factor.
Thus, the Improshare Plan did not provide for employee 
participation. There was no orientation program to acquaint 
employees with the operation of the Plan, nor were there 
Plan documents or an employee handbook to explain the 
operation of the bonus formula. This was unfortunate since 
of the three gainsharing plans—Scanlon, Rucker, and Im 
proshare—the Improshare bonus formula is the most com 
plex and difficult for employees (as well as managers) to 
understand.
Productivity at Site 12 was measured as the ratio of ad 
justed (constant) labor dollars shipped9 and indirect hours 
charged during the period July 1976 - June 1982. Productivi 
ty at Sites 13, 14 and 15 was measured by establishing a rela 
tionship between direct employee labor hours -5- indirect 
employee labor hours worked for the period January 
1977 - July 1982. It was not possible to utilize an output per 
hour measure due to the nature of production and limitation 
in the management information system.
This second measure, while not optimal, was an attempt to 
estimate the productivity of only the indirect employees. If 
productivity of the indirect workers increased, it would re-
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quire fewer hours to service the direct employees. The in 
tervention point was the introduction of the Improshare 
Plan in August 1979.
Employment at Site 12 was measured for the period 
January 1976 - June 1982, while at the other three it was 
analyzed for the period January 1979 - June 1982. The rela 
tionship between the number of indirect employees and 
direct employees at Site 12 was also measured as a ratio for 
the period January 1976 - June 1982. Table 6-12 summarizes 
the statistical analysis of this data and figure 6-6 provides a 
visual examination of the productivity data.
Productivity at Site 12 was unchanged throughout the pro 
ductivity time-series for both level and drift (t = -.41 and 
-.32, respectively, both n.s.). Employment was unchanged 
following the Plan's introduction (t=.18, n.s.). Over time, 
the division's employment was stable (t = -.38, n.s.), while 
the industry showed a downward trend (t = -1.33, n.s.). The 
relationship between the employment levels of indirect and 
direct workers remained unchanged throughout the time- 
series (t= .10 and -.68, n.s.).
Productivity at Site 13 remained initially stable following 
the intervention (t= .32, n.s.). Over time, however, produc 
tivity showed a statistically significant downward trend 
(t = -3.39, p<.001) (see figure 6-7). There was a statistically 
significant increase in the level of employment (t = 2.12, 
p<.05), while the industry suffered a downturn (t = -1.00, 
n.s.). The trend for both the division (t = -.56, n.s.) and in 
dustry employment (t = -.85, n.s.) remained stable.
Site 14's productivity time-series exhibited a downward 
level change following the Plan's introduction (t=-l.ll, 
n.s.) and was generally stable over time (t = -.88, n.s.). The 
division's employment level and trend were stable over the 
time-series (t= .77 and t= .79, both n.s.). Industry employ 





















(N = 72, df=68)
Employment
Employment control 
(N = 78, df=74)
Indirect/direct 
(N = 78, df=74)
Site 13
Productivity 
(N = 79, df=75)
Employment
Employment control 
(N = 40, df=36)
Levei T-Stat Lev Chg T-Stat Drift T-Stat Dft Chg T-Stat
4.70 20.83 -0.09 -0.41 0.03 0.68 -0.02 -0.32
315.07 72.87 5.44 1.26 -1.07 -1.62 -0.37 -0.38
166.64 8.49 3.57 0.18 0.60 0.17 -5.89 -1.33
0.65 47.56 0.00 0.10 -0.00 -0.27 0.00 -0.68
1.15 22.62 0.02 0.32 0.01 2.81 -0.01 -3.39 +
97.02 57.77 3.42 2.12* -0.03 -0.03 -0.63 -0.56
18.77 36.39 -0.46 -1.00 0.08 0.70 -0.10 -0.85
Site 14
Productivity 3.49 12.32 -0.39 -1.11 0.01 1.13 -0.02 -0.88 
(N = 79, df=75)
Employment
Employment control
(N = 40, df=36)
Site 15
Productivity
(N = 79, df=75)
Employment
Employment control
(N = 40, df=36)
*p<.05, + p<.001
22.65 19.25 0.80 0.77 -0.27 -1.06 0.21 0.79
18.77 36.39 -0.46 -1.00 0.08 0.70 -0.10 -0.85
3.15 8.63 -0.34 -0.92 0.04 1.63 -0.09 -2.29*
22.71 97.27 -1.14 -5.55+ 0.21 4.31 -0.22 -4.32 +








(t=-1.00, n.s.), remaining unchanged over time (t = -.85, 
n.s.).
Productivity at Site 15 was initially unchanged (t = -.92, 
n.s.). The trend, though, exhibited a statistically significant 
decrease (t = -2.29, p<.05). Employment suffered a 
statistically significant downturn in both the level and trend 
(t = -5.55 and t = -4.32, both p<.001). At the same time, in 
dustry employment showed an increase in level (t=1.16, 
n.s.). Over time, industry employment experienced a 
downturn (t=-1.09, n.s.), though to a much lesser degree 
than that of the division.
This Improshare Plan did increase employee earnings. Site 
12 paid a bonus 33 out of 35 months and Site 13 earned a 
bonus 27 of 35 months; Site 14 has paid a bonus less often, 
14 of 34 months, but the bonuses have been much larger, for 
example, 5 have been in excess of 25 percent. The largest 
bonuses were paid at Site 15, where 12 of the 28 bonuses paid 
were more than 25 percent. Needless to say, the earning of 
differential bonuses, particularly when it had very little to do 
with indirect employee efforts, caused tension among the 
employees involved.
If the Improshare measure of productivity, that is, the 
bonus formula is examined, then productivity can be con 
sidered to have increased. There is no reason to assume that 
measure is a poor one and several managers interviewed in 
dicated that Improshare provided the first real examination 
of productivity the sites had made. In comparison with 
Scanlon and Rucker measures, it comes closest to a pure out 
put per hour ratio. Yet, because of the quality of the measure 
of productivity at Sites 13-15, it is not possible to conclusive 
ly judge the effectiveness of Improshare.
However, using the productivity data provided by the four 
sites, no immediate change in indirect labor productivity 
could be found. Moreover, at Sites 13 and 15, there was a
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negative trend over time. At Site 13, this can partially be ex 
plained by the introduction of new capital equipment follow 
ing introduction of the Improshare Plan. This reduced the 
number of direct labor employees but increased the number 
of indirect workers required to maintain and service the new 
equipment.
One of the advantages of the Improshare Plan is that the 
bonus measurement system can be adapted for a large group 
of employees, yet need not apply to the entire employee com 
plement as with the Rucker and Scanlon Plan. This was 
demonstrated in this case. However, there were several 
unintended consequences. First, there were differential earn 
ings among groups of employees doing nearly the same 
work. Since it was unclear from the outset what impact in 
direct employees could have on productivity improvement, 
both workers and the management questioned the validity of 
the bonus formula. This problem was further compounded, 
as shown here, by the lack of good quality data to determine 
whether productivity had increased. In fact, no one ever 
knew whether productivity had increased, decreased, or re 
mained the same. One of the most interesting overall find 
ings from this study is that many companies are very poor at 
measuring their own productivity. This caused internal con 
flict within management as several of the divisions put forth 
proposals to modify the bonus formula. Needless to say, the 
union leadership also had internal difficulties in dealing with 
the differential earnings among the four groups of 
employees. The problem became further compounded when 
several employees working in one division were switched into 
another division for bonus calculation purposes only on the 
premise that their efforts primarily benefitted that division.
A strong argument can be made against the institution and 
structure of gainsharing at this site. The plan was for indirect 
employees only, whose efforts could not be clearly attached 
to company performance. There were four plans instead of
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one which would be typical. And there were no internal 
measures of productivity to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
gainsharing arrangement. This should not be considered a 
criticism of Improshare generally. Any form of gainsharing 
would have been inappropriate in this setting. In fact, Im 
proshare is the only gainsharing approach that could have 
been even marginally appropriate in this situation. The 
counter argument to this criticism was put forth by a 
management proponent of the Plan. He took the position 
that since a commitment was made to raise the wages of the 
indirect workforce in negotiations, at the very least Im 
proshare permitted the company to "get something for the 
money."
This position was not shared universally. The labor rela 
tions manager asserted a claim that was made at several 
other research sites as well. He argued that there was an 
over-reliance on the utilization of incentive systems (at this 
company, Halsey, Rowan and Improshare) to manage the 
workforce and facilitate production. Management, he alleg 
ed, relied on the incentive to manage employees, rather than 
supervision. Greater efforts should be made in the direction 
of improved supervisory management, meaningful employee 
involvement, and human resources programs to increase 
employee commitment and motivation.
Conclusions
The ten cases presented serve to highlight the diversity in 
patterns of union-management cooperation and the 
variability of success. The stimulus for cooperation varied. 
In one instance (Case 1), cooperation (Scanlon Plan) occur 
red to save the plant, while in Case 8 (L-MC), it was to save 
large numbers of jobs. Differential outcomes occurred—the 
former was very successful and the latter a dismal failure.
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In Cases 6, 7, and 10 cooperation centered around the in 
troduction of new payment or incentive systems, while in 
three others—3, 4 (to win back concessions), and 5—the 
stimulus was for higher earnings. Thus the traditional union 
goal of higher earnings is very much present in these 
cooperative schemes. It is important to note that in Cases 6 
and 7, very few bonuses were paid and "cooperation" end 
ed. In Case 5, three Scanlon Plans of long duration paid 
large bonuses and this is an important element in their sur 
vival.
At least four cases represent situations in which jobs were 
immediately threatened (Cases 4, 8, and 9) or the plant was 
due to close. This is the greatest threat to the local union and 
its members, as well as to site management. Yet one has to 
question why situations are permitted to deteriorate to crisis 
proportions before adequate attention is paid to resolving 
the problems. Much of this can be explained by the adver 
sary process of collective bargaining which has created a very 
high level of mistrust at the local level. If our industrial rela 
tions institutions are to be proactive rather than reactive, the 
level of mistrust must be reduced. Perhaps the current high 
level of cooperation will push parties in that direction.
In Cases 2 and 9, both plants which were part of the same 
multinational firm attempted to dramatically increase 
employee involvement. In Case 2, involvement was readily 
and overwhelmingly accepted, while in Case 9 involvement 
was resoundingly rejected by a vote of the employees. Case 3 
presents a situation in which the impact of cooperation as 
measured by an improvement in quality and lower 
absenteeism was delayed by several months.
In this research, several measures of the impact of 
cooperation were utilized. They included organizational ef 
fectiveness measures (productivity, as defined by output per 
hour; level of employment; quality, absenteeism, turnover,
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tardiness, and grievances), program duration, and payment 
of bonuses. There are, however, other measures of effec 
tiveness that could have been utilized as well. These include 
unit labor costs; the actual degree of employee involvement; 
employee attitudes toward work; employee mental health 
and safety; the impact of the cooperation on the internal af 
fairs of the union and in its success in representing its 
members in collective bargaining; and the impact of 
cooperation on managerial decisionmaking and the quality 
of those decisions.
Finally, what characteristics separate the successful cases 
from the unsuccessful ones? Although the sample of firms 
was too small for a statistical determination of effectiveness, 
several factors were preliminarily identified. These included: 
type of ownership, technology, age composition of the 
workforce, program implementation strategies (i.e., training 
for supervisors and shop stewards), and the frequency of 
bonus payments. The cases presented in this chapter identify 
other additional factors.
In one case (8), the key management decisionmaker on site 
did not participate. In two others the failure of the key 
manager to involve himself in the cooperative process led to 
the demise of earlier efforts (4 and 9). In two cases (2 and 5), 
there was a strong desire by management for employee par 
ticipation, while in another a structure was put in place for 
participation but very little shop floor decisionmaking was 
permitted (Case 7). Managerial problems unrelated to the 
unionized workforce were present and overcome in one case 
(4), but continued to be a source of frustration in another 
(Case 8). Hence, the attitudes, values, and competence of the 
management have a great deal to do with the success of the 
cooperative effort.
Where expertise is required to assist the parties, particular 
ly in devising bonus formulas, most firms utilized widely
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known and respected consultants. Along the same lines, one 
Labor-Management Committee (Case 4) was assisted by the 
staff of an Area Committee and was very successful, while 
another (Case 8) had no similar support and proved to be 
very unsuccessful.
Questionable practices were associated with the calcula 
tion of bonuses in two cases (6 and 7). The lack of bonus 
earnings combined with the impression of manipulation led 
to termination of the cooperative effort. Few bonuses were 
paid in spite of the fact that there was evidence to suggest 
that productivity had increased.
Several successful cases (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) paid high to 
moderate bonuses, at times equalling as much as 25 percent 
of pay. Yet, most of these firms experienced and survived ex 
tended periods of very limited or no bonuses. Thus payment 
of a bonus is not by itself a sole condition for success. For 
example, in Case 10, large and frequent bonuses were con 
sistently paid, yet there remains some doubt whether such a 
bonus record was justified by the productivity experience in 
this instance.
NOTES
1. Originally there were five categories. Very Positive or Very Negative 
Impact was indicated when the t-statistic measuring the impact of the 
change was significant at the p<.05, p<.01, or p<.001 levels. A 
Positive or Negative Impact was indicated by a t-statistics of ± 1.00, 
while t-statistics of less than ± .99 were classified as no change. The ra 
tionale for doing this stemmed from the small size of the sample, the fact 
that the number of observations in each time-series was roughly 
equivalent, the conservative nature of the time-series test, and the desire 
for preliminary identification of some of the determinants of success.
2. Note that a "Positive Impact" on absenteeism, turnover, tardiness, 
grievances occurred when there was a decrease in rate.
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3. Several of the cases discussed in this section are also presented in a 
recently published paper: M. Schuster, "The Impact of Union- 
Management Cooperation on Productivity and Employment." In 
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, 1983, Vol. 36(3), 415-430.
4. The productivity data could not be statistically analyzed due to the 
manner in which they were provided. Instead, they were examined 
graphically.
5. Supplemental Agreement, p. 30.
6. Ibid., p. 30.
7. All quotations are from the minutes of the meetings of the Union- 
Management Study Group on Productivity and Quality of Worklife. No 
further referencing is provided.
8. Shop floor employees are often classified as direct and indirect 
employees. Direct employees are those who work on the machinery, for 
example, lathe operators. Indirect employees provide a support function, 
for example, material handling or stores.




This chapter presents some of the major findings of the 
research, along with the policy implications from these find 
ings. There are five sections in this chapter. Three corres 
pond to chapters 4, 5, and 6, that is, they address the struc 
ture, process,and impact of union-management cooperation. 
The final two segments identify and discuss the 
methodological findings and discuss future research issues.
The Structure of Cooperation
There were six types of interventions investigated for this 
research. These included three types of gainsharing 
plans—Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare Plans—as well as 
Quality Circles, Labor-Management Committees, and 
Quality of Worklife projects. The results of this analysis are 
reported in detail in chapter 4. Several important findings 
are noted below.
The six interventions vary significantly in their underlying 
philosophy. Scanlon Plans and Quality Circles are based 
upon a more humanistic view of workplace management, 
in contrast to Improshare Plans, which are primarily 
group incentive programs. Rucker Plans are also more 
directly based on economic incentives, but do provide for 
some limited employee participation.
None of these interventions is a substitute for competent 
management, good union-management relations, or
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responsible union leadership. Organizations without these 
ingredients may not be adequately prepared for an exten 
sive organizational change. In these instances, Labor- 
Management Committees are particularly effective at 
changing the industrial relations environment, thereby 
permitting more significant interventions, for example, 
Quality Circles, gainsharing or Quality of Worklife pro 
jects, to be instituted.
If the management of a company is not fully committed to 
employee participation, then implementing involvement 
structures (for example, Quality Circles) mil not lead to 
improved organizational effectiveness. Employee involve 
ment requires that management be willing to relinquish 
some control over workplace behavior. Employees have to 
be trusted to act responsibly and managers must be willing 
to listen to employee ideas.
Supervisors play a key role in improving workplace per 
formance. Unfortunately, the quality of American pro 
duction supervision appears to be mediocre, at best. This 
problem is further compounded by the lack of resources 
firms expend for supervisory training.
The bonus formulas are an excellent means of equitably 
sharing organizational improvements. However, they 
must be developed with great care and caution since they 
are difficult to change once implemented. Consultants 
serve a useful role in developing the formulas. There is one 
caveat. In a workplace environment of great distrust, and 
particularly when no bonus is received, the calculation of 
the bonus each month can be a source of additional 
animosity, as workers question the integrity of the for 
mula and the honesty of management in assembling the 
figures.
The Process of Cooperation
Analysis of the process of cooperation considered the 
means by which the parties changed their relationship. These
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findings are reported in detail in chapter 5. Several general 
conclusions were drawn.
There were a number of reasons for companies and unions 
to enter into a cooperative relationship. These include a 
desire to increase productivity, improve labor- 
management relations, increase wages, and institute a new 
incentive program. In many instances, the initial stimuli 
influenced the choice of intervention. Thus, gainsharing 
programs are likely to be more successful at improving 
productivity than Labor-Management Committees. 
However, L-MCs will likely be a more effective strategy 
for preparing an organization for in-depth change. Addi 
tionally, where the stimulus for a cooperative effort in 
cludes both improvement of productivity and improved 
labor-management relations, a program such as the 
Scanlon Plan can offer a beneficial result even where the 
organization experiences no significant increase in produc 
tivity.
There mil be no cooperation if the traditional collective 
bargaining process is effective at resolving organizational 
difficulties. Companies and unions still prefer to interact 
with one another as they have since the inception of collec 
tive bargaining. At this time, there is very little evidence 
(the popular press notwithstanding) to suggest that a new 
era of union-management relations based upon trust and 
cooperation is on the horizon. Indeed, companies and 
unions will continue to approach industrial relations 
pragmatically and will cooperate only when it is in their in 
terest to do so.
The cooperative process requires neutrals and consulting 
expertise. The parties need the expertise of outsiders to 
assist them in formulating and implementing cooperative 
programs. For example, in this research, Labor- 
Management Committees were far more effective when 
they were guided by the expertise of the staff of Area 
Labor-Management Committees. Expansion of the 
number of Area L-MCs and increasing their resources 
would be very useful and should result in increased union- 
management cooperation and more effective Labor- 
Management Committees.
220 Conclusions
There has been an increasing interest in employee par 
ticipation at the workplace. Although many companies 
and unions are attempting to provide employees with an 
opportunity to influence decisionmaking, there is as yet no 
concrete evidence as to the actual quantity and quality of 
that participation, nor what effect it has on organizational 
effectiveness.
There is still no indication that guarantees of employment 
security will become commonplace in American industrial 
relations. Nearly all firms studied appear to be unwilling 
or unable to guarantee workers a job.
Unions have less confidence in the cooperative process 
than management, which tends to believe it will be likely 
to produce desired organizational results. In addition, 
management also believes that, in practice, there are more 
benefits to be gained through cooperation.
The Impact of Cooperation
There were ten measures of program impact. These were 
level and drift changes in productivity, quality, employment, 
turnover, absenteeism, tardiness, grievances, plus data on 
program survival after two and five years, frequency of 
bonus earnings, and rater effectiveness. There were many 
important results, several of which are highlighted below.
Union-management cooperation can lead to significant 
improvements in productivity. Of 23 sites, productivity 
improved in 11 and was unchanged in 10. Thus, it appears 
that companies and unions have very little to risk and 
much to gain from a cooperative venture. In 16 of 23 firms 
bonuses were paid to employees more than 50 percent of 
the time. This indicates that unions can supplement wage 
gains from collective bargaining through union- 
management cooperation and gainsharing.
Employment tends to be more influenced by general in 
dustry conditions than by any other factor. Thus, employ 
ment at firms with cooperative programs frequently tends
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to follow the industry trend. However, there were in 
stances where industry employment dropped and the site 
remained stable. Several companies claimed that the 
cooperative effort had helped them to be more cost com 
petitive. This permitted the plants to acquire a greater 
share of the available business, thereby helping to stabilize 
employment.
Labor-management relations can be significantly improv 
ed through union-management cooperation. In the vast 
majority of cases, union-management relations were im 
proved. Greater trust and confidence were established, 
and more frequent and substantive problemsolving in 
teraction occurred. In many cases, both union and 
management respondents reported that a new perspective 
on their relationship had developed.
Data are still too preliminary to determine the factors 
which influence success and failure in cooperative ven 
tures. However, there is some support for the factors 
outlined in chapter 2 (employment security, employee 
involvement, plantwide compensation distributed on a 
monthly basis, an effective acceptance strategy, and 
technology) as well as others that were identified in the 
case analysis presented in chapter 5. Further research is re 
quired in order to create a sufficiently large sample to con 
duct such an analysis.
Methodological Findings
Previous research on union-management cooperation has 
been severely criticized on methodological grounds. One of 
the major goals of this study was to further develop and 
refine strategies for studying cooperation and change in 
unionized settings. These observations are the result of the 
field work conducted during this study and ongoing 
monitoring of the cooperative union-management and quali 
ty of worklife literature.
A program evaluation approach can be utilized to study 
cooperative union-management strategies. Union-
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management cooperation can be studied in the same man 
ner as other interventions. Thus the strategies, techniques, 
and procedures utilized by evaluation researchers become 
appropriate. Industrial relations researchers can adapt the 
rich body of evaluation literature to study interventions 
such as labor-management committees, quality of 
worklife programs, and gainsharing. Well-designed case 
studies are likely to provide the best method for studying 
cooperative programs.
Evaluations of cooperation and change should be 
longitudinal and include performance measures of effec 
tiveness both before and after the introduction of the pro 
gram. Studies conducted over short time frames do not ad 
dress the process and impact of change when the newness 
and excitement of the "experiment" have worn. There has 
been too much research emphasis on attitudes toward 
cooperation and descriptive studies of the cooperative pro 
cess and only a small number of studies have examined the 
"before and after" effects of cooperation. Thus, what is 
needed are studies conducted over an extended time 
frame, using measures such as output per hour, scrap 
rates, unexcused absences, etc., with pre- and post-change 
data being analyzed.
There is a need to study unsuccessful cases. There are very 
few studies of failure in union-management cooperation. 
Yet, there is general agreement that many experiments 
fail. Little is known of the dynamics that result in failure. 
Much could be learned and transmitted to other bargain 
ing relationships from the study of unsuccessful cases. Un 
fortunately, unsuccessful cases are generally more difficult 
to locate and it is often difficult to get the participants to 
discuss their experiences.
It is very difficult to get company and union represen 
tatives to participate in field studies of the cooperative 
process. There is a fear that the introduction of a resear 




An outcome of this research has been to identify seven 
areas for further investigation. The seven are:
(1) Investigation of additional research sites;
(2) Continued analysis of selected sites, including sites 
where cooperation has ended;
(3) Study of additional forms of union-management 
cooperation;
(4) Study of worker-management cooperation in non 
union firms;
(5) Addition of attitudinal variables;
(6) Analysis of the calculation of the bonus formulas used 
in gainsharing plans;
(7) Improving the research design and analytical tech 
niques over previous research.
Investigation of Additional 
Research Sites
There is a need to continue to build the size of the sample 
of interventions. The current sample of 38 remains too small 
to permit an in-depth evaluation of the determinants of suc 
cess and failure. Increasing the sample size would permit 
cross-sectional analysis of variables such as employee com 
position, type of interventions, employee participation, 
technology, and size, frequency and amount of bonus 
payments.
Continued Analysis of Selected 
Sites Including Those 
Where Cooperation has Ended
The initial post-intervention time frame of two to three 
years of analysis should be expanded to at least five. In this 
way it will be possible to determine whether the impact was 
long term rather than temporary, and whether cooperation 
has survived some natural occurrences, for example,
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negotiation of a new contract, union elections, change of 
plant management, and economic downturn.
Additionally, cooperation at several sites has ended. It 
would be very interesting, and important, to study the per 
formance of the firm and union-management relations dur 
ing the post-cooperation period.
Study of Additional Forms 
of Union-Management Cooperation
There has been a significant increase in the use of Quality 
Circles. The Circles have become pervasive not only in the 
private sector, but also in hospitals and the public sector. 
Very little evaluation research of the impact of these pro 
grams has occurred.
Another form of cooperation where research has been 
limited has been profit-sharing plans. The popular press has 
reported an increase in profit-sharing plans. These plans 
closely resemble gainsharing except that they utilize a global 
measure of organizational performance rather than produc 
tivity. A methodology similar to the one used in this research 
would be appropriate for assessing the impact of Quality 
Circles and profit sharing.
Study of Worker-Management 
Cooperation in Nonunion Firms
Although not a major direction of the research, five non 
union firms with cooperative experiments similar to those in 
unionized firms participated in this research. Further in 
vestigation of these plans would make it possible to draw 
some conclusions about the differences and similarities be 
tween union and nonunion firms.
Addition of Attitudinal Variables
It is important to determine which attitudinal constructs 
best explain employee motivation to improve productivity 
and increase effectiveness in the cooperative endeavors. Ex-
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pectancy, equity, and commitment models have been offered 
as possibilities. However, data to substantiate any construct 
do not exist at this time. This area should be given priority 
consideration in future research.
Analysis of the Calculation of Bonus 
Formulas in Gainsharing Plans
One common question frequently posed by management 
and union respondents dealt with the bonus formula 
measurement. In essence, many respondents wanted to know 
what the results would have been if another bonus formula 
had been utilized. In this research there was one site with a 
Rucker Plan which provided sufficient data to simulate the 
Scanlon Plan bonus formula. Wide differences in payouts 
occurred. At the present time this evidence is preliminary 
and further investigation at more sites is needed.
Improving the Research Design 
and Analytical Techniques
One goal of this research was to develop the 
methodological techniques to scientifically evaluate ex 
periments in productivity improvements and union- 
management cooperation. The extensive findings from this 
aspect of the study are presented in chapter 3. In particular, 
better software packages for time-series impact assessment 
have recently become available. Also, extending the length 
of the time-series would enable investigators to better fit 
time-series (ARIMA) statistical models.
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